

# ***The Israeli—Arab Conflict: Towards a Socialist Solution***<sup>1</sup>

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The focus of this paper is the nature of the relationship between Arabs and Jews and the Arab attitude towards Jews in Palestine, based on a scenario of a real and genuine peace. We, do not intend to retrace history to cite the Arab treatment of Jews for the following reasons:

2. First: The relationship between Arabs and Jews, especially the fair treatment Jews received in the Arab Homeland and Andalucia, took place under different social—economic formations and historical eras. The focus of this paper, is to assess the potential future Arab—Jewish relations isolated from the past, despite the fact that the past has been a 'credit' for Arabs.

3. Second: The Arab—Israeli conflict was never been a conflict between two races or religions. It is, objectively, between the Arab nationalist project for development and unity on the one hand, and the capitalist imperialist—Zionist alliance on the other.

4. Third: Within the context of this analysis, the Arab—Israeli conflict is discussed with the purpose of proposing a solution that culminates in socialism.

5. Therefore, this paper is an attempt to provide an answer for the future of a Jewish minority in the Arab Homeland<sup>2</sup>. It also intends to propose to the Jews in Israel and to convince them that their position in the Arab Homeland will be established on the basis of equality with Arabs. Perhaps Jews, or some of them, wish to remain privileged with superiority over the Arabs. This status can be sustained under *only* the current imperialistic/comprador solution of the Oslo Accords, but would not be feasible or tolerated by the Arab populace regardless of what kind of oppressive and distorted leadership that they must endure. We are, therefore, and without any doubt, addressing the future and

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<sup>1</sup> Parts of this paper and some of the basic concepts were published previously in another article titled: "Peace for Jews in a United Socialist Arab State". The core concept of that article was that the the Arab comprador ruling classes can guarantee the security for the Ashkenazi state of Israel. However, peace for Jews may be achieved only in a united socialist Arab state. See "Epidemic of Globalization: World Order, Zionism and Arab Nation" by Adel Samara, Chapter Four, pp. 86-112. Palestine Research and Publishing Foundation, USA, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Arab Homeland: This term refers to all Arab countries. It deliberately rejects the incorrect and imposed term the 'Arab World'. We understand the Arab World as those Arab countries (in Arabic aqtar) that are neighboring countries but not necessarily one nation. Arab World is a colonial term that was coined to negate Arab nationalism through a gradual and long-term re-education process of Arabs themselves that they are not one nation, rather several ones. By using the term 'Arab Homeland', the authors confirm that it is the adequate and proper term: the one that is reflective of the aspirations and the interests of Arabs. While colonialists and imperialists (mainly British) invented the term "Arab World", they later proceeded to fabricate other deformed terms for the Arab Homeland such as the "Middle East" and "North Africa".

possible solutions, which no one can speculatively ascertain, but can be realized on a humanistic basis.

## II. THE ENEMY WE CONFRONT: DEFINING THE 'OTHER'

6. It is presumed that our presentation deals with the relationship with the Zionist Israeli enemy, the 'other'. Contrary to what has been referred to by many as the 'other', we don't see this 'other' among Israeli Jews as a group. Conversely, we don't perceive it as restricted to the Zionist majority among these Jews. Nor do we view the entire Israeli left, albeit too small, as being outside the Zionist realm. We also don't consider all Sephardic Jews as part of the 'other', the enemy, despite the hegemony of extremist right wing, which is dominated and supported by Sephardic Jews. More importantly, we don't see the 'other' as being restricted to the borders of 1948 Palestine (historic Palestine before the Zionist occupation in 1948).

7. The discussion still rages on heatedly within our own Palestinian society, as well as within the Arab nation, over the structural fabric of the Israeli society. Is it a nation? Is it a national identity? For a community of people to become a nation and/or an identifiable national entity, it is not necessary for this community to evolve through the natural process that is imposed by the passage of many centuries. If defining modern nations assumes that they must have passed through the pre—capitalist era of development, the creation of a common market, language and culture, we then find that these attributes are not rife among the Jews in Israel as an artificially and newly created state during capitalism in its imperialist era. However, Israel's evolution of its capitalist and historical development was forced through an accelerated process that makes its superficiality and artificiality very clear.

8. Nations are not measured or solely recognized by virtue of the length of their existence. There are old nations such as the Arab nation, or new nations such as the American nation, or those small African nations that are evolving before our very eyes.

9. We believe that our criteria ought to be focused on Israel's role and the Zionist ideology and project and should not be based on the limits of its social maturity or its transformation to a 'nation'. Our acknowledgment of its national evolution or societal development or the lack of it does not change our position towards it as a 'pure Jewish state', the liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian right of return (ROR). Recognizing the American nation, for instance, does not negate the fact that we consider the US capitalist and imperialist regime a brutal one that wreak pain and havoc on many peoples throughout the world. It is a regime that has exploited many peoples and impeded their development, progress and democratization. Israel's progression toward nationhood does not mean that the struggle against it, as an imperialist base, should in anyway cease. We must not forget that most wars occur among 'competing' nationalisms.

10. In light of the above, the 'other' is not meant in neighborly terms, (i.e. willing to live side by side with them), but rather an enemy with whom we have an intense ongoing struggle, an enemy that hinders our progress, usurps our land and stunts our ability to develop. This sheds more light on our discussion. The 'other' indeed includes the capitalist—imperialist—Zionist camp as well as its Arab comprador collaborators aided by few Arab and Jewish neo—liberal intellectuals. This 'other' clearly declares its identity as

different 'other' in the regional context. Therefore, the 'other' also includes all Zionist Israeli Jews, indeed all Jews who do not believe in the Palestinians' right of return to their ancestral homeland. Here, it is imperative to expose those Jewish leftists, whom we have welcomed into our midst, with whom the 'Palestinian left' is so enamored, and who does not support our struggle. Historically, this 'Israeli left' has treated its Palestinian counterpart condescendingly. On the other side, Palestinians are forever grateful for the generosity of 'Jewish left' for actually lowering their Jewish elitism for the occasional courtship. Ironically, you will not find too many Sephardim (also known as Sephardic or Arab Jews) among this left. Many of these Sephardim consider themselves, culturally at least, Arabs.<sup>3</sup>

11. The factors at play in determining the identity of the 'other' are: ideology, interest and role and not ethnicity, nationality, religion or the level of development. Here, it becomes clear that it is the role that Israel plays in the grand colonial— imperialist scheme that determines who is this 'other'. It also becomes more clear how integrated are the interests of the western imperialist regimes with those of the Zionist 'other'. It is only natural, therefore, that those Arabs whose interests are in tandem with those of the imperialist—Zionist camp, are counted among this 'other', regardless of their language or ethnicity. Unless we are willing and ready to conduct our critique on this basis, we will continue to run aimlessly in a vicious circle without ever arriving at determining our identity or goals, and will be condemned to inactivity and lack of relevant productivity.

### III. SOME DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 'OTHER'

12. While Israel is one of the expressions of white settler colonialism, it differs from others such as those in Australia, Canada, the USA, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Of course, all these colonialist expressions share several commonalities such as racism and total confiscation of land and resources that belong to the natives, both necessary for a settler—colonialism to succeed.

13. Israel is different in many aspects. One of them is that it has come late into the 'Cycle of the Global White Settler—Colonialist Movement'. The Zionist settler campaign came in the 20th century, while other white settlers in North America, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand took place some centuries earlier. The first attempt for Zionism to establish settler colonialism in Palestine in the 1860s failed. The Zionist colonization of Palestine and the establishment of the Zionist entity—Israel, however, succeeded only in the aftermath of World War II.

14. Other fundamental differences between Israel and the other settler—colonialists is that each settler—colonial case has had its own 'motherland'. This 'motherland', in the case of North American and Australian settlers, was, to a large extent, British. For the Zionists, the motherland is viewed as the entire western capitalist center — the entire capitalist map. Within this mosaic, there is what is loosely referred to as 'Financial Israel', as represented by strong Jewish banking influence in the United States, which in turn, is expressed through political and social clout. There is also the 'Demographic Israel', dependent on world Jewry most recently from the former Soviet Union. Conversely, the Palestinians were

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<sup>3</sup> See Ella Shohat, Mizrahim In Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims, in *News from Within* vol XIII no 1 January 1997, p.p. 29-49.

differentiable by Palestine's Arab depth, which allowed them the benefit of geographical national refuge and demographic depth in ways that maintained the Palestinian struggle, as was the case of American and Australian natives for instance. This Arab dimension, gave the Palestinians a margin of support for waging a struggle to recover what has been lost. This same Arab depth, challenges the various and continuous plans to settle the Palestinian refugees far from the borders of Palestine, especially in Iraq and Syria.<sup>4</sup>

15. The Zionist occupation and settlement in Palestine wasn't merely a result of the Nazi crimes. The issue predates and is certainly more complicated than that event. The real target of Jewish settlement in Palestine was to create a capitalist Ghetto, inhabited by Jews. The role of this 'capitalist Ghetto' was designed to maintain the world capitalist system and enable it to dominate the Arab Homeland. Therefore, this capitalist ghetto, one must conclude, was intended to be a permanent enmity with the region in which it was implanted. Theodore Herzl, the father of political Zionism wrote: "The Jewish State will be a barrier between Eastern barbarism and the Western civilization".

16. It is important to note that Herzl adopted this issue and further developed it from the early speeches of imperialist strategists. This, further, emphasizes that western capitalism, for reasons of its own interest, grasped the myth of the 'promised land', and 'put it to work' within a strategic project: the Jewish state in Palestine. This goes to remind us how easy capitalism utilizes religion and biblical claims. Napoleon Bonaparte of France called upon the Jews to settle in Palestine. Lord Palmerstone, the British Secretary of State in 1840, called for the same goal. This is the reason why the secular Zionist ideology and project in Palestine has nothing in reality and practicality to do with religion. Since its creation in Palestine, this entity has been a strategic 'investment' in the Arab Homeland.

#### **IV. LOCAL ALLIES AND IMPOSED NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL**

17. It wasn't an easy mission for imperialism and Zionism to create an aggressive entity in Palestine without having internal Arab allies. This unholy alliance was needed in two periods: (1) at the inception of the imperialist—Zionist project and (2) at present, the stage of its maintenance and sustenance. The Arab allies were and still are the ruling classes in the Arab Homeland. This alliance, between imperialism and Zionism on the one hand, and between those forces and each Arab ruling class on the other, did in fact benefit all involved parties. The imperialists/Zionists offered the Arab rulers protection against their own peoples. These Arab rulers, were and still are, launching an ongoing civil war against their popular masses. This 'civil war', that perpetuates dependency, dictatorships and underdevelopment, represents an attrition war against the Arab nationalist movement hindering the realization of its main goals of Arab unity, liberation of Palestine, and development. In other words, the Arab ruling classes are buffer zones between Arab popular classes and their goals. They are the enemies of their own nation. The antagonistic nature of Arab regimes with national goals made any compromise between the revolutionary movement and the regimes impossible. The relationship between the rulers

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<sup>4</sup> The Zionists aim was to force the Palestinian refugees to settle far from Palestine's borders, e.g. to Syria and Iraq. However, neither the rulers of these two Arab countries, nor of any Arab country accepted that. The only exception was the military regime of General Husni Al-Zaa'im in Syria who tried that, but finally failed. See Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim" and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria, *Middle East Focus* 9 no 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 26-31.

and the ruled is that of antagonism: 'to be or not to be'. Based on this alliance with imperialism, both Israel and the Arab dependent regimes, for their sustenance and survival, needed the continuous support of imperialism in various forms. One of these forms is the direct imperialist aggression against Arab national regimes or nationalist movements when the balance of power, inside one or more Arab countries, started shifting against the imperialist allies. The French, British and Zionist (Tripartite) aggression against Egypt 1956, the Israeli aggression 1967, the US led aggression against Iraq 1991 are all direct proofs of this. This series of continuous abortive attempts of Arab liberation, unity, and development in our region led to the loss of a whole century of transition, the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This very long transitional period did not lead to developing either capitalist or socialist formations.

18. During this period and under these circumstances, the parties which 'developed' themselves and benefited were the two foreign allies of the Arab dependent regimes: the capitalists—imperialists (who gained enormous profits) and the Zionist entity (which benefited and developed itself). The benefits to the region's enemies, however, were not limited to diplomatic and economic relationship between Arab rulers and Israel. These enemies wanted to be accepted *as they are* and be warmly welcomed by the Arab nation. The Zionists, imperialists and the Arab ruling dependent regimes, are working on a political and cultural re—education<sup>5</sup> of the Arab popular classes to normalize relations with Israel. Once this goal is accomplished, the economic normalization will follow easily. If this were to happen, any development in the Arab Homeland will be totally blocked.

19. Rejecting normalization is Israel's 'soft spot'. The experiences of the Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab people show that their attitude toward Israel is still firm. Mass demonstrations that took in many Arab countries in support of the Palestinian *intifada 2000*, revealed that the Arab nation opposes normalization with Israel. Therefore, the ball is now in the enemy's court to either make a compromise that might be 'accepted' by the Arab popular classes, or to split the nation, or to impose the normalization solution upon the people against their will. It is evident that, in either case, the masses will resist and oppose the official position of the Arab regimes as the case has always been.

20. However, this is not sufficient and constitutes only half of the equation. The second half is that the popular classes must formulate a new approach to totally de—link themselves from the regimes. For the popular classes to achieve this de—linking, they must develop a new national liberation movement. The prerequisite for this must be the de—linking with most of the traditional national liberation leadership and same leadership that internalizes the defeat.

21. This people's struggle will aggravate the crisis the western capitalist center whose main interest is to impose the 'liberalization of trade over the entire region. Liberalization of trade requires an area, or even the world, with no 'tension', i.e. a world with no popular resistance to capitalist exploitation. In other words, while capital is in a continuous class re—ordering, its interest and plan are to prevent the oppressed and exploited classes from

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<sup>5</sup> Re-education: The imperialist capitalist center, with the assistance and through some foreign, local agents and some international financial institutions (such as the World Bank, IMF..) attempt to 're-educate' the people to accept 'new' values, habits, and culture that contradict their own and that are inconsistent with their beliefs. The aim of this re-education is to demoralize and weaken people's spirit of resistance and revolution on one hand, and to implant selfish values of consumerism, free market, and internalization of defeat (IOD) on the other

the same. One might ask here, where is the interest of the Jewish people in this mixed official and popular national and class conflict? Is the mission of change in the region limited to the Arab peoples? This takes us to the discussion of other related issues.

## V. THE ZIONIST—ISRAELI ENTITY: MORE THAN A SETTLER COLONIAL PROJECT

22. The settler nature of the Zionist entity, and the success of its Ashkenazi ruling elite in incorporating all the settler Jewish social classes into its aggressive project—Israel, made the Jewish society relatively impotent to generate progressive forces. The Jewish people in Palestine occupy the Palestinian land, exploit the Palestinians as a cheap labor...etc, but, this is not the whole picture. Other components of the social fabric of the Zionist project deserve to be discussed.

### 1. THE LEFT IN ISRAEL

23. Until today, the relationship between the Arab left and Jewish—Israeli left (Israeli left) has never been placed into its proper context. Based on its position from the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, the Israeli left is a colonial left. The Israeli left that recognizes the legitimacy of the State of Israel as settler—colonial state and a watchdog for imperialism in the region, in fact plays in the hands of imperialism and Zionism. This left pretends that it is non—Zionist which is different from being against or anti—Zionist. For a political party to be anti—Zionist, it must be opposed to the Zionist ideology and its state should be illegitimate. In reality, we found that all Israeli leftist political parties and organizations base their analysis and position on the *de facto* and *de jure* acceptance of the Zionist settler state.

24. In the case of Israel, it is not enough for the left to abandon the Zionist ideology, or to be an opposition to the capitalist system, i.e. it is not enough for it to declare itself a Marxist, just of any kind. This Marxism must lead the left to oppose the very existence of a Zionist Ashkenazi settler entity. Unfortunately, this was never the case. The Israeli left is relatively monopolized by the Ashkenazi Jewish ethnicity and it is a left that inherited the Zionist racist ideology.

25. This might raise a question of why did not the Ashknazi leadership of the Israeli left, (i.e. the Israeli Communist Party), recruit Eastern Jews, the Sephardim<sup>6</sup> as the poorer Jewish ethnicity to be its base, and concentrated on the Palestinian Arabs who are living under the Zionist entity? If the answer is because Arabs, as a race, are more inclined to socialism then this is no more than a racist response. Part of the answer is that because the Arabs, are the most oppressed nationality in the Zionist entity, and because the Israeli Communist Party and some other smaller leftist groups were the only Jewish political parties which consider themselves non—Zionist. The Arabs who live under the Zionist entity<sup>7</sup> (also known as 1948 Arabs) were never permitted or given the right to form and

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<sup>6</sup> While Spheradi Jews constitute nearly 20 percent of all Jews in the world, their percentage in Israel approaches 43 percent. Along the with the Palestinians Arabs, both constitute nearly two thirds of the total population of Israel.

<sup>7</sup> The Palestinians who remaind in Palestine after the Zionist occupation in 1948 and continue to live under the Israeli rule were given several naems. Many call them the Israeli Arabs or the Israeli Palestinians. In this paper we interchangeably use the terms 1948-Palestinians or the 1948-Arab Palestinians or Arabs to avoid confusion, indicati their geography, and

organize their own national political parties. The poorly educated Eastern Jews were pleased that they, as Arab Jews, were treated by the Zionists as an upper class, over the Palestinian Arabs. The Ashkenazi left never cared about educating Eastern Jews, hence there were targeted by the Israeli right wing, which used them to seize power in the 1977 Israeli elections.

26. The important lesson here is that, the 1948 Palestinian communists in Israel and most of the Arab left that recognized Israel are non—nationalist and revisionist communists. The 'Israeli left' and the leftist Jews have consistently supported the Ashkenazi entity and, therefore, became more Zionists than communists. If this is the case, the 'Israeli left' is more Zionist than a communist, then its relations with the Arab left is in the service of Zionism. This relation has reduced the radicalism of the Arab left and distanced it from the struggle for the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. For Zionism, this form of the 'Arab left' is 'acceptable' so long as it does not practice any real class struggle. This inability is due to an 'absolute' poverty of working class consciousness. Additionally, the opportunistic attitude towards the Ashkenazi state is not limited to the Israeli left, the international left falls into the same trap.

27. There are two main criteria to judge a leftist attitude towards the settler state, the Zionist entity. The first, is to examine the creation of a settler, capitalist and racist entity through a communist understanding and approach to World Order. For a communist, the World capitalist order is the enemy of socialism, liberation movements and development of the countries of the periphery (COP). Following the 1920s, most of the two currents of the socialist movement, the social democracy and communist parties, supported the Zionist movement. Some of them invented the term 'positive colonialism'.<sup>8</sup> This position goes for the Soviet Union, that recognized Israel despite the fact that it was supported openly by the imperialist capitalist center.

28. The second criterion is to examine Israel according to the writings of the founders of Marxism. Marx, Lenin and Kautsky took a firm position against the pretence that there is any national or religious Jewish question. Their analysis of the Jewish question was a class analysis. The Zionist state, as an idea and a project, has been supported by the capitalists, socialists, even communists (for a certain period), most of the Christian churches, and certainly by the Jewish clergy. The proper explanation for this support lies in the fact, that the capitalist order created and continue to supports Israel. This uncovers the deep contradiction and crisis of the Israeli left. It is a contradiction because this left received its legitimacy, as a political movement, from a state that is created by the capitalist center. It is also a crisis because it is working in a settler social formation, that does not provide the proper environment for class struggle.

29. Based on the nature of the Israeli Zionist racist formation, the rise of a popular alternative would be expected, but still is not accomplished, from the Arab side. One of the reasons why it was never accomplished, is that large factions of the Arab left were dependent on the Soviet revisionism. This dependent attitude led this part of the Arab left to deal with Israel and the Israeli left from a position of inferiority. While, some of the

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differentiate them geographically from other Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or those who live in Arab countries or other parts of the world.

<sup>8</sup> Regarding "Positive Colonialism" See Paul Kelemen, *Zionism and the British labor Party in Palestine 1917-1939*. Published in *Kana'n* no 72 in January 1996, pp. 57-66.

aforementioned objections were raised within the Arab left, the majority of the left never raised these debatable issues in the open or in the course of self—criticism. Even the part of the Arab left, (especially the Palestinian) that renegaded from Marxism following the collapse of the Soviet Union, did not re—assess its conceptualization of these issues. It become, directly or indirectly, part of the false ‘peace’ process and ‘turned its back’ to its own history. This explains the total absence of their literature on these issues and when that literature is scarcely available, it is void of the leftist discourse and even of the terminology.

30. Another obstacle facing the new alternative Marxist analysis and attitude towards the Zionist entity is the fact that many leftists, Marxist and communist Arab parties and organizations, sank in the crisis of the world left. They are not only in crisis of not re—assessing their own experience, but also because they proved to the counter—revolution, the capitalist and globalization, that they were never genuine and committed Marxists in the first place. The long passive experience of the Arab left that recognized the Zionist state, facilitates the mission of the Arab dependent bourgeoisie in fighting communism for the sake of imperialism. This, despite the fact that the dependent Arab bourgeoisie supported the creation of Israel, and still hinder all popular initiatives in the struggle against it.<sup>9</sup> It is only recently that the Arab comprador declared their true attitude towards Israel and their secret relationship with it. In their recognition of the Zionist entity, communists followed a wrong line of analysis, whether it was motivated by good will or by backward class and communist consciousness. However, the Arab comprador followed clearly its class interests as dependent on the imperialist capitalist West. When Arabs and Palestinians all shades of the political spectrum recognized Israel, they failed to acknowledge and see the suffering of throughout a prolonged ‘holocaust’ that lasted more than one century. The Arab comprador, which recognized the Zionist entity through ‘integration through domination’ (ITD)<sup>10</sup>, is blocking the struggle of the Palestinian people struggle to end that suffering.

## 2. ISRAEL: THE FIRST THEOLOGICAL STATE

31. The left and secular people, worldwide, failed to observe that the Ashkenazi state is the first state in modern history that is based on religious claims: on the myth that God granted the ‘chosen people of Israel’ the ‘promised land’ of the Palestinians. Who knows whether these are the ‘words’ of the Old Testament and why would God give ‘certain people’ the land of ‘another’? Israel is the first theological state. The question is why does Zionism and the Zionist state behave as a secular movement towards the outside world, while inside Israel, it acts as a religious state, a state for Jews only? While it is true that the main component of the Zionist project and ideology is its capitalist nature, the Ashkenazi state—Israel did not behave as a true secular regime. This false secularism paved the way for the very creation of the fanatic Israeli right wing parties, especially *Shas* and those in the WBG

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<sup>9</sup> Arab reactionary regimes facilitated the immigration of the Arab Jews as settlers to Palestine especially between the years 1948-1952, thus providing the Zionist entity with its most essential needs: cheap labor and soldiers.

<sup>10</sup> Integration Through Domination (ITD): This term refers to Israeli attempts and efforts to forcefully integrate itself into the Arab Homeland, but on its own terms and conditions. Supported by US imperialism and other imperialist countries, Israel continuously tries to “eliminate tension” in the region through subjugating the Arab nation by force to the *level of no resistance*. ITD practically means that the Arab nation will accept Israel as a “normal” state in the region. Israeli products will be marketed freely and Israel will be the industrial and financial center of the region. It will have the upper hand in the military power as well. In other words, Israel will be accepted as a “capitalist center for the Arab periphery”.



settlements. Zionism, as a settler ideology, considers land one of its main cornerstones. In this context, it exploits the myth of the 'promised land', to use the Jewish religion in the service of its capitalist project. The question of whether Zionism is a secular ideology, is meaningless because what is more important is that Zionism acts in a dual fashion, secular and religious, depending on the needs of its settler project.

32. The Zionist Ashkenazi state behaves practically as a theological state. At the entrance of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, the following is written: 'the parliament of the state of Jews'. All members of this parliament, including the Palestinian Arabs, have to take the oath of allegiance and commit loyalty to the Jewish state. This reminds us of two forms of world hypocrisy. The first is the formal one that many regimes, especially those of the West, that attack the new Islamic states in Iran and Sudan, and do say a word about the first religious state in modern history: the Zionist entity—Israel. The second is the hypocrisy of many circles in the international left and academia that, on one hand, criticize the new Political Islamic (PI) movement accusing it of being either fundamentalist or terrorist, while on the other hand says nothing about or against Jewish fundamentalism, and even the new fundamentalist Christians in the West, especially the Evangelists in the United States. In fact, the Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine is to a large extent a response or reaction to Jewish fundamentalism.

### 3. THE EASTERN JEWS

33. Eastern Jews, (the Jewish settlers who came to Palestine from Arab and Islamic countries) constitute nearly half of the population of the Zionist entity. In comparison to the Ashkenazi, they are considered the lower class, the second degree citizens. Yet Eastern Jews are considered superior to the Palestinian Arab national minority inside Israel, and certainly superior to the Palestinian workers of the WBG who work in Israel.<sup>11</sup> In the last ten years, the status of these Eastern Jews has deteriorated due to the import of approximately one million new settlers, mainly from the former Soviet Union. These new white settlers were well—educated professionals and therefore gained a superior status over the Eastern Jews. The problem that resulted was one of class and not of ethnic or cultural distinction or discrimination. The Eastern Jews blame the Israeli regime for this discrimination. The other reason behind the deterioration of the status of the Eastern Jews, is the fast integration of the Zionist state into the global economy. Eastern Jews work mostly in traditional economic sectors and therefore, they are not prepared to compete in the information and hi—technology sectors.

34. Another main and important aspect is the Zionist integration into the process of 'peace for capital'<sup>12</sup> in the region. This peace enables Israeli companies to relocate to, and do

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<sup>11</sup> In this context, Yacov Ben Efrat wrote: "the developments have left behind another group that has long suffered from discrimination: the Mizrahi Jews. Class differences have grown. An Ashkenazi worker today earns 1.5 times more than a Mizrahi and twice as much as an Arab. " (When America Stumbles, Israel falls, in *Challenge*, March-April 2001, no 66, p 17.)

<sup>12</sup> Peace for Capital: Several peace agreements have been signed between some Arab regimes, especially the PLO leadership (later the Palestinian Authority), and Israel. The experience shows that this peace has, indeed, taken place among the capitalist classes in the western capitalist center, especially USA and Europe, Israeli capitalist ruling class, and the Arab capitalist regimes in the periphery. The main goal of this peace was to maintain and accelerate the capitalist slogan: "The liberalization of trade on the World scale". The experience in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG) also shows that those who benefited from this peace were the capitalist hierarchy starting from its center in the USA to the

business in, Egypt and Jordan. Most of the Jewish workers who were laid off by the Israeli factories in the 1990s, which relocated to Jordan and Egypt were Eastern Jews. The Palestinians in Israel represented the remainder of the laid off workers. The level of class consciousness of the Eastern Jews and the Palestinians, is low. Both classes are divided according to their respective national ethnic backgrounds. They are divided into a lower status, the case of the settler working class on the one hand, and the oppressed Palestinian worker who faces combined class and ethnic oppression, on the other. Despite that, the two communities are still too weak to start a social 'class' alliance against their joint class enemy, the Ashkenazi settler capitalism. The Eastern Jews are not satisfied with the terms of the Oslo peace process. This is not because they consider it 'peace for capital' or because they are in favor of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The reason is, that the Eastern Jews believe that this peace will give the poorer Arab workers access to compete with them for jobs, whether inside the Zionist entity or when some Israeli companies relocate to Arab countries. All this is indicative of how capital is dominating labor in the region.

35. In such circumstances, one may understand why Eastern Jews are attracted by the most right wing and reactionary Jewish institutions: the army and the fundamentalist political parties. This deepens the schisms among their culture, which is Arabic, their social status, as the lowest Jewish ethnicity, and their class status, as the poorest Jewish class and the most vulnerable in an economic crisis. The deterioration of the class status of the Eastern Jews, did in fact negate the old Zionist propaganda that the Israeli state is the 'mother of all Jews'. As class division inside the settler society deepens, the objective condition for creating class consciousness improves and matures. This is the rule, although it can be denied due to the nature of the Zionist entity. It may not be coincidental, that an identical development occurs inside the PLO which has shifted from being the 'mother' of all Palestinians to be the 'mother' of the Palestinian comprador capitalist class. Both developments are essentially related to the imperatives of globalization.

## VI. THE SOLUTION FOR THE CONFLICT: THE DEBATE

36. The following section is dedicated to review several views and proposed solutions for the question of Palestine and Palestinians. It is not all inclusive but it provides a review of a wide and representative spectrum of the opinions of both, Arabs and Jews.

37. In his speech in Abna' Il—balad conference, 6 June 1998, **Asa'ad Ghanem** (of the University of Haifa), argued for a bi—national state on the entire soil of historic Palestine: "...Arab nationalist renaissance project was delayed for another twenty years...I was the first liar when I said that the Palestinian people will establish a democratic state. In a bi—national state, there is equality among all nationalities such as veto right for each community, equal representation in states' associations, autonomy in education etc... For those who want a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and leaving the 1948

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comprador capitalists in the WBG. Briefly, this peace did not serve or save the lives of the Palestinians in the WBG. That is why it is a peace for capital, not for people.

Palestinians to solve their problems with Israel, I say that our problems will never be solved between us and Israel only".<sup>13</sup>

38. The Arab nationalist project might be delayed for even more than twenty years, Ghanem said. However, the choice is to struggle for achieving it and not giving it up to the Zionist Ashkenazi entity. The 'delay' of the Arab nationalist project, led Ghanem to ignore the Arab dimension in the conflict. This explains why he limited the solution only to the Jews and the Palestinians. The same position has been adopted by the Ashkenazim, left and right equally, who consistently ignore, and even hate to hear, the Arab national dimension because this would deny them the opportunity of continuing the monopoly over the land of Occupied Palestine. Although this might work in the short run, but in the final solution, the Ashkenazim are looking for Arab markets and normalization of relations with the Arabs. Ghanem failed to realize that the normalization between the Arab nation and Israel cannot be achieved so long as the Zionists monopolize the land of Palestine, refuse the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, and control the economy and the military apparatus in the Zionist entity—Israel. The bi—national state is also meaningless because it cannot solve these complicated issues.

39. In addition to his adoption of a bi—national state, **Nadem Rohana** (of Harvard University) goes beyond the horizon of Ghanem by expecting that in the bi—national state, "... land laws will change, both peoples will enjoy the land...but the chances for the acceptance of these changes on the Jewish side are still weak".<sup>14</sup> It is clear that Rohana, like Ghanem, bases his argument on a solution between the Palestinians and the Jews ignoring the Arab national dimension. Rohana did not tell us either how will both peoples 'enjoy' land ownership under a capitalist regime, even when becomes bi—national state and is no longer a racist— settler one. He failed to tell us, particularly, if the Palestinians will be able to enjoy his own land, which was occupied by the settlers. If the Palestinians are not able to enjoy that right, then Rohana must provide us with some justification as to why should a Palestinian accept the settlers' monopoly over his land or a joint use of his private property with the settlers, in a capitalist system?

40. There is no need to ask Rohana whether he is able to guarantee that the settlers will allow the Palestinians to share the use of land with him. In other words, he did not question the nature of the Zionist entity and the necessity to change it. More importantly, Rohana did not touch upon the Zionist imposed taboo: the impossibility of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.

41. As a Jewish settler, writer **Sami Smootha's** based his position on the official Israeli policy towards its Palestinian Arab citizens. He calls for: "Israel as a Jewish state, democratic with equality for the Palestinians and a continuous improvement for the condions of the Arab". Samoha continues: "But now, due to the political deterioration on the nationalist Arab level, is it still possible for the Israeli Arabs to recruit the Arabs for the goal of changing the Zionist—Jewish nature of the state".<sup>15</sup>

42. Let's agree, for the sake of discussion, that the Palestinian Arabs in Israel are supposed to recruit the Arabs for the struggle to abolish the racist Zionist—Jewish nature of Israel.

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<sup>13</sup> Asa'ad Ghanem, a lecturer in Haifa University and Giva'at Haviva Institute. "A Bi-national State All Over Palestine Without a Palestinian state". A lecture in Abna Il-Balad Conference at Nazareth, June 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Nadim Rohana's speech in Abna' Il-Balad Conference 6 June 1998, Nazareth.

<sup>15</sup> Sami Smootha's speech in Abna' Il-Balad Conference, 6 June 1998, Nazareth.

Let's also suppose that the Arabs, in their fight against Israeli aggression, weren't motivated neither for changing the racist Zionist—Jewish nature of Israel, nor realize Arab nationalism and unity. Did Smootha assume that the Arabs, as a nation, are now opposed to normalization with Israel? The question becomes, whether Smootha can understand that this new position, the Arab support for anti—normalization with Israel, is an expression of Arab masses for their national commitment? Can Smootha grasp the fact that in this era of 'peace of capital', the interest of Arab popular classes is in protection themselves from the Zionists on the one hand, and their Arab and foreign allies on the other? Does he realize that the Zionist demand from Arabs to normalize with Israel is, by itself, another form of aggression against the Arab nation? So long as Smootha's ideas are based on the official policies of the Ashkenazi state, it will be fruitless to engage him in a debate about the Palestinian right of return. As a colonial—settler, he believes only in force and is likely to understand only that method.

43. The same is true for **Ilan Saban**, of the University of Haifa<sup>16</sup>, whose argument stems from the official Zionist—Ashkenazi policies and ideology. He favors giving the 1948—Palestinian Arabs an autonomy, their own parliament, and participation in the 'democratic' Jewish state. In other words, as a colonialist by nature and culture, he is 'clever' enough to attempt to contain the development of national aspirations of the Palestinians of the 1948 occupied territories. From its side, the Zionist authority is 'pragmatic' and 'clever' as it works continuously on further expropriation of the land in 1948 and the expansion of the Jewish settlements especially in Galilee area. In addition, the pursuit continues to integrate Palestinian intellectuals and merchants into the lower circles of the Zionist regime. This policy of integrating the Arab intellectual and merchant elite, is the same policy of integrating the Eastern Arab Jews, but in lower national/class strata, i.e. the Eastern Jewish elite remains superior to the Arab Palestinian elite. The two forms of integration, however, take place for different reasons. The integration of Arabs is based on and pursued for reasons of national and ethnic background rather than those of class interest or analysis.

**44. Muhammad Amarah**, (of the University of Bar Ilan) is more pessimistic than the others. He expects "... harsh Israeli treatment for the 1948—Palestinians, deterioration in their civil rights but without cancelling their right to vote, economic and social discrimination, and obligation to serve the military".<sup>17</sup> In fact, the situation is wide open for a variety of possibilities, including transfer of palestinians to areas outside their native land and most likely to neighbouring Arab countries. The massacres that are being committed by the Zionist Jewish army during the current palestinian *intifada 2000* and the killing and wounding thousands of Palestinians, in an evidence for these Israeli policies. The implementation of any of these plans will entirely depend on the balance of power and the various factors of the political environment at that moment.

45. On the other hand, **Rasim Khamaiseh** designs three different scenarios for a solution of the 1948—Palestinians. He proposes that the Palestinian Arabs who are geographically separated from the rest of Arab majority as a result of the annexation of the areas which they populate, be removed to a neighboring state to join and become part of the majority in

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<sup>16</sup> Ilan Saban, "An Improved Status Quo". Paper Presented in Abna' Il-Balad Conference 6 June 1988, Nazareth.

<sup>17</sup> Muhmad Amarah, Increased Decline In the Arab Situation , Paper Presented in Abna' Il-Balad Conference 6 June 1988, Nazareth.

that state. The second component of Khamaiseh's proposal is to create a new political entity in the areas where the Palestinian Arabs constitutes a majority and to allow them to administer their affairs independently. Thirdly, the implementation of an agreed upon mass transfer of the Arab minority in the form of population exchange with bordering states with whom they share the same issues and have communalities such as culture, religion and nationality. However, he observes that the inclination to create an independent entity is 'weak' among the Arabs in Israel.<sup>18</sup>

46. Each of Khamaiseh's ideas has some possibilities. While he noted that the independent entity has little support among the Arabs, but he provided no facts to support such a claim. He also does not refer to the position of the Zionist entity towards this proposal. However, due to the nature of the PA and its commitment to the 'peace of capital', i.e the Oslo peace accords, it is highly likely that the PA will agree on the exchange of land or population or both.<sup>19</sup>

**47. Illana Kofman**, of the Open University, goes a step further. She suggest that the Israeli state be: "... a civil national state, either by becoming: (1) a Hebrew state looking at its citizens, Jews and Arabs, as one nation, a secular democratic republic, the law of return for Jews would be abolished and limited to those who want it and military service must be universal and applied to both, Jews and Arabs, or (2) to declare Israel as a multi—cultural state...whose goal the welfare of all its citizens...". She adds: " It is difficult, however, to apply these models as long as Israele enjoys international legitimacy as a Jewish state. Additionally, this is what the vast majority of the Jews in Israel wants".<sup>20</sup>

48. These are 'nice ideas' that Kofman is suggesting. However, mere suggestions are not enough, if the tools for their implementation are not provided. This is precisely what Koffman does not mention. Despite the fact that she herself does not declare whether she supports an exclusive Jewish state, she offers nothing but a blocked road of her simple suggestions when she mentions that the vast majority of the Jews are in favor of a Jewish state. Here is the core of the issue: What can be done and what are the means that should be used to achieve changes in this

49. colonial— settler, reactionary and racist public opinion that elected, and re—elected Ariel Sharon in the years 2000 and 2003 in spite of his well known responsibility in massacring hundreds of Palestinian in the refugee camps of Sabrs and Shatilla in Beirut, Lebanon, in September 1982.

**50. Azmi Bishara**, an Arab Palestinian memembr of the Israeli Knesset, is different from all those we referred thus far, at least in two important aspects. Firstly, because he is a leader of a political party and claims that he is an Arab nationalist. Secondly, which is important to note, because he spent most of his political life as a member in the Israeli Communist Party. These facts gain more significance when we note that Bishara firmly recognizes the Zionist State which a core issue of the political program of this party. In other words,

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<sup>18</sup> Rasim Khamaiseh, 'Separation, and Transfeer of Arabs', a paper Presented in Abna' Il-Balad Conference 6 June 1988, Nazareth.

<sup>19</sup> This has been confirmed by some PA negotiating team in Camp David 2000, two months before the second *intifada* took place.

<sup>20</sup> Illana Kofman, *The State of Israel: A National-Religious State.*, a paper presented in Abna' Il-Balad Conference 6 June 1988, Nazareth.

Bishara rejected Marxism, maintained his loyalty to the Zionist State, and pretended that he is an Arab nationalist.

51. Bishara said: "...despite the fact that I neither recognize the history of Zionism, nor the Zionism historically, I found myself obliged to recognize the fruit this Zionism created. Because Israel was born out of international legitimacy, I can not say that it does not exist, nor that it doesn't have rights. What I still insist on is that its rights should not materialize at the expense of others or by force".<sup>21</sup>

52. Bishara, however, does not define for us or draw a line as to where and when do the 'rights' of the settler state start to materialize at the expense of others. The mere existence of a settler state in Palestine is at the expense of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, there is no solution capable of halting the Zionist entity from confiscating the rights of others except a socialism, the solution that Bishara turned his back to.

53. Bishara's main argument is to make Israel a 'state for all its' citizens'. This thesis is a continuity, in quantitative and qualitative sense, of the slogan of the Israeli Communist Party: "Equality among Arabs and Jews in Israel". It seems that Bishara adopted some concepts learning from the arguments of others as well. Although he favors the cultural and educational autonomy<sup>22</sup> for the 1948—Arabs, he is not in favor of an independent Palestinian State for them. Here is what Bishara wrote on this issue: "It is meaningless, it is not a real issue at all, there will be no geographic autonomy because the Arabs are scattered all over the country... My aim is a state for all its citizens. A cultural autonomy, without this will lead to a demand of liberated areas and their unification in a natural unity. This will lead to a conflict... but if the cultural autonomy is deeply rooted in a state for all of its citizens it will be a base for integration".<sup>23</sup> One could grasp, at this junction, where Bishara's heart lies: it is on the Zionist side. He is almost warning and advising the Zionists that the best road for integration of Palestinians into the Zionist state is to give them cultural autonomy. Otherwise, the Palestinians will raise their political ceiling to separation. This is a special form of Arab nationalism, whose main objective is to integrate Palestinians into the Zionist entity—Israel.

54. The most provocative of Bishara's ideas is his opinion on Zionism. He argued: "... Zionism never had internal harmony. Its nature wasn't despotic as perceived by the traditional Arab point of view. This point of view was accustomed to see Zionism as a colonial movement. However, through my readings of the Zionist literature, I am quite sure that it is more sophisticated. Zionism views itself as a renaissance movement, a liberation movement. Accordingly, it has always been in a situation of tension between its self—

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<sup>21</sup> *Haaretz* (Hebrew daily, in Tel Aviv) supplement, 29-5-1998, quoted in, Ali Samniyeh, *Dirasah Hawl A'laqat Filistenee al 1948 bil-Dawlah al-Abriayah , bil-Kneseet, wabil-Mustakbal bain al-Tarafain*, ( A Research on the Relationship 1948 Palestinians, the Hebrew State, the Knesset, and the Future between the Two Parts. 2001, p. 29, (publisher not mentioned).

<sup>22</sup> Said Zaidani, one of the early Palestinian Arabs in Israel who wrote on the cultural Autonomy for the 1948 Palestinians, wrote. "...and the Cultural Autonomy, as I imagine it, is the compromise between a just solution mediated between the individual civil rights solution and the national communal right. The integration of the Arabs in Israel with the life of the society and state no more than a big lie, and their total separation from it is a dream that will never materialize, especially at a time when the chance for a secular democratic state not viable". Said Zaidani, *The Autonomy as a Golden Middle Solution between Integration and Separation*, in *Kadaia*, no 5, Jerusalem, 1990. The least that can be said on Zaidani's argument that it is a typical liberal intellectual argument based on the ideology of adaptation.

<sup>23</sup> Azmi Bishara, Ya Allah: Prime Minister! Interview by Lary Derfner, in *The Jerusalem Post* 28 Feb 1997. see for details Adel Samara, Bi-national, Cultural Autonomy, and a State for All its Citizens are Zionist Solutions, in *Kana'an*, no 85, 1997.

perception and its practices”.<sup>24</sup> This attitude of Bishara and other Arabs towards Zionism sheds light on a new trend among Arab and Palestinian intellectuals who accept Zionism, but in a more 'sophisticated', educated and complex fashion compared to the relatively uneducated Arab rulers. Arabs who have these tendencies and who accept Zionism and the Zionist entity *as it is*, are *de facto* Zionists. Yes, it is possible for an Arab to become Zionist, because Zionism is an ideology. It is impossible to call an Arab a Jew since, according to Judaism, a Jew must be born to a Jewish mother. It is also impossible to claim that there is a common culture among Arabs and Jews who maintain two different cultures, the Jewish and the Arab, since a common Israeli culture does not exist. This Bishara's 'flexible' conceptualization of Zionism, it appears, was the main reason behind his decision to nominate himself for Knesset, the parliament of the Jewish state. Being a member of that parliament, one in fact must sacrifice the right of return of Palestinian refugees. This apparent compromise may place Bishara within a 'comfort zone', one may rationalize. However, the most striking hypocrisy of Bishara's position is when he insists on being a member of the Israeli Knesset and at the same time pretending to be an Arab nationalist.

55. The Zionist regime initiated the investigation of Azmi Bishara by the end of 2002 aiming at forbidding him from nomination for the Israeli elections in 2003. In his response to the central committee of the Israeli elections (31 December 2002), Bishara declared that: "I pledge the oath for the State of Israel as it defines itself and as a member of Knesset, I am ...".<sup>25</sup>

56. If these fundamental issues are still debatable in the Zionist entity after more than fifty years of its creation, then it is a clear evidence that entity is not normal. All of the aforementioned ideas and proposals revolve within the range of 'accommodation' the Zionist goals. There is no real difference among them (both Arabs like Bishara, or Jews like Smooha) regarding the main issues. The differences, if any, are only in the details. To that extent, all of these ideas and proposals are Zionist. All of them, simply ignore the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, and ignore the Arab national dimension as a determining factor in both, the current conflict as well as the future of the entire region.

**57. Salman Abu Sitta**<sup>26</sup> tackled the conflict from two important angles. Firstly, is a technical pointview to prove that Palestine has the geographic capacity to, easily, absorb its original evicted people besides the Israeli Jews who are occupying it. Secondly, he quoted a letter, dated 12 October 1949, that was sent from the Gaza office of the Quakers Association to their office in Philadelphia 18 months after the eviction of the Palestinian refugees in April 1948. The letter stated: "Because it is difficult for the refugees to contact the outside world, it is our duty to inform you, as much as possible, of their ideas and opinions now. Before everything else their desire is to return to their homes, land and villages which are close by in most cases... While 18 months have elapsed since they were evicted from their homes, this did not reduce these demands. They see no meaning for their life without the return to their homes. They express that daily in many forms and means such as: 'why are you helping us to stay here?' This is one of the expressions they

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in [arab\\_nationalist@yahoo.com](mailto:arab_nationalist@yahoo.com), 20 January 2003

<sup>26</sup> Salman Abu Sitta is a Palestinian researcher in the affairs of Palestinian refugees and a former member of the Palestinian National Council. His article: *Return is the Basis for any Solution* (Arabic) was published in al-Aadab Magazine, July-August 2002, p.p. 6-12, Beirut.

use. This nostalgia to return to the homeland is as genuine and deep as anyone would feel towards his own home. The re—settlement of these refugees never comes to the mind of any of them”.<sup>27</sup> One of the recent studies, showed that the Palestinian refugees still hold the same position towards the right of return.<sup>28</sup>

58. The issue is, since this is the position of the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people, it should be the point of reference of any political opinion towards a just solution for the problem of Palestinian refugees. Many Palestinians, however, as well as Arab and foreign politicians and intellectuals ignore this fact and compromise the right of the refugees!

59. In his search for a solution, Abu Sitta unfortunately fell, later in his article, for the emotional and *iqlimi* attitude. Defining the parties to the 'conflict between Palestinians and Jews', he wrote: “I am saying, the Palestinians, not the Arabs, because the Palestinians are fighting alone, without reducing the value of the popular Arab sympathy. The Jews, on the other hand, whether in Israel or in America are fight as one block with one goal and joint coordination”.<sup>29</sup> This position ignores the Arab class/national dimension in the conflict which is crystallized in the classification of the Arabs on a class base. The Arab popular classes, that represent the real Arab nationalism of the popular, not comprador capitalist class, support the Palestinians and their struggle. The Arab comprador capitalist classes, on the other hand, stand in the opposite camp. In spite of pretending that they are Arab nationalists, their nationalism is that of the comprador, dependency and integration into the world order. As Abu Sitta generalizes the position of the ruling Arab classes to describe the entire Arab nation, he falls into the trap of the Palestinian *iqlimi*<sup>30</sup> comprador elite that uses this position to justify the catastrophic peace settlement of the Oslo Accords. He also ignores the international dimension of this conflict as well. The Zionist entity—Israel would not have been able to exist or survive as an idea nor as a colonial project without the role and the support of the ruling classes in the capitalist center. That is the reason why this conflict is not, never was, and will never be a ‘pure’ Israeli—Palestinian conflict.

60. Abu Sitta stated that: “the fixed and permanent rights do not expire with the passage of time, they expire if those who own them abandon them”.<sup>31</sup> This is true, however it is only one half of the truth. Some of those who own the right did compromise it, as did the PLO leadership did, the rest of the Palestinian people, however, did not.

61. Finally, Abu Sitta suggests a solution in the form of a joint state committed to democracy, justice and international law: "The future of peace depends on Israel not on the Arabs and there is no salvation for Israel except by eliminating all traces of racism in its laws and to peacefully co—exist with the Palestinians on the same land enjoying the same

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid p. 6

<sup>28</sup> See Adel Samara, *The Palestinian Refugees Between the Right of Return and the Internalization of Defeat (Al-Lajioun Al-Filistinion bain Haq Al-Awdah Wastidkhal Al-Hazimah)*, Chapter Four, The Refugees’s positions Towards the Right of Return. Publications of Palestine Publishing Foundation, Glendale, California. USA, 2000.

<sup>29</sup> Abu Sitta, Ibid, p. 8

<sup>30</sup> *Iqlimi* in Arabic is an adjective of *iqlim* and *qutri* is an adjective of *qutr*. Both terms in Arabic mean ‘a country or a part of a county’, a district, or province. In modern Arabic political life and discourse, *iqlimi* signifies an area (such as Syria and Iraq) that was artificially severed from the rest of the Arab Homeland as a result of occupation by European colonial powers (Britain and France) then became politically and geographically ‘independent’ and isolated from the collective of Arab countries. The term also refers to the underlying fragmentation of the Arab Homeland into *aqtar* (plural of *qutor*).

<sup>31</sup> Abu Sitta, Ibid, p.8.



rights. In this case, the question whether to establish a Palestinian state along the Israeli one or to establish a bi—national state becomes secondary since the question of rights is much more important than the question of sovereignty over the land. Once the principles of democracy, justice, and international law are implemented, then establishing one or two states will not be important since there will, no longer, be radical contradiction between the nature of this state or the other, particularly if there is an agreement on dividing the natural resources".<sup>32</sup>

62. Unfortunately, Abu Sitta failed to completely comprehend the important passage of the quoted Quakers' letter regarding the Palestinian right of return. If the refugees gain the right of return to the state which he is arguing for, who will secure or guarantee their homes and land? This capitalist state will never guarantee the right of the most vulnerable of its citizens. While he ends his article by anticipating "gradual changes based on continuity of the Palestinian struggle in all its forms, steadfastness of the Palestinian people, and international support for decades to come", Abu Sitta does not consider the Arab national dimension. In other words, his proposal plays in the hands of the Palestinian *iqlimi* comprador capitalists and their leadership, the PA.

63. On the onset of his article, **Muhammad Jamal Barout**<sup>33</sup>, states: "The Zionist movement represented a translation of a unique Jewish nationalism or a colonial one to solve the Jewish question based on the European concept of a state—nation in the age of nationalism, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century". It is not clear whether Barout really considers that there was a Jewish nation, or he meant that the Zionist movement pretended that and attempted to create one? In either case, it should be noted that for a society to become a natural, not a settler, nation it live on its own land. This raises the question of legitimacy of all white settler colonial states in the world. It is, therefore, possible to create a state, but to what extent would this formation, as a settler—colonial one, constitute a nation?

64. Barout argues: "However, the only possible route to the solution is a federal state over the entire historic Palestine to solve the question of Palestinian refugees and to offer both, the Jewish and Arab communities, despite their differences, collective cultural rights, in a framework of total equality... a state that declares itself as the ultimate state for all its citizens, not for the world Jews".<sup>34</sup>

65. Barout as many other Palestinians and Arabs hesitates to insist on the full meaning of the right of return of Palestinian refugees, which is the right to return to their land and homes. Even if they were to return to the Jewish part of the federal state, they will return as cheap labor and disinherited. One wonders, why do they have to accept that in a capitalist state? In fact, Barout is compromising the Palestinians right due to an inferior position towards Jews.

**66. Faisal Darraj**<sup>35</sup> begins his article with a profound critique of the PLO leadership, and argues that an end to its era is necessary. He suggests: "... a secular democratic state where

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<sup>32</sup> Abu Sitt, Ibid, p., 11.

<sup>33</sup> Muhammad Jamal Barout is a Syrian writer and researcher. His article: "*The Arab Problem' in Historic Palestine: Between Secular Utopia and the Close Possibility*" (Arabic) was published in al-Aadab Magazine, July-August 2002, pp.13-19, Beirut.

<sup>34</sup> Barout, Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>35</sup> Faisal Darraj is a prominent Arab Palestinian literary critic who has published a plethora of books and articles. His article: "*The Realistic and Imaginary in the 'Democratic Secular State'*" (Arabic) was published in al-Aadab Magazine, July-August 2002, pp.20-24, Beirut.

the Israelis and Palestinians will enjoy equal rights of citizenship, but this should not prevent the thinking of building of a joint Arab—Israeli peace block, if that is possible".<sup>36</sup> However, the "democratic state" he resumes "shouldn't be a mere new political project produced by 'organizatons', but it, rather, emerges from a new historical Palestinian consciousness that is able to understand the relationship between the goal and the balance of power and the short—term as well as the long—term goals".

67. While referring to the popular dimension, Darraj approaches the socialist solution closely, but he dose not adopt it as such. For this reason, he remains within the range of a not—socialist state, i.e. a capitalist state. The guarantee of citizenship rights for all communities does not guarantee for the Palestinians their rights in their properties. One might argue that we, by taking such a stand, may be defending the private ownership for Palestinian landlords and other classes that owned less. This may be an accurate argument. On ther hand, however, the question remains why should this land stay in the hands of the colonial—settlers? Would not that mean a preferential treatment for the Israeli Jews over the Arabs?

68. Darraj touches upon the pan—Arab dinension, and confirms that any Palestinian victory over Zionism is an Arab one as well. However, he stays short of placing this Arab—Palestinian relationship within the context of a united or even joint project of the Arab popular classes that includes those of the Palestinian people.

69. The democratic secular state in Palestine can not be viewed without a return to the history, **Maher al—Sharif** asserts in an article; "The Hisotical Evolution of the Ideas of Democratic Secular State and Bi—national State".<sup>37</sup>

70. In his article, al—Sharif praises the 'National Libaration League ( NLL) in Palestine' in 1930s, which was a communist organization, and harshly criticizes the traditional leadership of Palestinian national movement at that time because it demanded in the mid 1930s: "the independence of Palestine in the framework of Arab unity". That leadership, al—Sharif resumes insisted that "the Jews who have the right to stay in Palestine are only those who lived there before the World War I and who did not constitute more than 7% of the total population of Palestine". After World War II, this leadership failed, al—Sharif asserts, to conceptualize the deep changes which resulted from the war, changes that generated great sympathy with the Jews on a world scale, as well as the fact that the number of Jews in Palestine reached nearly half million. They became [the jewish settlers]a significant economic and political power that owned a large number of modern istitutions which composed a state inside a state".<sup>38</sup>

71. Why is it that the Palestinian national movement have to consider the changes in the wrold situation, while the Jewish settlers do not have to? These same settlers evicted about one million Palestinians from 78% their country in 1948. If they were successful in achieving that with world sympathy with the Jews, and thanks to a favorable balance of power, or because they were able to creat a strong alliance with the developed capitalist countires and their projects in the region, does that mean that the Palestinian movement must accept it? In this capitalist conflict, especially before the occupation of Palestine in

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<sup>36</sup> Darraj, Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>37</sup> Maher al-Sharif is a Palestinian writer who resides in Syria. His article was published in Arabic, in al-Aadab Magzine, July-August 2002, pp. 25-30, Beirut.

<sup>38</sup> Maher al-Sharif, Ibid, p. 25.

1948, the choice was whether the Palestinians evict the Jewish settlers or those settlers will evict the native Palestinian people, which is what ultimately took place. As a matter of fact, and since that time, the socialist solution was the only viable one. History has proven that the Palestinian national movement was right in seeking the solution of this conflict through Arab unity and not by means of an *iqlimi* position. It is because of that *iqlimi* position, that the conflict was never solved. It is worthy to note that al—Sharif, like the National Liberation League (NLL), is opposed to the solution of the conflict based on the depth of the national pan—Arab dimension because they attribute that to the commecial, feudal and currently the comprador capitalist classes. In the final analysis they failed to committ themselves to an internationalist/socialist solution: a socialist state in Palestine. Al—Sharif writes: “...after the end of the World War II the NLL demanded a ‘national democratic rule in Palestine which will secure the rights of all of its population... it is based on self—determination and the dessimination of democracy... The NLL warns that the slogans of the traditional leadership will lead, in the final analysis, to the partition of Palestine which is the most dangerous fate...the NLL emphasized that the Palestinian cause belongs to its population and its their duty to solve it”.<sup>39</sup>

72. The question is, however, why did not the NLL as well as the communist movement adopt a socialist solution? One would think that this should be its natural attitude.

Ultimately, the history teaches us that the very same NLL accepted the UN resolution of the partition of Palestine (1947) into two states, two capitalist states and recognized a settler state over the land of the Palestinian people! What is really astonishing is the NLL’s argument that the ‘question of Palestine’ belongs to its population. The question, then, becomes: are the ‘Zionist colonial—settlers Palestinian citizens and are equal to the natives of the country? Additionally, the conflict in Palestine was never an internal or a local one only and therefore, its solution cannot belong only to the local population. The whole conflict was created by the capitalist center as a step in a hegemonic plan for the entire region. Why didn’t al—Sharif and the NLL grasp these basic facts? Why did the Palestinian communists fail to understand the role of the world order in such an explosive region? One possible answer, one may conclude, is that their understanding of Marxism is truly deficient.

73. The solution for this conflict, according to al—Sharif lies in a: “... bi—national state, in which both peoples enjoy equal rights and is built on the following foundation: the Palestinian people recognizes the crystallization of an Israeli nationalism in Palestine that has no connection with what is called ‘world Jewish people’... and the Israeli rulers confess to their moral responsibilities towards the tragedy of the Palestinians and the eviction of most of them. This recognition means the recognition of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their Homeland, and to facilitate their absorpion, if not in the areas they inhabited before their expulsion, maybe in the areas that the Israeli government plans to settle the new Jewish immigrants”.<sup>40</sup>

74. These are, however, settlers and not immigrants. If they were immigrants, then the Palestinians would have no right to object or reject them. It appears that al—Sharif is making an attempt to ‘bypass’ the Palestinian right of return by leaving the Israeli

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<sup>39</sup> Maher al-Sharif, Ibid, p. 25.

<sup>40</sup> Maher al-Sharif, Ibid, p. 30.

government with an argument to say something like: " Well, we will let the refugees go back to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG) because we were planning to settle additional 10 million new settlers'. The question, however, remains, why does the Palestinian people have to recognize an Israeli nationalism, at a time when Israeli Jews are not asked or expected to apologize for the eviction of the Palestinian people? This part of al—Sharif's suggestion reminds us of the statements of retired Zionist army general Shlomo Gazet in which he proposes, in essence, that a solution for the conflict by having both Israelis and Palestinians apologize to each other and allow the return of some Palestinian refugees to the West Bank. One may wonder whether al—Sharif is assuming that the Israeli society is free of racism and culture of racism.

**75. Ghada al—Karmi**<sup>41</sup> describes the conflict as an Israeli—Palestinian one. She ends her article by adopting the solution of a bi—national state "which secures the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, a solution which permits the two peoples to be equal partners in land, and the compensation of the Palestinian refugees for the loss of land and resources... and the abolition of the Israeli Law of Return of the world Jewry to Palestine... This state must be founded on non—Zionist principles since it was the exclusive racist nature of Zionism that created the original problem".<sup>42</sup>

76. We will not argue against the bi—national state solution, but it should be mentioned that al—Karmi avoids a socialist solution at least for the land. The question is how will two peoples share the land 'equally' or, for that matter, even one people, without a socialist vision? Moreover, she wants the Palestinians to share their land with the settlers, but she does not demand or mention that the Jewish industrial base should be also shared as well as its military complex! Al—Karmi, in fact, agrees with the Western capitalist and Zionist attitude from the struggle that believes that the conflict should be solved at the cost of the Palestinians.

77. What is most unusual about al—Karmi's position is that she ends her article by saying: "If oppression continues without a solution, then it will remain a source of unrest and a cause of 'terror' in the region"! The question that arises is: if oppression is not removed, would the Palestinian struggle against it, in al—Karmi's view, be 'terror'. Additionally, would the persistence of Palestinian struggle be viewed as 'terror' like the Zionist one?

**78. Amir Makhool**<sup>43</sup> suggests the ideal compensation for the suffering of the Palestinians is: "a democratic state on the entire historic Palestine that guarantees the right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homes and properties, to compensate them for the period of refuge individually and collectively...and to abolish the collective privileges which Israel grants to its population who were brought at the cost of those Palestinian refugees who stay in their homeland... this state must be a state of institutions, a state that enjoys the separation of authorities as well as the separation between the state and religion. The role of this state is, also, to provide guarantees for the prevention of the Israeli domination over

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<sup>41</sup> Ghada al-Karmi is a Palestinian writer and academic. Her article, "A Democratic Secular State in Historic Palestine: An Idea Whose Time has come" (Arabic), appeared in al-Aadab Magazine, July-August 2002, pp. 31-36, Beirut.

<sup>42</sup> Ghada al-Karmi, Ibid, p. 36.

<sup>43</sup> Amir Makhool is the director of 'Al-Itijah' - The Union of Arab Association in Palestine of 1948 in Haifa. His article "Between the Essence of Israel and the divisibility of Solutions" (Arabic) was published in al-Adab Magazine, July-August 2002, pp. 37-41, Beirut.

resources, economy, government posts and those positions of authority.<sup>44</sup> At certain junctions of his proposal, Makhool approaches the socialist position we propose.<sup>45</sup> Makhool's proposed solution, however, does not explain how could the Israeli control over economic resources and positions of power be prevented without a radical change of the entire capitalist system?

**79. Joseph Massad**<sup>46</sup> provides a profound political critique of the Palestinian leadership of PLO and the PA. He contributes to the debate by advancing his analysis to explore the imposed internal geographic and political divisions among Palestinians (the WBG, the 1948—Palestinians, Palestinians in the *Shatat*<sup>47</sup>...etc). He warns that most of the solutions, especially that of the Oslo Accords, favor the Palestinians of the WBG at the cost of the Palestinian refugees and notes that even this favoring of WBG Palestinians is not genuine. Among all the Arab and Palestinian views and opinions that are assessed in this paper, Massad is the only one who pushes his argument to the depth of class analysis of the Palestinian society and deals adequately with this dimension. Despite his class analysis, Massad believes that it is becoming evident that “there will be no restitution of the rights of all Palestinians neither an end for this conflict except within the framework of a bi—national state”.<sup>48</sup>

**80. Muhammad Naffaa**<sup>49</sup> insists on what he calls the ‘more realistic solution’, a two—state solution with an adherence to the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. “Our vision for the future is the continuity of the struggle to achieve a program for just and comprehensive peace, an Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese occupied territories, removal of [Israeli] settlements, establishing the independent Arab—Palestinian state besides Israel with its capital East Jerusalem, and an adherence to the right of return of Palestinian refugees”.<sup>50</sup> In regard to the democratic secular state, Naffaa’ defers this solution “until conditions are more humane and more suitable for the freedom of residence and movement for both Arabs and Jews.”<sup>51</sup> Like the other writers, Naffaa’ does not explain how will this return be possible under the current regime in the Zionist state?

81. Finally, in addition to this critique of the various views that we presented, we must note that the opinion that accepts the reactionary notion of a ‘pure Jewish or any other religious state’ is not acceptable. Unfortunately, whether it is specifically mentioned or not, many views *de facto* accept a ‘pure Jewish state’ indirectly by not adopting a socialist state as a

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<sup>44</sup> Amir Makhool, *Ibid*, p. 40.

<sup>45</sup> See Adel Samara: *Epidemic of Globalization: Ventures in the World Order, Arab Nation and Zionism*. Chapter Five, pp. 113-132. Palestine Research and Publishing Foundation, Glendale 2002.

<sup>46</sup> Joseph Massad is assistant professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University, New York, USA. His article “*The Bi-National State and the Re-Unification of the Palestinian People*” (Arabic) appeared in *al-Adab Magazine*, July-August 2002, pp. 42-48, Beirut.

<sup>47</sup> *Shatat* is an Arabic term that signifies one's living outside of his/her homeland. In the context of this paper, *shatat* is used to indicate Palestinians who were forcefully expelled from their homeland – Palestine as a result of the Zionist occupation of Palestine in 1948 and the years that followed. These Palestinians reside, since 1948, in many Arab and other countries world-wide as Palestinian refugees.

<sup>48</sup> Joseph Massad, *Ibid*, p. 48.

<sup>49</sup> Muhmmad Naffaa’ is the Secretary general of the Israeli Communist Party. His article “*The Great Energy*” (Arabic) was published in *al-Adab*, July-August 2002, pp. 49-51, Beirut.

<sup>50</sup> Muhammad Naffaa’, *Ibid*, p. 51.

<sup>51</sup> Muhammad Naffaa’, *Ibid*, p. 50.

solution. Additionally, some writers avoid mentioning a socialist solution despite the fact that some of them are either members of communist parties or are ‘former Marxists’.

## VII. THE SOCIALIST PROJECT NECESSITATES THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ZIONIST ENTITY

82. There are three main developments that the Arab popular classes and their vanguard parties have to consider in developing their new strategy at the beginning of the millennium. The first development is at the world scale, the deterioration of communist internationalism and the world revolution, which started in the 1950s and reached its peak by 1990s. In other words, it is the victory of capitalism in the form of epidemic of globalization. The second development is internalization of defeat (IOD) by Arab regimes and many other political parties, which resulted in the false peace process (Oslo Accords) and Israel's arrogant position towards the rejection of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The third is the success of the enemy's camp to terminate possible Arab resistance against its plan of ‘peace for capital’. To achieve that success, imperialism and the *iqlimi* Arab regimes, destroyed the power of Iraq, encouraged the deterioration of the PLO leadership towards IOD, supported North Yemen in terminating the leftist regime in South Yemen, and inflamed bloody internal wars in Egypt and Algeria.

83. These developments pre—suppose an elaboration of a new Arab strategy for development, unity and the liberation of Palestine and other occupied Arab land. However, we will confine our discussion in this paper to its central theme: the struggle against the Zionist entity and its future place in the Arab socialist project.

84. There are two socio—political groups in Arab societies that had internalized the defeat. These are the ruling comprador capitalist classes and a large number of political parties. Accordingly, these groups became vehicles for normalization within the imperialist center and the Israel. However, the Zionist goal does not end at the point of ‘peace’ with Palestinians. The success of the Zionist agenda requires a ‘quiet’, underdeveloped, fragmented, non—socialist and open Arab Homeland (market) for Israeli products, i.e. a vast subjugated periphery. The ultimate aim of Zionism and the Zionist entity—Israel is to be accepted by Arabs as a 'normal part' of the region with the objective of dominating Arab markets, through ITD. In an objective sense, this means that the policy of normalization with Israel translate into a policy of aggression. It aims at (1) maintaining the Zionist entity *as it is*, and (2) to have the Arabs accept it openly and without restrictions. The real meaning of this goal is a new version of a Zionist war. However, this time, it is not a formal war against the ruling classes and their armies since these classes have become a part of the Zionist/imperialist camp. It is a war against the Arab nation, against the popular classes whose interest is in unity, development, socialism, and the liberation of the occupied Arab land. This takes us to a new era whereby on both of the struggle: the revolution and counter—revolution, the socialist and capitalist camps, are re—arranging their forces and classes in a new order.

## VIII. THE COMPONENTS OF THE SOCIALIST PROJECT AS COMPARED TO THE ZIONIST PROJECT

85. On the Arab side of the equation, the Arab comprador ruling classes have already marched a long way towards normalization with the Zionist entity. Many Arab regimes have declared the end of 'official' Arab boycotting of Israel and many have recognized it as is: an occupier and a colonial—racist state. The Zionist entity, on the other side of the equation, along with some Arab countries are 'promoting' trade among each other. Some Arab regimes have reduced their 'contacts' with Israel following, and as a result of the popular pressure in support of the Palestinian *intifada 2000*. However, there is no guarantee that they will not revive or even strengthen these contacts in the near future and as the political environment permits.<sup>52</sup>

86. Before dealing with the Arab socialist project and its attitude towards the Zionist entity, it is necessary to deal with the recent deterioration of the Palestinian struggle against that entity. It should be mentioned, that as long as the Palestinian resistance movement lowers its goal to the level of restoring the West Bank and Gaza, and abandons the liberation of entire Palestine, it will fall into the trap of 'dividing its own country with the enemy'. This deterioration started in the open after the defeat of the PLO and its eviction from Jordan 1970. The division of the homeland with the enemy, played a major role in the breeding of defeatist slogans and projects, e.g. two—state solution, bi—national state, democratic state...etc. In doing so, the PLO itself neutralized the popular Arab dimension from the struggle, a development that crushed the PLO's credibility. The deterioration to the level of these slogans and attitudes indicates that those who embrace them had deviated from the position of a national liberation movement to one of Palestinian Zionists. They are Zionists in terms of recognizing the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine which means that they accepted the Zionist ideology and policy of rejecting the Palestinian right of return even if they do not state that in public. These are some of the Arabs who had internalized the defeat.

87. As for the socialist solution of the conflict, we will divide our discussion into three interconnected areas. The first area relates to the 1948—Palestinians. This community is part of the Arab nation and has its own national identity: the Arab nationalism. It is not just an 'accumulation' or gathering of human beings without a social structure and political/national goal. Accordingly, their role in the joint Arab popular project is to struggle to create their own Palestinian state in the occupied part of Palestine 1948, i.e. the Zionist entity. This is, however, their transitional goal on the path towards the final socialist goal. The justifications for such a state are the following:

- a. It is their right, as a national minority to have their own state.
- b. They are opposed to the idea of the exchange of land between the Zionist entity and the PA, because they are against the idea of two—state solution, a solution that maintains and recognizes the Zionist project.

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<sup>52</sup> Israel had recently filed a complaint to the Egyptian government and the PA protesting all the publications that were critical to its policies and ideology. Incidentally, this is in accordance with the provisions of the 'peace' agreements that were designed to create cultural normalization as a part of a plan to terminate the people's spirit of resistance.

c. Their demand for an independent state is a challenge to the United Nations which supported a large number of new states that declared their separation from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia...etc.

d. The Palestinian state for the 1948—Palestinians is a step towards the disintegration of the Zionist entity as a step towards the re—unification of all of Palestine with the Arab Homeland.

88. The second area is the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBG), where the direct, transitional goal is the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation from the Palestinian Occupied Territories—1967. This withdrawal shouldn't be conditional or tied to recognition of the Zionist entity because this recognition, as mentioned earlier, means abandonment of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Our point here is that the PA must not pretend that it is representing all the Palestinian people. This representation was accepted to a certain extent when the PLO was a national liberation movement, fighting for the liberation of Palestine. In other words, the direct goal must be the end of occupation without recognition of the Zionist entity. This must be the Palestinian position, even if its cost will be the termination of the declaration of a Palestinian state in the WBG, or the continuity of the occupation itself. We oppose the declaration of a Palestinian state in the WBG as a final solution, because it is a Zionist demand more than a Palestinian one. The occupation must be defeated and forced to withdraw from the WBG, but not for the sake of establishing a Palestinian state limited to these areas, as a final solution of the Arab—Israeli conflict.

89. The Zionists are in favor of a Palestinian state so they can sign a final agreement with a 'state' and not with a 'political organization, the PLO'. The declaration of a Palestinian state in the context of Oslo Accords is a mere recognition of the Zionist entity and an acceptance of the termination of the refugees right of return. In addition, it is an invitation from the Palestinians to the Arabs to cease the anti—normalization activities and it also means the continuity of the 'peace for capital'. Bi—national, and /or a democratic state in Palestine, terminate the Arab national dimension of the Palestinian question. These solutions ignore the right of return, because they are solutions for the Palestinians and the Jews who reside currently in Palestine. Once any of these solutions is implemented, then the Palestinian national struggle will be reduced to the level of an internal civil rights issue in a 'legitimate' state and presumed democracy. If the Palestinians were to accept any of these solutions, they will be, in fact, asking the Arabs to normalize with the Zionist entity and abandon their role in the struggle against this entity as an occupier of Palestine and as a watchdog for imperialism in the region.

90. The withdrawal of occupation from the WBG and the creation of a Palestinian state for 1948—Palestinians are an introduction to the disintegration of the Zionist entity. This preliminary, or transitional solution, is aimed at re—uniting Palestine with the Arab Homeland. This leads us to the third and main goal, the Arab popular socialist solution which is the only solution that guarantees for the Jews the right to live as an ethnic minority with full rights like Arabs and other ethnic groups. Some might argue that Jews in Palestine or the Israelis have the right of self determination as in the case of the Kurds. This analogy is absolutely false. While the Israeli Jews are settlers in the land of the people whom they evicted, the Kurds have lived in their own land for centuries. Additionally, under a socialist regime, all ethnicities must be integrated into the socialist nation. This project, however, is



in contradiction with the Zionist main goal in the region which can be summarized as follows:

- To maintain Jewish control over all of the land of Palestine.
- To reject the right of return for Palestinian refugees.
- To maintain Israel as a pure, Jewish state.
- To keep Israel as a watchdog for imperialism in the region.
- To be accepted as a normal entity in the Arab Homeland.

91. This is a classic racist thinking and typical for the mentality of subjugation. As long as the Zionists maintain this policy and mentality on the one hand, and insist on being accepted into the Arab Homeland by ‘integration through domination’ on the other, then Israel is expanding its direct military war to the spheres of economic, social and cultural wars against the Arab people. It is an aggression against the people's ability to produce so that they will be forced to consume only the Israeli goods. The popular Arab solution in Palestine consists of right of return of the Palestinian refugees in the first place, and the dismantling of the Zionist entity as a colonial—settler racist entity. It also requires the elimination of all forms of Jewish monopolies of land, economy and the military apparatus. This solution can be implemented only through a united socialist Arab federation with a socialist Palestine as one of its members.

92. Here comes the role of the Arab socialist project whose goals are Arab unity, development, and liberation of the occupied Arab land. Since these goals are in a direct contradiction with Zionism and imperialism, the Arab socialist project is opposed to normalization with the Zionist entity and imperialism. This is the only solution that guarantees, for the Jews, genuine human rights in a developed, united or federal Arab socialist state.

## **IX. THE VEHICLE OF THE STRUGGLE IS NATIONALISM OF THE POPULAR CLASSES**

93. The Zionist entity, as a racist and settler project, is neither capable of generating a social political force that is ready to arrive at a real peace with the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, nor of generating a communist movement. Accordingly, our argument will focus on the nationalism of the Arab popular classes (Arab nationalism), which has the potential of achieving that goal. For the purpose of this paper and for the sake of clarity, Arab nationalism means the nationalism of the Arab popular classes and their struggle against their enemies. Arab nationalism should be evaluated based to its objectives, its political movement, and within the context of historical events that are the subject of discussion. We argue that Arab nationalism in this era, as an expression of the needs, rights, and interests of an oppressed nation, is progressive by nature. Parts of the Arab Homeland are still colonies in the real sense of the word. The Arab nation aspires to achieve unity, development, and the liberation and restoration of all its occupied territories, not only Palestine.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> These occupied regions include part of Syria occupied by Turkey, a part of Iraq and a part of Bahrain that are occupied by Iran, and a part of Al-Maghrib (Morocco) that is occupied by Spain.

94. The nature of contradictions sheds lights on and determines the forms of the struggle. The struggle of a nation for development, liberation, and unity, in the era of globalized capitalism, must be a socialist struggle. To elaborate more, the social class, that is 'supposed' to lead the struggle for liberation, independence, and unity, is the bourgeois class. This class in the Arab Homeland had turned against unity, allied itself with imperialism and 'donated' its occupied territories to the colonial and settler— colonial powers. In other words, the comprador bourgeoisie class is an enemy of the nation. Therefore, this class has lost its supposed historical role to achieve the nation's goals of development, unity and liberation. Based on that, the social class, that will the lead, will be the popular classes whose interests and aspirations are in Arab unity, development, liberation of occupied land and ultimately achieving socialism.