Anti—Globalisation and the Dangers of Nationalism and Anti—Semitism

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The great scandal of global capital is that it is choking itself up on the pyramids of accumulated abstract wealth. Yet, when looking at social conditions, when listening to the ever more urgent demand for greater labour flexibility, it seems as if the global crisis is really just a consequence of a scarcity of capital. This is indeed the conclusion one would have to reach when one looks at Africa’s misery, when one sees the thousands and thousands of children living in poverty, not just in Africa, not just in Latin America and Asia, not just in those areas of the world deemed inessential by global capital but also in the centres of globalisation, in Europe and the USA. Yet, the dramatic increase in poverty and misery across the globe is not caused by conditions of economic scarcity. There is too much capital, too many commodities that can not be sold for profit, too many workers are ‘overexploited’, on the one hand, and, on the other, too many workers are not even exploitable.

2. Over the last two decades, profits have risen and so too has unemployment. Labour productivity has increased dramatically and poverty has increased, wages have stagnated, and conditions deteriorated.

3. Against this background, Negt (2001) is surely right when he charges many left critics of globalisation for their failure to offer any views on how the accumulated wealth can be used to liberate millions and millions of people, not only in the ‘developing’ societies but in the centres of wealth too, from conditions of misery, poverty and starvation; and on how socially necessary labour can be organised to meet human needs. Critics urge the creation of new forms of political regulation at the national and international level to contain capital’s ‘neo—liberal’ self—destructive force in favour of the common good. In opposition to global institutions like the WTO which are seen to affirm neo—liberal values and institutionalise an unfair system of trade, critics urge the renewal of democratic controls of capital so as to regulate trade more fairly and limit the power of global finance and global financial institutions that keep so—called developing nations in debt and force them further into debt. Others call for the de—linking of ‘developing’ countries from the world market to secure national economic development. Globalisation is seen...
here as a form of American imperialism and global institutions, like the IMF, are seen as agencies of US imperial power. National self—determination is seen as a socialist opposition to imperialist globalisation. What, however, is anti—capitalistic in anti—capitalism when it seeks to regulate capital without touching the relations of exploitation, when it poses the national state as the sovereign power that places controls on capital to secure the common national good? What is the common national good? The function and role of the state is to achieve homogeneity of national conditions. In its liberal conception, this means the equality of all before the law. In its Leninist conception, it means the equality of labour. In its nationalist version it means equality as a nation, as a Volk. In its essence, the nationalist conception of equality in terms of Volk entails the projection of a classless ‘national community’ whose existence is threatened by the ‘external enemy within’.

4. The anti—globalisation movement of the political Left originated, in Europe at least, against the new anti—immigration populist right led by, for example, Le Pen in France, Haider in Austria, and also Hanson in Australia. The populist right poses national identity and communality as a response to the perceived threats of globalisation. The common feeling of these nationalist backlash forces was well focused by Mahathir Mohamad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia. His assessment of Malaysia’s financial collapse in 1997 is symptomatic: ‘I say openly, these people are racists.

5. They are not happy to see us prosper. They say we grow too fast, they plan to make us poor. We are not making enemies with other people but others are making enemies with us’. (2)

6. In its structure, the conception of ‘speculators’ as the external enemy bent on destroying relations national economy harmony, belongs to modern anti—semitism. It summons the idea of finance and speculators as merchants of greed and, counterposed to this, espouses the idea of a national community. In the nationalist conception of equality, the ‘folk is “subject to blood”, it arises from the “soil”, it furnishes the homeland with indestructible force and permanence, it is united by characteristics of “race”, the preservation of whose purity is the condition of the folk’s “health” (Marcuse, 1988, p. 23). Nationalism offers a barbaric solution to globalisation.

7. The contemporary conditions of poverty, misery, hopelessness, and hunger are not just an appearance of the contradictions of capitalist social reproduction on a global scale — that too. They are also sharp reminders of a conception of progress that entailed barbarism from its inception. (3) Critics argue, rightly, that if unchecked, globalisation will lead to barbarism. However, barbarism has already been. In relation to an earlier resolution to global crisis, Adorno’s (1990) insight demands serious consideration: Auschwitz, he argued, not only confirmed the violence of the bourgeois relations of abstract equality and abstract identity. It also confirmed the bourgeois exchange relations of pure identity as death.

8. It is, however, the case that the horror of Auschwitz persists as a barbaric solution to crisis for as long as those social relations exist that made Auschwitz possible (Adorno, 1969, p. 85).

9. The nerve—centre of barbarism is a fetishistic critique of global relations that projects a class—ridden society as a national community, subsuming, through arson and murder, class relations into the abstract identity of national sameness — the national ‘we’. National wealth and autonomy is seen to be undermined by external forces which disrupt the integrity of national economies. Thus ‘national disharmony’ is merely imported from the outside. The nationalist
critique of global capital, then, favours the strong and capable state to restore the cohesion, integrity, and wealth creating potentials of its national economy against threats to stability from the outside. Historically, the restoration of ‘national harmony’ developed through war and the transformation of economies into war economies. This transformation depends on the creation of the national ‘we’ and thus on the identification and persecution of the ‘external’ enemy within. This machination is inherently racist and can easily tip over into anti-semitism. Racism stands for a barbaric conception of ‘equality’ and, as this essay argues, anti-semitism is the objective ideology of barbarism that makes anti-capitalism directly useful for capitalism. It amounts to a fetishistic critique of bourgeois notions of equality in favour of an abstract national identity, of Volk.

10. The essay focuses on that form of anti-Semitism that found its raison d’être in Auschwitz. Such an examination sheds light on the contemporary connection between globalisation and nationalist anti-globalisation. The essay argues that anti-semitism is directly related with ‘modernity’s’ attempt at reconciling its constituting contradiction, that is the class antagonism between capital and labour. The conclusion returns to the wider discussion on anti-globalisation and offers some theoretical and practical suggestions.

II. ANTI-SEMITISM: THE OBJECTIVE IDEOLOGY OF BARBARISM

12. In the Preface to his Philosophy of Right, Hegel argued that those who render abstractions effective in social life are engaged in the destruction of social reality. Auschwitz stands for such an imposition of abstraction. There is of course a difference between the anti-Semitism that culminated in Auschwitz and the anti-Semitism of the post—1945 world. However, whether anti-Semitism persists because or despite of Auschwitz is, ultimately, an idle question. This is for two reasons: Firstly, the notions ‘despite’ and ‘because’ presuppose that the power of anti-semitic thought was somewhat put to rest at Auschwitz. It thus gives credence to Auschwitz as a factory of death that is assumed to have destroyed anti-Semitism. Furthermore, and connected, anti-Semitism is viewed as a phenomenon of the past, that merely casts its shadow on the present but has itself no real existence. In this way, overt expressions of anti-Semitism are deemed ‘ugly’ merely as pathological aberrations of an otherwise civilised world.

13. Human values such as honesty, sincerity, tolerance, and especially dignity have no price and can not be quantified, neither sold nor bought. These values connote individual human distinctiveness, difference, sense and significance, that is, Man (Mensch) in possession of himself as a subject. Yet, we are used to think in terms of abstractions, such as capital, the market, the state, the Nation, etc. These, following Sohn-Rhetel’s (1970) terminology, are really existing abstractions. The purpose of Marx’s critique of fetishism was to demystify their ostensibly objective force and to show that their apparent independence is an objective delusion. He argued that their objective force has a real existence as forms of social relations, that is, as forms constituted and reproduced through human social practice. Their objective delusion is fostered by the capitalist exchange relations themselves. They suggest that rationally acting subjects meet on the market to realise their rational interests, whereas in fact they act as executives of abstract social laws which they themselves have generated historically and reproduce through their rational behaviour and over which they have no control (Reichelt, 2002, p. 143). The critique of
political economy is fundamentally a critique of fetishism where social relations exist as relations between things, as abstractions. In the false totality of bourgeois society it takes courage to demystify abstractions. Dignity has not price. It can however be destroyed when critical—practical judgement is suspended through the identification of really existing humans as mere personifications of abstractions. There is only one human standard which, though unchangeable and indivisible, can be lost—through the imposition of abstract identity (cf. Adorno, 1990).

14. Anti-Semitism does not ‘need’ Jews. The category ‘Jew’ has powers attributed to it which can not be defined concretely. It is an abstraction that excludes nobody. Anyone can be considered a Jew. The concept ‘Jew’ knows no individuality, can not be a man or a woman, and can not be seen as a worker or beggar; the word ‘Jew’ relates to a non—person, an abstraction. ‘The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew’ (Satre, 1976, p. 69). For anti-Semitism to rage, the existence of ‘Jews’ is neither incidental nor required. ‘Anti-Semitism tends to occur only as part of an interchangeable program’, the basis of which is the ‘universal reduction of all specific energy to the one, same abstract form of labor, from the battlefield to the studio’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 207). Thus, anti-Semitism belongs to a social world in which sense and significance are sacrificed in favour of compliance with the norms and rules of a political and economic reality that poses sameness, ritualised repetition, and object—less subjectivity as Man’s only permitted mode of existence. Difference, and therewith the elevation of human dignity to a purpose of social existence, beyond and above the ritualised mentality of empty and idle thought stands rejected. The mere existence of difference, a difference that signals happiness beyond a life of rationalised production and its expansion into every area of social life fosters the blind resentment and anger that anti-Semitism focuses and exploits but does not itself produce (cf. ibid., pp. 207—8).

15. In what follows, I have freely borrowed from Horkheimer and Adorno (1989) and Postone (1986). In their Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno emphasise that Enlightenment’s ‘reason’ obtains fundamentally as ‘instrumental reason’ or ‘instrumental rationality’. Theirs is not a denunciation of ‘reason’ as such, that is of ‘reason’ as the categorical imperative that we all live a good, a dignified life. On the contrary, their concern was to criticise instrumental reason in and through which ‘reason’ subsists in a mode of being denied. Thus, they negate that ‘reason’ and ‘instrumental reason’ relate to each other in an external way. They belong together without being identical with each other. The determination of ‘reason’ as reason being denied in the form of ‘instrumental reason’ entails that instrumental reason is reason’s false friend and that, as such a friend, it negates reason’s promise to destroy all relations where humanity exists as a resource. (4)

16. Reason, Anti-Semitism and Equality

Anti-Semitism differentiates between ‘society’ and ‘national community’. ‘Society’ is identified as ‘Jewish’; whereas community is modelled as a counter—world to society. Community is seen to be constituted by nature and ‘nature’ is seen to be at risk because of ‘evil’ abstract social forces. The attributes given by the anti—Semite to Jews include mobility, intangibility, rootlessness and conspiracy against the values and cohesion of an ‘ancestral’, that is, original community. The presumed ‘well—being’ of this community is seen to be at the mercy of evil powers: intellectual thought, abstract rules and laws, and the disintegrating forces of communism and finance capital. Both, communism and finance capital are seen as uprooting powers and as entities of reason, and both are seen as the property of the rootless
intelligence of ‘Jews’, an intelligence based on reason and critical judgement. Reason stands rejected because of its infectious desire to leave behind relations of domination and exploitation. Reason is the weapon of critique. It challenges conditions where Man is degraded to a mere resource that stands to attention clicking his heels to receive the commands of those who demand the transformation of the world into one huge factory of commandeered labour. For the anti—Semite independence of thought and the ability to think freely without fear, is abhorrent. In sum, anti—semitism projects the ‘Jew’ as some—body who is not part of the — national — family.

17. Anti—Semitism as a national movement was always based on an urge which its instigators held against the Social Democrats: the urge for equality. Social Democracy sees equality as emanating from the project of the Enlightenment. It urges equality to achieve a just and fair society. This demand focuses on citizenship rights for all and on the sphere of distribution where equality of opportunity is seen as a civil good compensating for the absence of humanity at the point of production.

18. Anti—Semitism urges a different sort of equality. It derives equality from membership in a völkische community, a national community. This equality is defined by the mythical ‘property’ of land and soil based on the bond of blood. Blood and soil are configured as the mythical bond of community, of Volk, of Nation.

19. The nationalist conception of equality defines ‘society’ as the Other—a parasite whose objective is deemed to oppress, undermine and pervert the ‘natural community’ through the ‘disintegrating’ force of the abstract and intangible values of — bourgeois — civilisation. The category ‘Jew’ is seen to personify abstract thought and abstract equality, including its incarnation, money. The Volksgenosse, then, is seen as somebody who resists ‘Jewish’ abstract values and instead upholds some sort of natural equality. Their ‘equality’ as Jews obtains as a construct to which all those belong who deviate from the conception of the Volksgenosse, that is, mythical concrete matter. In this way, then, ‘the portrait of the Jews that the nationalists offer to the world is in fact their own self—portrait’ (Horkeimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 168). The Volksgenosse sees himself as a son of nature and thus as a natural being. He sees his natural destiny in the liberation of the national community from rootless, abstract values, demanding their naturalisation so that everthing is returned to ‘nature’. The Volksgenosse portrays himself as rooted in blood and ancestral tradition to defend his own faith in the immorality of madness. ‘The true benefit of the Volksgenosse lies in collective approval of anger’ (ibid., 170). This anger is directed towards civilisation’s supposed victory over nature, a victory that is seen as condemning the Volksgenosse to sweat, toil and physical effort, whereas the Other is seen to live a life as banker and speculator. This the Volksgenosse aspires for himself with murder becoming the climax of his aspiration. The Volksgenosse speculates in death and banks the extracted gold teeth.

20. For the Volksgenossen, the Jews ‘are the scapegoats not only for individual manoeuvres and machinations but in a broader sense, inasmuch as the economic injustice of the whole class is attributed to them’ (ibid., p. 174). The separation, then, of community from society is not only conceived as a liberating action but, also, as a moral obligation: anti—Semitism calls for a ‘just’ revenge on the part of the ‘victimised’ national community against the powers of rootless society. ‘Community’ is seen to be both victimised and ‘strong’. Strength is derived from the biological conception of the national community: blood constituted possession and tradition. This
biologisation of community finds legitimation for murder in the biologisation of the ‘action’: biology is conceived as a destiny. From this follows the demand to overturn and break society’s hold on community in order for the latter to reassert its purity. The means legitimate the ends. ‘As a perfect madman or absolutely rational individual, he destroys his opponent by individual acts of terror or by the carefully conceived strategy of extermination’ (ibid., p. 191).

21. In a world where the ‘true social individual’ (cf. Marx) subsists against himself in the commodity form, the power of reason finds its claim to reason perverted by the very forces upon which it rests. Reason that escorted the primitive accumulation of capital with the promise of human dignity, appears transformed into the idle occupation of killing for the sake of killing. Kant’s notion that reason was to lead mankind to maturity formulated reason’s claim to think beyond itself in order to find deliverance in significance and meaning, in humanity. This is reason’s moral and indeed revolutionary imperative. However, reason is not one-sided; it has a darker side as de Sade showed. This darker side subsists as instrumental rationality, a joyless rationality interested only in calculability be it in terms of an all pervasive market rationality or fordist production processes.(5) Instrumental rationality does not know human values. Everything and everybody is just a tool, an utility, in the forward march of accumulation for accumulation’s sake. For instrumental rationality, human values are a scandal for they inhibit the full utilisation of technical efficacy and humanity is merely conceived as an irritating factor of production, a living resource that has to be integrated into the well-oiled systems of economic production and political machines.

22. The Cartesian dualism between subject and matter emphasises pure reason as an abstraction devoid of social content and thus in sharp contrast to reason’s claim to lead humanity’s exodus from its self—imposed immaturity. Within the negative dialectic of the Enlightenment, instrumental rationality is reason’s other — its constituting — self (Horkheimer, 1985). Reason’s claim to lead the exodus to a better world and the resourceful rationality of instrumental reason are two halves of the same walnut: Revolution and its containment in the name of revolution itself. ‘The thought of happiness without power is unbearable because it would then be true happiness’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 172). Instrumental reason is reason denied. It allows merely technological revolutions and is interested merely in the corrosion of character — Men with no qualities, humans of standardised and yet flexible issue, always prepared to be called upon to function as resourceful tools for profitable calculations whatever the ‘product’.

23. All that instrumental rationality wishes for itself is how best to achieve the optimum result, how best to increase efficiency be it in terms of produced cars or gassed corpses. It is interested only in quantifiable results regardless of content. The efficient organisation and the cold, dispassionate execution of the deed — the cruelty of silence in the house of the hangman — is mirrored by its disregard for individuality; corpses all look the same when counting the results and they are equal to each other; and nothing distinguishes a number from a number except, of course, the difference in quantity — the measure of success. The mere existence of happiness is a provocation. Judgement is suspended. Everybody is numbered and assessed for use. ‘The morbid aspect of anti—Semitism is not projective behaviour as such, but the absence from it of reflection’ (ibid., p. 189). The attack on reason set ‘loose all irrational powers — a movement that ends with the total functionalization of the mind’ (Marcuse, 1988, p. 23). Auschwitz is beyond comprehension. ‘The soul, as the possibility of self—comprehending guilt, is destroyed’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 198).
24. Anti—Semitism’s stigmatisation of reason and money as evil not only mythologises reason and money as forces that come from nowhere. It also produces the legend that those with a ‘home’, ‘tradition’, ‘roots’ and ‘soil’ are mere objects of evil, abstract forces of darkness. The insight that ‘the constitution of the world occurs behind the backs of the individuals, yet it is their work’ (Marcuse, 1988, p. 151) is turned against itself: nationalists agree that the world makes itself manifest behind the backs of what they consider as the People. Yet, they deny that it is their work. Instead, it is a world of evil forces conspiring to undermine relations of national harmony. The evil force is personified in the category ‘Jew’. Capitalism becomes Jewish capitalism and globalisation a Jewish conspiracy. In the struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ reconciliation appears neither possible nor desirable. Evil needs to be eradicated in order for the ‘good’ to be set free. The paradox of this claim seems clear, or so it seems. The attack on ‘reason’ rests on the employment of reason’s other self: instrumental rationality, confirming, rather than denying, the circumstance that Nazism was less an aberration in the forward march of instrumental reason than the transformation of the forward march itself into delusion. ‘The unleashed colossi of the manufacturing industries did not overcome the individual by granting him full satisfaction but by eliminating his character as a subject. This is the source of their complete rationality, which coincides with their madness’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 205). Thus the negative dialectic of the Enlightenment: the ‘victory of society over nature changes everything into pure nature’ (ibid., p. 186). Civilisation’s supposed victory over nature is assumed to have overcome its own law of impoverishment. This ‘notion which justified the whole system, that of man as a person, a bearer of reason, is destroyed’ (ibid., p. 204). Auschwitz, then, confirms the ‘stubbornness’ of the principle of ‘abstraction’ not only through mass killing but also, and because of it, through ‘abstractification’. The biologisation of the abstract as ‘Jew’ denied not only humanity, as the ‘Jew’ stands expelled from the biologised community of the concrete. The abstract is also made abstract: all that can be used is used like teeth, hair, skin; labour—power; and, finally, the abstract is made abstract and thus invisible itself through gas. The invisible hand of the market, identified as the abstract—biological power of the ‘Jew’, is transformed into the invisible itself. Within the negative dialectic of the Enlightenment, Auschwitz stands for the ‘victory’ of instrumental reason over reason’s moral imperative that we all live a good life in dignity. Reason’s claim to lead humanity out of self—imposed immaturity showed itself as smoked—filled air.

25. Nazism’s Anti—capitalist National Socialism projected itself as an anti—capitalist movement. This projection should not be dismissed out of hand. As the late left—wing terrorist Ulrike Meinhoff put it, ‘finance capital and the banks, the hard core of the system of imperialism and capitalism, had turned the hatred of men against money and exploitation, and against the Jews...Anti—semitism is really a hatred of capitalism’ (quoted in Rose, 1990, p. 304).(6) Yet, National Socialism also embraced industrial capital and new technology. Indeed, according to Aly and Heym (1988), the preparation of the Final Solution in occupied Poland was based less on anti—Semitism as an ideology, but, in fact, followed the instrumental reasoning of Neo—Malthusian resource management. Their argument is that, for the Nazis, the economic viability of occupied Poland depended on the reduction of the population per capita in order to secure that capital exported to Poland could be applied efficiently.

26. What is the relationship between Nazism’s anti—capitalist ideological projection and the rational calculation that proposes mass murder as a ‘solution’ to capitalist profitability? Nazi
anti—Semitism is different from the anti—Semitism of the old Christian world. This does not mean that it did not exploit Christian anti—Semitism. Christian anti—Semitism constructed the ‘Jew’ as an abstract social power: The ‘Jew’ stands accused as the assassin of Jesus and is thus persecuted as the son of a murderer. In modern anti—Semitism, the Jew was chosen because of the ‘religious horror the latter has always inspired’ (Sartre, 1976, p. 68). In the Christian world, the ‘Jew’ was also a social—economic construct by virtue of being forced to fill the vital economic function of trafficking in money. Thus, the economic curse that this social role entailed, reinforced the religious curse.

27. Modern anti—Semitism uses and exploits these historical constructions and transforms them: The Jew stands accused and is persecuted for following unproductive activities. His image is that of an intellectual and banker. ‘Bankers and intellectuals, money and mind, the exponents of circulation, form the impossible ideal of those who have been maimed by domination, an image used by domination to perpetuate itself’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 172). The ‘Jew’ is seen as one who is not rooted in ‘concrete matter’ and as such accused to stand behind phenomena. The biologically defined possession of land and tradition is counterposed to the possession of universal, abstract values. The terms ‘abstract, rationalist, intellectual...take a pejorative sense; it could not be otherwise, since the anti—Semite lays claim to a concrete and irrational possession of the values of the nation’ (Satre, 1976, p. 109). The abstract values themselves are biologised, the abstract is identified as ‘Jew’. Both, thus, the ‘concrete’ and the ‘abstract’ are biologised: one through the possession of land (the concrete as rooted in nature, blood and tradition) and the other through the possession of ‘poison’ (the abstract as the rootless power of intelligence and money). The myth of national unity is counterposed to the myth of the Jew. Tradition is counterposed to reasoning, intelligence, and self—reflection; and the nationalist conception of community, economy and labour is counterposed to the abstract forces of international finance and communism. All these abstract values are deemed to be Jewish values: Jewry is seen to stand behind the urban world of crime, prostitution, and vulgar, materialist culture. ‘The illusory conspiracy of corrupt Jewish bankers financing Bolshevism is a sign of innate impotence’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 172). The Volksgenossen are thus equal in blindness. ‘Blindness is all—embracing because it comprehends nothing’ (ibid., p. 172). In short, ‘pogroms demonstrate the impotence of sense, significance and ultimately truth. The idle occupation of killing confirms the stubbornness of the life to which one has to conform, and to resign oneself’ (ibid., p. 171).

28. Nationalist anti—capitalism, this barbaric critique of speculation, articulates a senseless rejection of capitalism that renders anti—capitalism functional for capitalism. ‘The rulers are only safe as long as the people they rule turn their longed—for goals into hated forms of evil’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 199). The Jews seem ready made for the projection of horror. ‘No matter what the Jews as such may be like, their image, as that of the defeated people, has the features to which totalitarian domination must be completely hostile: happiness without power, wages without work, a home without frontiers, religion without myth. These characteristics are hated by the rulers because the ruled secretly long to possess them’ (ibid.). Anti—Semitism invited the ruled to stabilise domination by urging them to de—humanise, maim and kill, suppressing the very possibility and idea of happiness through their participation in the rationally organised slaughter, robbing the projected—capitalist — Others of all possession, including their life. Fascism, then, ‘is also totalitarian in that it seeks to make the rebellion of suppressed
nature against domination directly useful to domination. This machinery needs the Jews’ (ibid., p.185). This insight poses the issue of Nazism’s anti—capitalist capitalism, that is, its espousal of capitalist enterprise and its tirades against ‘Jewish capitalism’. Anticipating much of the following argument, the fetishistic critique of capitalism as ‘Jewish capitalism’ argues that capitalism is in fact nothing more than an unproductive money—making system. The Nation is deemed productive and capitalism is projected on to the racist image of the ‘money Jew’. The nationalist critique of global capital is based on a dualist conception between, on the one hand, social relations as relations between creative, industrious individuals and, on the other, their subordination to relations between things, to money.

29. Marx’s critique of fetishism supplied an uncompromising critique of this dualist conception by making clear that the two do not exist independent from each other but are in fact each other’s mode of existence. The critique of capital has to be a critique of economic categories, and that is, a critique of the fetishism of the commodity form which entails the exploitation of labour and the form of money as its presupposition. Without such a critique, it is all too easy to succumb to the objective delusion that the commodity form presents. On the one hand, there is the separation of reality into concrete matter and abstract destructive force, leading to the fetish—like endorsement of the concrete, of creative enterprise and of industry supplying material products that satisfy wants. On the other hand, there is the abstract sphere occupied by money and finance, specifically speculation and global finance capital. The celebration of the concrete goes hand—in hand with the rejection of the mobility, universality and intangibility of finance capital that is charged with knowing neither national identity nor national ‘responsibility’. The Vampire—like figure of capital sucking labour in the quest for surplus value, portrayed by Marx in Capital, is thus displaced: the Vampire becomes money. Industrial enterprise, rather than being conceived in terms of an enterprise of exploitation, is projected as the ‘national laboratory’ of concrete, creative labour. It is projected as a national community where national labour is employed in the much praised one—national boat. The viability of this labour is seen to be threatened by money. Money is conceived as the root of all evil and the cause of all perversion. Enterprise and industry are fetishised as concrete community, as concrete nature. National industrial endeavour is thus portrayed as a ‘victim’ of the evil forces of abstract values, of money. In sum, modern anti—semitism is the barbaric ideology of what Marx (1966, p. 438) described in his analysis of the role of credit as the ‘abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself’. National Socialism focuses the resolution of this negative abolition on the national state as the ‘harmonies’ last refuge’ (Marx, 1973, p. 886) that restores in the face of global economic turmoil, the alleged ‘communal interest’ in the exploitation of labour through terror.

30. For the anti—Semites, the world appears to be divided between finance capital and concrete nature. The concrete is conceived as immediate, direct, matter for use, and rooted in industry and productive activity. Money, on the other hand, is not only conceived as the root of all evil, it is also judged as rootless and of existing not only independently from industrial capital but, also, over and against the industrial endeavour of the nation: all enterprise is seen to be perverted in the name of money’s continued destructive quest for self—expansion.(7) In this way, money, that is financial capital, is identified with capitalism while industry is perceived as constituting the concrete and creative enterprise of a national community. Between capitalism as monetary accumulation and national community as industrial enterprise, it is money which calls the shots.
In this view, industry and enterprise are ‘made’ capitalist by money: money penetrates all expressions of industry and thus perverts and disintegrates community in the name of finance capital’s abstract values. This destructive force puts claim on and so perverts: the individual as entrepreneur; the creative in terms of a paternalist direction of use—value production; the rooted in terms of Volk; the community in terms of a natural community. Instead of community’s natural order of hierarchy and position, money’s allegedly artificial and rootless force is judged to make the world go round by uprooting the natural order of the Volksgenossen. In this way, then, it is possible for the Volksgenossen not only to embrace capitalism but, also, to declare that the exploitation of labour creates freedom: Arbeit macht frei. ‘They declared that work was not degrading, so as to control the others more rationally. They claimed to be creative workers, but in reality they were still the grasping overlords of former times’ (ibid., p. 173). By separating what fundamentally belongs together, that is ‘industrial’ exploitation and money, the differentiation between money on the one hand, and industry and enterprise, on the other, allows the attack on reason and universality in the name of instrumental rationality set to work to improve capital efficiency.

31. With the biologisation of creative activity, the unfettered operation of the exploitation of labour in the name blood and soil is rendered attainable by the elimination of the cajoling and perverting forces of the abstract — the ‘money Jew’. In this way, the ideology of blood and soil, on the one hand, and machinery and unfettered industrial expansion, on the other, are projected as images of a healthy nation that stands ready to purge itself from the perceived perversion of industry by the abstract, universal, rootless, mobile, intangible, international ‘vampire’ of ‘Jewish capitalism’. The celebration of the Volksgenosse as the personification of the concrete, of blood, soil, tradition and industry, manifests a stubbornness of the most industrial kind: killing as an idle and efficiently discharged occupation. Their stubbornness only serves to strengthen their sense of destiny. As Volksgenossen they have all committed the same deed and have thus become truly equal to each other: their occupation only confirmed what they already knew, namely that they had lost their individuality as subjects.

32. The transformation of judgement and sense into blind compliance with instrumental rationality renders hope in a human world impotent. ‘In spite of, and because of, the evident evil nature of domination, the latter has becomes so supremely powerful that each individual in his impotence can exorcise his fate only by blind obedience’ (ibid., p. 199). ‘Anti—Semitic behaviour is generated in situations where blinded men robbed of their subjectivity are set loose as subjects’ (ibid., p. 171). They were set loose as subjects of instrumental reason and are thus robbed of their subjectivity as social individuals to whom reason has and reveals meaning and significance. While reason subsists in and through the critique of social relations, the Volksgenosse has only faith in the efficiently unleashed terror of instrumental rationality. The collection of gold—teeth from those murdered, the collection of hair from those to be killed, and the overseeing of the slave—labour of those allowed to walk on their knees for no more than another day, only requires effective organisation.

33. Everything is thus changed into pure nature. The abstract was not only personalised, it was also ‘abstractified’. Auschwitz was a factory ‘to destroy the personification of the abstract. Its organisation was that of a fiendish industrial process, the aim of which was to “liberate” the concrete from the abstract. The first step was to dehumanize, that is, to strip away the “mask” of humanity, of qualitative specificity, and reveal the Jews for what “they really are” — shadows,
ciphers, numbered abstraction’. Then followed the process to ‘eradicate that abstractness, to transform it into smoke, trying in the process to wrest away the last remnants of the concrete material “use—values”: clothes, gold, hair, soap’ (Postone, 1986, pp. 313—14).

34. The treatment of humanity as a resource and the demand that humanity is a purpose, both of these ideas belong to the tradition of the Enlightenment. The treatment of humanity as a resource has, at times, been overshadowed by the social democratic conception of equality. This project could not succeed: the attempt to humanise the inhuman finds itself confronted by the paradox that the effort of ‘humanising’ presupposes inhuman conditions. Thus, the limits of reason within the tradition of the Enlightenment whose project of ‘civilisation’ presupposes the continuous guarantee of abstract value through exploitation. Auschwitz destroyed the hope in the Enlightenment’s civilising project. ‘The dialectic of Enlightenment is transformed objectively into delusion’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989, p. 204).

III. CONCLUSION

35. Adam Smith was certain in his own mind that capitalism creates the wealth of nations and he noted that ‘the proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country where he could either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease’ (1981, pp. 848—49). Ricardo concurred, adding that ‘if a capital is not allowed to get the greatest net revenue that the use of machinery will afford here, it will be carried abroad’ leading to ‘serious discouragement to the demand for labour’ (Ricardo, 1995, p. 39). According to Hegel, the accumulation of wealth renders those who depend on the sale of their labour power for their social reproduction, insecure in deteriorating conditions. He concluded that despite the accumulation of wealth, bourgeois society will find it most difficult to keep the dependent masses pacified, and he saw the form of the state as the means of reconciling the social antagonism, containing the dependent masses. Ricardo formulated the necessity of capitalist social relations to produce ‘redundant population’. Marx developed this insight and showed that the idea of ‘equal rights’ is in principle a bourgeois right. In its content, it is a right of inequality (see Marx, 1968). Against the bourgeois form of formal equality, he argued that communism rests on the equality of individual human needs. Adorno and Horkheimer have argued that anti—semitism is a fetishistic, barbaric critique of capitalism that makes the hatred of capitalism directly useful for capitalism. Luxemburg has argued that the fight against barbarism is a fight for socialism.

36. The history of capitalism shows that the so—called golden age of the capitalism of the 1950s was an exception, if indeed it was golden at all. It did not come about as a result of either cosmopolitan reason or commitments to redistributive justice. As Gambino (1996) has shown, Fascism and Nazism were not in their origins the losing versions of Fordism, but were forced to become such thanks to the class struggles of the 1930s in the United States. This struggle is the practical question of our time.

37. What is the contemporary meaning of this question? “The renunciation of internationalism in the name of resurgent nationalism” is the biggest danger (Clarke, 2001, p.91). “Anti—globalisation” gives in to reactionary forces if its critique of globalisation is a critique for
the national state. The history of protectionism, national self—sufficiency and “national money” has always been a world market history (Bonefeld, 2000) — there are however disturbing exceptions like, for example, Nazi—Germany, Albania during the Cold War and North Korea. The critique of globalisation in favour of ‘national socialism’ merely offers, whether intentionally or not, the horrors of the past to the present as a solution.

38. The idea of saving capitalism through institutional reform from its own self—destructive dynamic has to be exposed to reveal its meaning and that is, that money must manage and organise the exploitation of labour. What is the opposite term to the unfettered global accumulation of capital? Is the opposing term the national state that, with transformed regulative powers, forces capital to guarantee the common good? The ethical appeal of the demand for regulative transformation resides in its critical comparison between the less than perfect reality of capitalist relations and the pleasant norms of equality and justice. Such critical comparison fails to see that the pleasant norms are adequate to their content, the bad reality of a capitalist mode of production. Marx’s (1973, pp. 248—49) critique of ‘the foolishness of socialists...who want to depict socialism as the realization of the ideals of bourgeois society’ was unambiguous: ‘What divides these gentlemen from the bourgeois apologist is, on the one side, their sensitivity to the contradictions included in the system; on the other, the utopian inability to grasp the necessary difference between the real and the ideal form of bourgeois society, which is the cause of their desire to undertake the superfluous business of realizing the ideal expression again, which is in fact only the inverted projection [Lichtblick] of this reality’. In short, the much desired benevolent regulation of capital presupposes inhuman conditions and these find a political expression in the form of the state which Marx summarised as: ‘the concentration of bourgeois society’. In short, discontent with — neo—liberal — politicians amounts to, paraphrasing Marx, a critique of character masks, deflecting from the social constitution of their existence and because of this, it affirms the state as if it were an “independent being which possesses its own intellectual, ethical and libertarian bases” (Marx, 1968, p. 28). It thus amounts to a mere rebellion for a virtuous state — a state, that is, which secures the ‘communal interests’ of bourgeois society. Regardless of its historically changing forms (Agnoli, 1997, Clarke, 1992), the function of the capitalist state has always been to secure the ‘communal interests’ of a capitalistically organised form of social reproduction: capitalist accumulation.

39. Lastly, the critique of globalisation fails if it is merely a critique of speculative capital and that is, a critique for productive accumulation. It was the crisis of productive accumulation that sustained the divorce of monetary accumulation from productive accumulation (Bonefeld and Holloway, 1996). Globalisation is not responsible for the ever more precarious conditions of work, poverty, and debt, and the ever more destructive force of speculation. Rather, and as Daniel Cohen (1997, p. 15) has argued, it is the restructuring of work that makes globalisation possible and gives globalisation a bad name. This then means that ‘anti—globalisation’ has to be a critique of the capitalistically constituted relations of production. The critique of, for example, the WTO is not enough. Trade, whether deemed fair or unfair, presupposes capitalist relations of exploitation. Further, without the critique of exploitation, the critique of speculation leads with necessity to xenophobia and anti—semitic denunciations of money. It conceals the relations of exploitation and is complicit, whether intentionally or not, in the critique of finance as parasitic. Nazi anti—semitism shows what that means.
40. The rejection of the bourgeois relations of abstract equality in favour of nationalist conceptions of equality is reactionary. This is the law of abstract equality: ‘The power which each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of exchange value, of money. The individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in his pocket’ (Marx, 1973, pp. 156—57). And the law of the national equality of a people? It is racist. Nationalism is capitalism’s barbaric ideology and anti—semitism is the objective ideology of barbarism (Enderwitz, 1991). The critique of abstract equality has to be an anti—national critique and that is, a critique of capital and its state — the political master of the national homogenisation of human relations as mere personifications of relations between things.

41. The theoretical and practical orientation on the utopia of the society of the free and equal is the only realistic departure from the inhumanity that the world market society of capital posits (cf. Agnoli, 2000). In short, those who seriously want freedom and equality as social individuals but do not wish to destabilise capitalism and instead wish to regulate ‘abstractions’, be it capital or the market, contradict themselves. The attempt to regulate abstractions affirms their constituted existence and thus renders them effective. The struggle for socialism is a struggle against abstractions — and ‘abstractifications’ — and that is, a struggle for the equality of individual human needs. Paraphrasing Marx (1959, p. 93), ‘it is precisely necessary to avoid ever again to counterpose “society” as an abstraction, to the individual’.

42. Anti—capitalism has, thus, to mean anti—capitalism. It has to mean the complete democratisation of all social forces, making them accountable to individual human needs in and through the democratic organisation of socially necessary labour by the freely associated producers themselves. The democratisation of human social relations opens the right perspective for the struggle for a world where the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. ‘Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man [Menschen] himself’ (Marx, 1964, p. 370).

43. The democratic organisation of economic relations of necessity and the reduction of labour time belong together as each other’s presupposition. How much labour time was needed in 2002 to produce the same amount of commodities that was produced in 1992? Twenty percent? Forty percent or fifty percent? Whatever the percentage might be, what is certain is that labour time has not decreased. It has increased. What is certain too is that the distribution of wealth is as unequal as never before. And how does bourgeois society cope with the expansion of ‘redundant populations’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the overaccumulation of abstract wealth, of capital? The contradiction between the forces and relations of production does seeks resolution: destruction of productive forces, scrapping of labour through war and generalised poverty and misery, the racist demand for national equality, and all this against the background of an unprecedented accumulation of wealth and the ever more destructive attempts to valorise atoms of time through greater labour flexibility.

44. In conclusion, anti—capitalism has to demand the democratic organisation of socially necessary labour time by the associated producers themselves. This, then, is the splendid category of full employment in and through the emancipation of labour that Marx conceived as the democratic organisation of necessity through the realm of freedom. Democracy means human self—determination, that is, human sovereignty and thus human dignity. Anti—capitalist indifference to the project of human emancipation does not pose an alternative to capitalism. It succumbs to abstractions, deprives itself of the weapon of reason, and leaves the door open to
socialism’s alternative, that is, barbarism. The more improbable socialism appears, the more desperately one has to stand up for it’ (Horkheimer, 1974, p. 253).
NOTES

1) I wish to thank Ana Dinerstein, John Holloway, Susanne Soederberg, and Greg Schwartz. The usual disclaimers apply.


3) On this the exchange between de Angelis, Bonefeld and Zaremka in The Commoner.

4) This is the basis of their claim that ‘enlightenment which is in possession of itself and coming to power can break the bounds of enlightenment’ (p. 208).

5) On the connection between ‘Fordism’ and concentration camps see Gambino’s important analysis of the origins of Fordism. As he puts it, ‘the assembly line is, together with totalitarian state systems and racist nationalism, one of the originating structures which broadly explain the concentration—camp crimes perpetrated on an industrial scale’. The history of so-called Fordism is often seen as a phase where capitalism took on reforming itself in a social—democratic manner. However, as Gambino emphasises, ‘Fascism and Nazism were not in their origins the losing versions of Fordism, but were forced to become such thanks to the social and working—class struggles of the 1930s in the United States’ (Gambino, 1996, p. 48).

6) Rose’s book offers a conventional conservative critique of revolutionary thought. For a thorough assessment, see IFS (2000).

7) On the internal relationship between industrial capital and finance capital, see Clarke (1978). On Marx’s conception of money, see Bonefeld (1996).

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