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Archive-name: ar-faq
Last-modified: 95/Apr/29
Version: ar_faq.txt 2.08a
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Animal Rights
Frequently Asked Questions
(AR FAQ)
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INTRODUCTION
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Welcome to the Animal Rights Frequently Asked Questions text (AR FAQ).
This FAQ is intended to satisfy two basic goals: a) to provide a source
of information and encouragement for people exploring the issues involved
in the animal rights movement, and b) to answer the common questions and
justifications offered up by AR opponents. It is unashamedly an advocacy
vehicle for animal rights. Opponents of AR are invited to create a FAQ
that codifies their views; we do not attempt to do so here.
The FAQ restricts itself specifically to AR issues; nutrition and
other vegetarian/veganism issues are intentionally avoided because they
are already well covered in the existing vegetarianism and veganism FAQs
maintained by Michael Traub. To obtain these FAQs, contact Michael at
his e-mail address given below.
The FAQ was created through a collaboration of authors. The answers have
been attributed via initials, as follows:
TA Ted Altar taltar@beaufort.sfu.ca
JE Jonathan Esterhazy jester@cc.umanitoba.ca
DG Donald Graft dgraft@gate.net
JEH John Harrington jeh@bisoym.com
DVH Dietrich Von Haugwitz vonha001@mc.duke.edu
LJ Leor Jacobi leor@mellers1.psych.berkeley.edu
LK Larry Kaiser lkaiser@umich.edu
JK Jeremy Keens keens@pitvax.xx.rmit.edu.au
BL Brian Luke luke@checkov.hm.udayton.edu
PM Peggy Madison madison@alpha.acast.nova.edu
BRO Brian Owen brian6@vaxc.middlesex.ac.uk
JSD Janine Stanley-Dunham janine@wlb.hwwilson.com
JLS Jennifer Stephens jlstephe@uncc.edu
MT Michael Traub traub@btcs.bt.co.uk
AECW Allen ECW aecw001@mayfair.demon.co.uk
The current FAQ maintainer is Donald Graft (see address above). Ideas and
criticisms are actively solicited and will be very gratefully received. The
material included here is released to the public domain. We request that it
be distributed without alteration to respect the author attributions.
This FAQ contains 96 questions. If they are not all present, then a mailer
has probably truncated it. Contact the FAQ maintainer for a set of split-up
files.
DG
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GENERAL
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#1 What is all this Animal Rights (AR) stuff and why should
it concern me?
-----------------------
The fundamental principle of the AR movement is that nonhuman animals
deserve to live according to their own natures, free from harm, abuse, and
exploitation. This goes further than just saying that we should treat
animals well while we exploit them, or before we kill and eat them. It
says animals have the RIGHT to be free from human cruelty and
exploitation, just as humans possess this right. The withholding of this
right from the nonhuman animals based on their species membership is
referred to as "speciesism".
Animal rights activists try to extend the human circle of respect and
compassion beyond our species to include other animals, who are also
capable of feeling pain, fear, hunger, thirst, loneliness, and kinship.
When we try to do this, many of us come to the conclusion that we can no
longer support factory farming, vivisection, and the exploitation of
animals for entertainment. At the same time, there are still areas of
debate among animal rights supporters, for example, whether ANY research
that harms animals is ever justified, where the line should be drawn for
enfranchising species with rights, on what occasions civil disobedience
may be appropriate, etc. However, these areas of potential disagreement do
not negate the abiding principles that join us: compassion and concern
for the pain and suffering of nonhumans.
One main goal of this FAQ is to address the common justifications that
arise when we become aware of how systematically our society abuses and
exploits animals. Such "justifications" help remove the burden from our
consciences, but this FAQ attempts to show that they do not excuse the
harm we cause other animals. Beyond the scope of this FAQ, more detailed
arguments can be found in three classics of the AR literature.
The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan (ISBN 0-520-05460-1)
In Defense of Animals, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-06-097044-8)
Animal Liberation, Peter Singer (ISBN 0-380-71333-0, 2nd Ed.)
While appreciating the important contributions of Regan and Singer, many
animal rights activists emphasize the role of empathetic caring as the
actual and most appropriate fuel for the animal rights movement in
contradistinction to Singer's and Regan's philosophical rationales. To the
reader who says "Why should I care?", we can point out the following
reasons:
One cares about minimizing suffering.
One cares about promoting compassion in human affairs.
One is concerned about improving the health of humanity.
One is concerned about human starvation and malnutrition.
One wants to prevent the radical disruption of our planet's ecosystem.
One wants to preserve animal species.
One wants to preserve wilderness.
The connections between these issues and the AR agenda may not be obvious.
Please read on as we attempt to clarify this.
DG
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand
of tyranny.
Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)
Life is life--whether in a cat, or dog or man. There is no difference
there between a cat or a man. The idea of difference is a human
conception for man's own advantage...
Sri Aurobindo (poet and philosopher)
Non-violence leads to the highest ethics, which is the goal of all
evolution. Until we stop harming all other living beings, we are still
savages.
Thomas Edison (inventor)
The time will come when men such as I will look upon the murder of
animals as they now look on the murder of men.
Leonardo Da Vinci (artist and scientist)
SEE ALSO #2-#3, #26, #87-#91
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#2 Is the Animal Rights movement different from the Animal Welfare
movement? The Animal Liberation movement?
-----------------------
The Animal Welfare movement acknowledges the suffering of nonhumans and
attempts to reduce that suffering through "humane" treatment, but it does
not have as a goal elimination of the use and exploitation of animals. The
Animal Rights movement goes significantly further by rejecting the
exploitation of animals and according them rights in that regard. A person
committed to animal welfare might be concerned that cows get enough space,
proper food, etc., but would not necessarily have any qualms about killing
and eating cows, so long as the rearing and slaughter are "humane".
The Animal Welfare movement is represented by such organizations as the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the Humane Society.
Having said this, it should be realized that some hold a broader
interpretation of the AR movement. They would argue that the AW groups do,
in fact, support rights for animals (e.g., a dog has the right not to be
kicked). Under this interpretation, AR is viewed as a broad umbrella
covering the AW and strict AR groups. This interpretation has the advantage
of moving AR closer to the mainstream. Nevertheless, there is a valid
distinction between the AW and AR groups, as described in the first paragraph.
Animal Liberation (AL) is, for many people, a synonym for Animal Rights
(but see below). Some people prefer the term "liberation" because it brings
to mind images of other successful liberation movements, such as the movement
for liberation of slaves and liberation of women, whereas the term "rights"
often encounters resistance when an attempt is made to apply it to nonhumans.
The phrase "Animal Liberation" became popular with the publication of Peter
Singer's classic book of the same name.
This use of the term liberation should be distinguished from the literal
meaning discussed in question #88, i.e., an Animal Liberationist is not
necessarily one who engages in forceful civil disobedience or unlawful
actions.
Finally, intellectual honesty compels us to acknowledge that the account
given here is rendered in broad strokes (but is at least approximately
correct), and purposely avoids describing ongoing debate about the meaning
of the terms "Animal Rights", "Animal Liberation", and "Animal Welfare",
debate about the history of these movements, and debate about the actual
positions of the prominent thinkers. To depict the flavor of such debates,
the following text describes one coherent position. Naturally, it will be
attacked from all sides!
Some might suggest that a subtle distinction can be made between the Animal
Liberation and Animal Rights movements. The Animal Rights movement, at least
as propounded by Regan and his adherents, is said to require total abolition
of such practices as experimentation on animals. The Animal Liberation
movement, as propounded by Singer and his adherents, is said to reject the
absolutist view and assert that in some cases, such experimentation can be
morally defensible. Because such cases could also justify some experiments
on humans, however, it is not clear that the distinction described reflects
a difference between the liberation and rights views, so much as it does a
broader difference of ethical theory, i.e., absolutism versus utilitarianism.
DG
Historically, animal welfare groups have attempted to improve the lot of
animals in society. They worked against the popular Western concept of
animals as lacking souls and not being at all worthy of any ethical
consideration. The animal rights movement set itself up as an abolitionist
alternative to the reform-minded animal welfarists. As the animal rights
movement has become larger and more influential, the animal exploiters have
finally been forced to respond to it. Perhaps inspired by the efforts of Tom
Regan to distinguish AR from AW, industry groups intent on maintaining the
status quo have embraced the term "animal welfare". Pro-vivisection,
hunting, trapping, agribusiness, and animal entertainment groups now refer
to themselves as "animal welfare" supporters. Several umbrella groups whose
goal is to defend these practices have also arisen.
This classic case of public-relations doublespeak acknowledges the issue
of cruelty to animals in name only, while allowing for the continued use and
abuse of animals. The propaganda effect is to stigmatize animal rights
supporters as being extreme while attempting to portray themselves as the
reasonable moderates. Nowadays, the cause of "animal welfare" is invoked by
the animal industry at least as often as it is used by animal protection
groups.
LJ
SEE ALSO: #1, #3, #87-#88
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#3 What exactly are rights and what rights can we give animals?
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Despite arguably being the foundation of the Western liberal tradition,
the concept of "rights" has been a source of controversy and confusion
in the debate over AR. A common objection to the notion that animals have
rights involves questioning the origin of those rights. One such argument
might proceed as follows:
Where do these rights come from? Are you in special communication
with God, and he has told you that animals have rights? Have the
rights been granted by law? Aren't rights something that humans
must grant?
It is true that the concept of "rights" needs to be carefully explicated.
It is also true that the concept of "natural rights" is fraught with
philosophical difficulties. Complicating things further is the confusion
between legal rights and moral rights.
One attempt to avoid this objection is to accept it, but argue that
if it is not an obstacle for thinking of humans as having rights, then it
should not be an obstacle for thinking of animals as having rights. Henry
Salt wrote:
Have the lower animals "rights?" Undoubtedly--if men have. That is
the point I wish to make evident in this opening chapter... The
fitness of this nomenclature is disputed, but the existence of some
real principle of the kind can hardly be called in question; so that
the controversy concerning "rights" is little else than an academic
battle over words, which leads to no practical conclusion. I shall
assume, therefore, that men are possessed of "rights," in the sense
of Herbert Spencer's definition; and if any of my readers object to
this qualified use of the term, I can only say that I shall be
perfectly willing to change the word as soon as a more appropriate
one is forthcoming. The immediate question that claims our attention
is this--if men have rights, have animals their rights also?
Satisfying though this argument may be, it still leaves us unable to
respond to the sceptic who disavows the notion of rights even for humans.
Fortunately, however, there is a straightforward interpretation of
"rights" that is plausible and allows us to avoid the controversial
rights rhetoric and underpinnings. It is the notion that a "right" is the
flip side of a moral imperative. If, ethically, we must
refrain from an act performed on a being, then that being can be said to
have a "right" that the act not be performed. For example, if our ethics
tells us that we must not kill another, then the other has a right not to
be killed by us. This interpretation of rights is, in fact, an intuitive
one that people both understand and readily endorse. (Of course, rights so
interpreted can be codified as legal rights through appropriate
legislation.)
It is important to realize that, although there is a basis for speaking
of animals as having rights, that does not imply or require that they
possess all the rights that humans possess, or even that humans possess all
the rights that animals possess. Consider the human right to vote. (On the
view taken here, this would derive from an ethical imperative to give humans
influence over actions that influence their lives.) Since animals lack the
capacity to rationally consider actions and their implications, and to
understand the concept of democracy and voting, they lack the capacity to
vote. There is, therefore, no ethical imperative to allow them to do so,
and thus they do not possess the right to vote.
Similarly, some fowls have a strong biological need to extend and flap
their wings; right-thinking people feel an ethical imperative to make
it possible for them to do so. Thus, it can be said that fowl have the right
to flap their wings. Obviously, such a right need not be extended to humans.
The rights that animals and humans possess, then, are determined by their
interests and capacities. Animals have an interest in living, avoiding pain,
and even in pursuing happiness (as do humans). As a result of the ethical
imperatives, they have rights to these things (as do humans). They can
exercise these rights by living their lives free of exploitation and
abuse at the hands of humans.
DG
SEE ALSO: #1-#2
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#4 Isn't AR hypocritical, e.g., because you don't give rights to
insects or plants?
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The general hypocrisy argument appears in many forms. A typical form
is as follows:
"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a cow but not for a plant;
therefore, cows cannot have rights."
Arguments of this type are frequently used against AR. Not much
analysis is required to see that they carry little weight. First, one
can assert an hypothesis A that would carry as a corollary hypothesis
B. If one then fails to assert B, one is hypocritical, but this does
not necessarily make A false. Certainly, to assert A and not B would
call into question one's credibility, but it entails nothing about the
validity of A.
Second, the factual assertion of hypocrisy is often unwarranted. In
the above example, there are grounds for distinguishing between cows
and plants (plants do not have a central nervous system), so the charge
of hypocrisy is unjustified. One may disagree with the criteria, but
assertion of such criteria nullifies the charge of hypocrisy.
Finally, the charge of hypocrisy can be reduced in most cases to
simple speciesism. For example, the quote above can be recast as:
"It is hypocritical to assert rights for a human but not for a plant;
therefore, humans cannot have rights."
To escape from this reductio ad absurdum of the first quote, one
must produce a crucial relevant difference between cows and humans,
in other words, one must justify the speciesist assignment of rights
to humans but not to cows. (In question #24, we apply a similar reduction
to the charge of hypocrisy related to abortion. For questions dealing
specifically with insects and plants, refer to questions #39 through #46.)
Finally, we must ask ourselves who the real hypocrites are. The following
quotation from Michael W. Fox describes the grossly hypocritical treatment
of exploited versus companion animals.
DG
Farm animals can be kept five to a cage two feet square, tied up
constantly by a two-foot-long tether, castrated without anesthesia, or
branded with a hot iron. A pet owner would be no less than prosecuted for
treating a companion animal in such a manner; an American president was, in
fact, morally censured merely for pulling the ears of his two beagles.
Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)
SEE ALSO: #24, #39-#46
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#5 What right do AR people have to impose their beliefs on others?
-----------------------
There is a not-so-subtle distinction between imposition of one's views
and advertising them. AR supporters are certainly not imposing their views
in the sense that, say, the Spanish Inquisition imposed its views, or the
Church imposed its views on Galileo. We do, however, feel a moral duty to
present our case to the public, and often to our friends and acquaintances.
There is ample precedent for this: protests against slavery, protests
against the Vietnam War, condemnation of racism, etc.
One might point out that the gravest imposition is that of the exploiter
of animals upon his innocent and defenseless victims.
DG
If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what
they do not want to hear.
George Orwell (author)
I never give them hell. I just tell the truth and they think it's hell.
Harry S. Truman (33rd U.S. President)
SEE ALSO: #11, #87-#91
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#6 Isn't AR just another facet of political correctness?
-----------------------
If only that were true! The term "politically correct" generally refers
to a view that is in sync with the societal mainstream but which some might
be inclined to disagree with. For example, some people might be inclined
to dismiss equal treatment for the races as mere "political correctness".
The AR agenda is, currently, far from being a mainstream idea.
Also, it is ridiculous to suppose that a view's validity can be
overturned simply by attaching the label "politically correct" or
"politically incorrect".
DG
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#7 Isn't AR just another religion?
-----------------------
No. The dictionary defines "religion" as the appeal to a supernatural
power. (An alternate definition refers to devotion to a cause; that is
a virtue that the AR movement would be happy to avow.)
People who support Animal Rights come from many different religions
and many different philosophies. What they share is a belief in the
importance of showing compassion for other individuals, whether
human or nonhuman.
LK
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#8 Doesn't it demean humans to give rights to animals?
-----------------------
A tongue-in-cheek, though valid, answer to this question is given by
David Cowles-Hamar: "Humans are animals, so animal rights are human rights!"
In a more serious vein, we can observe that giving rights to women and
black people does not demean white males. By analogy, then, giving rights to
nonhumans does not demean humans. If anything, by being morally consistent,
and widening the circle of compassion to deserving nonhumans, we ennoble
humans. (Refer to question #26 for other relevant arguments.)
DG
The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way
its animals are treated.
Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)
It is man's sympathy with all creatures that first makes him truly a man.
Albert Schweitzer (statesman, Nobel 1952)
For as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other. Indeed, he
who sows the seed of murder and pain cannot reap joy and love.
Pythagoras (mathematician)
SEE ALSO: #26
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#9 Weren't Hitler and Goebbels in favor of animal rights?
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This argument is absurd and almost unworthy of serious consideration.
The questioner implies that since Hitler and Goebbels allegedly held views
supportive of animal rights (e.g., Hitler was a vegetarian for some time),
the animal rights viewpoint must be wrong or dubious.
The problem for this argument is simple: bad people and good people can
both believe things correctly. Or put in another way, just because a person
holds one bad belief (e.g., Nazism), that doesn't make all his beliefs
wrong. A few examples suffice to illustrate this. The Nazis undertook smoking
reduction campaigns. Is it therefore dubious to discourage smoking?
Early Americans withheld respect and liberty for black people. Does that
mean that they were wrong in giving respect and liberty to others?
Technically, this argument is an "ignoratio elenchus fallacy", arguing
from irrelevance.
Finally, many scholars are doubtful that Hitler and Goebbels supported
AR in any meaningful way.
DG
SEE ALSO: #54
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#10 Do you really believe that "a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy"?
-----------------------
Taken alone and literally, this notion is absurd. However, this
quote has been shamelessly removed from its original context and
misrepresented by AR opponents. The original context of the quote is
given below. Viewed within its context, it is clear that the quote
is neither remarkable nor absurd.
DG
When it comes to having a central nervous system, and the ability to
feel pain, hunger, and thirst, a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy.
Ingrid Newkirk (AR activist)
SEE ALSO: #47
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ANIMALS AND MORALITY
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#11 There is no correct or incorrect in morals; you have yours and I
have mine, right?
-----------------------
This position, known as moral relativism, is quite ancient but became
fashionable at the turn of the century, as reports on the customs of
societies alien to those found in Europe became available. It fell out of
fashion, after the Second World War, although it is occasionally revived.
Ethical propositions, we are asked to believe, are no more than statements
of personal opinion and, therefore, cannot carry absolute weight.
The main problem with this position is that ethical relativists are
unable to denounce execrable ethical practices, such as racism. On what
grounds can they condemn (if at all) Hitler's ideas on racial purity?
Are we to believe that he was uttering an ethical truth when advocating
the Final Solution?
In addition to the inability to denounce practices of other societies,
the relativists are unable to counter the arguments of even those whose
society they share. They cannot berate someone who proposes to raise
and kill infants for industrial pet food consumption, for example,
if that person sees it as morally sound. Indeed, they cannot articulate
the concept of societal moral progress, since they lack a basis for
judging progress. There is no point in turning to the relativists for
advice on ethical issues such as euthanasia, infanticide, or the use of
fetuses in research.
Faced with such arguments, ethical relativists sometimes argue that
ethical truth is based on the beliefs of a society; ethical truth is
seen as nothing more than a reflection of societal customs and habits.
Butchering animals is acceptable in the West, they would say, because
the majority of people think it so.
They are on no firmer ground here. Are we to accept that chattel
slavery was right before the US Civil War and wrong thereafter? Can all
ethical decisions be decided by conducting opinion polls?
It is true that different societies have different practices that
might be seen as ethical by one and unethical by the other. However,
these differences result from differing circumstances. For example, in
a society where mere survival is key, the diversion of limited food to
an infant could detract significantly from the well-being of the
existing family members that contribute to food gathering. Given that,
infanticide may be the ethically correct course.
The conclusion is that there is such a thing as ethical truth
(otherwise, ethics becomes vacuous and devoid of proscriptive force).
The continuity of thought, then, between those who reject the evils of
slavery, racial discrimination, and gender bias, and those who denounce
the evils of speciesism becomes striking.
AECW
Many AR advocates (including myself) believe that morality is relative.
We believe that AR is much more cogently argued when it is argued from the
standpoint of your opponent's morality, not some mythical, hard-to-define
universal morality. In arguing against moral absolutism, there is a very
simple objection: Where does this absolute morality come from? Moral
absolutism is an argument from authority, a tautology. If there were such
a thing as "ethical truth", then there must be a way of determining it, and
obviously there isn't. In the absence of a known proof of "ethical truth",
I don't know how AECW can conclude it exists.
An example of the method of leveraging a person's morality is to ask the
person why he has compassion for human beings. Almost always he will agree
that his compassion does not stem from the fact that: 1) humans use language,
2) humans compose symphonies, 3) humans can plan in the far future, 4) humans
have a written, technological culture, etc. Instead, he will agree that it
stems from the fact that humans can suffer, feel pain, be harmed, etc. It is
then quite easy to show that nonhuman animals can also suffer, feel pain, be
harmed, etc. The person's arbitrary inconsistency in not according moral
status to nonhumans then stands out starkly.
JEH
There is a middle ground between the positions of AECW and JEH. One can
assert that just as mathematics is necessarily built upon a set of
unprovable axioms, so is a system of ethics. At the foundation of a system
of ethics are moral axioms, such as "unnecessary pain is wrong". Given
the set of axioms, methods of reasoning (such as deduction and induction),
and empirical facts, it is possible to derive ethical hypotheses. It is
in this sense that an ethical statement can be said to be true. Of course,
one can disagree about the axioms, and certainly such disagreement renders
ethics "relative", but the concept of ethical truth is not meaningless.
Fortunately, the most fundamental ethical axioms seem to be nearly
universally accepted, usually because they are necessary for societies to
function. Where differences exist, they can be elucidated and discussed,
in a style similar to the "leveraging" described by JEH.
DG
To a man whose mind is free there is something even more intolerable
in the sufferings of animals than in the sufferings of man. For with the
latter it is at least admitted that suffering is evil and that the man
who causes it is a criminal. But thousands of animals are uselessly
butchered every day without a shadow of remorse. If any man were to
refer to it, he would be thought ridiculous. And that is the unpardonable
crime.
Romain Rolland (author, Nobel 1915)
SEE ALSO: #5
-----------------------
#12 The animals are raised to be eaten; so what is wrong with that?
-----------------------
This question has always seemed to me to be a fancy version of "But
we want to do these things, so what is wrong with that?" The idea that
an act, by virtue of an intention of ours, can be exonerated morally is
totally illogical.
But worse than that, however, is the fact that such a belief is a
dangerous position to take because it can enable one to justify some
practices that are universally condemned. To see how this is so,
consider the following restatement of the basis of the question:
"Suffering can be excused so long as we breed them for the purpose."
Now, cannot an analogous argument be used to defend a group of
slave holders who breed and enslave humans and justify it by saying "but
they're bred to be our workers"? Could not the Nazis defend their
murder of the Jews by saying "but we rounded them up to be killed"?
DG
Shame on such a morality that is worthy of pariahs, and that fails to
recognize the eternal essence that exists in every living thing, and
shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that see
the sun!
Arthur Schopenhauer (philosopher)
SEE ALSO: #13, #61
-----------------------
#13 But isn't it true that the animals wouldn't exist if we didn't raise
them for slaughter?
-----------------------
There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner
may be referring to "the animals" as a species, in which case the argument
might be more accurately phrased as follows:
"The ecological niche of cows is to be farmed; they get continued
survival in this niche in return for our using them."
Second, the questioner may be referring to "the animals" as individuals,
in which case the phrasing might be:
"The individual cows that we raise to eat would not have had a
life had we not done so."
We deal first with the species interpretation and then with the
individuals interpretation. The questioner's argument applies
presumably to all species of animals; to make things more concrete,
we will take cows as an example in the following text.
It is incorrect to assert that cows could continue to exist only if
we farm them for human consumption. First, today in many parts of India
and elsewhere, humans and cows are engaged in a reciprocal and reverential
relationship. It is only in recent human history that this relationship
has been corrupted into the one-sided exploitation that we see today.
There IS a niche for cows between slaughter/consumption and extinction.
(The interested reader may find the book Beyond Beef by Jeremy Rifkin
quite enlightening on this subject.)
Second, several organizations have programs for saving animals
from extinction. There is no reason to suppose that cows would not
qualify.
The species argument is also flawed because, in fact, our intensive
farming of cattle results in habitat destruction and the loss of other
species. For example, clearing of rain forests for pasture has led to
the extinction of countless species. Cattle farming is destroying
habitats on six continents. Why is the questioner so concerned about
the cow species while being unconcerned about these other species?
Could it have anything to do with the fact that he wants to continue
to eat the cows?
Finally, a strong case can be made against the species argument from
ethical theory. Arguments similar to the questioner's could be
developed that would ask us to accept practices that are universally
condemned. For example, consider a society that breeds a special race
of humans for use as slaves. They argue that the race would not exist
if they did not breed them for use as slaves. Does the reader accept
this justification?
Now we move on to the individuals interpretation of the question. One
attempt to refute the argument is to answer as follows:
"It is better not to be born than to be born into a life of
misery and early death."
To many, this is sufficient. However, one could argue that the fact that the
life is miserable before death is not necessary. Suppose that the cows are
treated well before being killed painlessly and eaten. Is it not true that
the individual cows would not have enjoyed their short life had we not
raised them for consumption? Furthermore, what if we compensate the taking
of the life by bringing a new life into being?
Peter Singer originally believed that this argument was absurd because
there are no cow souls waiting around to be born. Many people accept this
view and consider it sufficient, but Singer now rejects it because he accepts
that to bring a being to a pleasant life does confer a benefit on that being.
(There is extensive discussion of this issue in the second edition of Animal
Liberation.) How then are we to proceed?
The key is that the AR movement asserts that humans and nonhumans have a
right to not be killed by humans. The ethical problem can be seen clearly
by applying the argument to humans. Consider the case of a couple that gives
birth to an infant and eats it at the age of nine months, just when their
next infant is born. A 9-month old baby has no more rational knowledge of
its situation or future plans than does a cow, so there is no reason to
distinguish the two cases. Yet, certainly, we would condemn the couple. We
condemn them because the infant is an individual to whom we confer the right
not to be killed. Why is this right not accorded to the cow? I think the
answer is that the questioner wants to eat it.
DG
It were much better that a sentient being should never have existed,
than that it should have existed only to endure unmitigated misery.
Percy Bysshe Shelley (poet)
SEE ALSO: #12
-----------------------
#14 Don't the animals we use have a happier life since they are fed and
protected?
-----------------------
The questioner makes two assumptions here. First, that happiness or
contentment accrues from being fed and protected, and second, that
the animals are, in fact, fed and protected. Both of these premises can
be questioned.
Certainly the animals are fed; after all, they must be fattened for
consumption. It is very difficult to see any way that, say,
factory-farmed chickens are "protected". They are not protected from
mutilation, because they are painfully debeaked. They are not protected
from psychological distress, because they are crowded together in
unnatural conditions. And finally, they are not protected from predation,
because they are slaughtered and eaten by humans.
We can also question the notion that happiness accrues from feeding
and protection alone. The Roman galley slaves were fed and protected
from the elements; nevertheless, they would presumably trade their
condition for one of greater uncertainty to obtain happiness. The same
can be said of the slaves of earlier America.
Finally, an ethical argument is relevant here. Consider again the
couple of question #13. They will feed and protect their infant up to
the point at which they consume it. We would not accept this as a
justification. Why should we accept it for the chicken?
DG
SEE ALSO: #13
-----------------------
#15 Is the use of service animals and beasts of burden considered
exploitative?
-----------------------
A simple approach to this question might be to suggest that we all must
work for a living and it should be no different for animals. The problem is
that we want to look at the animals as like children, i.e., worthy of the
same protections and rights, and, like them, incapable of being morally
responsible. But we don't force children into labor! One can make a
distinction, however, that goes something like this: The animals are
permanently in their diminished state (i.e., incapable of voluntarily
assenting to work); children are not. We do not impose a choice of work for
children because they need the time to develop into their full adult and
moral selves. With the animals, we choose for them a role that allows them
to contribute; in return, we do not abuse them by eating them, etc. If this
is done with true concern that their work conditions are appropriate and not
of a sweat-shop nature, that they get enough rest and leisure time, etc.,
this would constitute a form of stewardship that is acceptable and beneficial
to both sides, and one that is not at odds with AR philosophy.
DG
-----------------------
#16 Doesn't the Bible give Humanity dominion over the animals?
-----------------------
It is true that the Bible contains a passage that confers on humanity
dominion over the animals. The import of this fact derives from the
assumption that the Bible is the word of God, and that God is the ultimate
moral authority. Leaving aside for the moment consideration of the meaning
of dominion, we can take issue with the idea of seeking moral authority from
the Bible. First, there are serious problems with the interpretation of
Biblical passages, with many verses contradicting one another, and with
many scholars differing dramatically over the meaning of given verses.
Second, there are many claims to God-hood among the diverse cultures of
this world; some of these Gods implore us to respect all life and to not
kill unnecessarily. Whose God are we to take as the ultimate moral
authority?
Finally, as Tom Regan observes, many people do not believe in a God and
so appeals to His moral authority are empty for such people. For such
people, the validity of judgments of the supposed God must be cross-checked
with other methods of determining reasonableness. What are the cross-checks
for the Biblical assertions?
These remarks apply equally to other assertions of Biblical approval of
human practices (such as the consumption of animals).
Even if we accept that the God of the Bible is a moral authority, we
can point out that "dominion" is a vague term, meaning "stewardship" or
"control over". It is quite easy to argue that appropriate stewardship
or control consists of respecting the life of animals and their right
to live according to their own nature. The jump from dominion to approval
of our brutal exploitation of animals is not contained in the cited
Biblical passage, either explicitly or implicitly.
DG
-----------------------
#17 Morals are a purely human construction (animals don't understand
morals); doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality
to animals?
-----------------------
The fallaciousness of this argument can be easily demonstrated by making
a simple substitution: Infants and young children don't understand morals,
doesn't that mean it is not rational to apply our morality to them? Of course
not. We refrain from harming infants and children for the same reasons that
we do so for adults. That they are incapable of conceptualizing a system of
morals and its benefits is irrelevant.
The relevant distinction is formalized in the concept of "moral agents"
versus "moral patients". A moral agent is an individual possessing the
sophisticated conceptual ability to bring moral principles to bear in
deciding what to do, and having made such a decision, having the free will
to choose to act that way. By virtue of these abilities, it is fair to hold
moral agents accountable for their acts. The paradigmatic moral agent is the
normal adult human being.
Moral patients, in contrast, lack the capacities of moral agents and thus
cannot fairly be held accountable for their acts. They do, however, possess
the capacity to suffer harm and therefore are proper objects of consideration
for moral agents. Human infants, young children, the mentally deficient or
deranged, and nonhuman animals are instances of moral patienthood.
Given that nonhuman animals are moral patients, they fall within the
purview of moral consideration, and therefore it is quite rational to accord
them the same moral consideration that we accord to ourselves.
DG
SEE ALSO: #19, #23, #36
-----------------------
#18 If AR people are so worried about killing, why don't they become
fruitarians?
-----------------------
Killing, per se, is not the central concern of AR philosophy, which is
concerned with the avoidance of unnecessary pain and suffering. Thus, because
plants neither feel pain nor suffer, AR philosophy does not mandate
fruitarianism (a diet in which only fruits are eaten because they can be
harvested without killing the plant from which they issue).
DG
SEE ALSO: #42-#46
-----------------------
#19 Animals don't care about us; why should we care about them?
-----------------------
The questioner's position--that, in essence, we should give rights only
to those able to respect ours--is known as the reciprocity argument. It is
unconvincing both as an account of the way our society works and as a
prescription for the way it should work.
Its descriptive power is undermined by the simple observation that we
give rights to a large number of individuals who cannot respect ours.
These include some elderly people, some people suffering from degenerative
diseases, some people suffering from irreversible brain damage, the
severely retarded, infants, and young children. An institution that, for
example, routinely sacrificed such individuals to test a new fertilizer
would certainly be considered to be grievously violating their rights.
The original statement fares no better as an ethical prescription.
Future generations are unable to reciprocate our concern, for example, so
there would be no ethical harm done, under such a view, in dismissing
concerns for environmental damage that adversely impacts future
generations.
The key failing of the questioner's position lies in the failure to
properly distinguish between the following capacities:
The capacity to understand and respect others' rights (moral agency).
The capacity to benefit from rights (moral patienthood).
An individual can be a beneficiary of rights without being a moral
agent. Under this view, one justifies a difference of treatments of two
individuals (human or nonhuman) with an objective difference that is
RELEVANT to the difference of treatment. For example, if we wished to
exclude a person from an academic course of study, we could not cite the
fact that they have freckles. We could cite the fact that they lack
certain academic prerequisites. The former is irrelevant; the latter is
relevant. Similarly, when considering the right to be free of pain and
suffering, moral agency is irrelevant; moral patienthood IS relevant.
AECW
The assumption that animals don't care about us can also be
questioned. Companion animals have been known to summon aid when
their owners are in trouble. They have been known to offer comfort
when their owners are distressed. They show grief when their human
companions die.
DG
SEE ALSO: #17, #23, #36
-----------------------
#20 A house is on fire and a dog and a baby are inside. Which do you
save first?
-----------------------
The one I choose to save first tells us nothing about the ethical
decisions we face. I might decide to save my child before I saved yours,
but this certainly does not mean that I should be able to experiment on
your child, or exploit your child in some other way. We are not in an
emergency situation like a fire anyway. In everyday life, we can choose to
act in ways that protect the rights of both dogs and babies.
LK
Like anyone else in this situation, I would probably save the one to
which I am emotionally more attached. Most likely it would be the child.
Someone might prefer to save his own beloved dog before saving the baby
of a stranger. However, as LK states above, this tells us nothing about
any ethical principles.
DVH
-----------------------
#21 What if I made use of an animal that was already dead?
-----------------------
There are two ways to interpret this question. First, the questioner
might really be making the excuse "but I didn't kill the animal", or
second, he could be asking about the morality of using an animal that
has died naturally (or due to a cause unassociated with the demand for
animal products, such as a road kill). For the first interpretation, we
must reject the excuse. The killing of animals for meat, for example,
is done at the request (through market demand), and with the financial
support (through payment), of the end consumers. Their complicity is
inescapable. Society does not excuse the receiver of stolen goods because
he "didn't do the burglary".
For the second interpretation, the use of naturally killed animals,
there seems to be no moral difficulty involved. Many would, for esthetic
reasons, still not use animal products thus obtained. (Would you use the
bodies of departed humans?) Certainly, natural kills cannot satisfy the
great demand for animal products that exists today; non-animal and
synthetic sources are required.
Other people may avoid use of naturally killed animal products because
they feel that it might encourage a demand in others for animal products,
a demand that might not be so innocently satisfied.
DG
This can be viewed as a question of respect for the dead. We feel
innate revulsion at the idea of grave desecration for this reason.
Naturally killed animals should, at the very least, be left alone rather
than recycled as part of an industrial process. This was commonly
practiced in the past, e.g., Egyptians used to mummify their cats.
AECW
You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughterhouse is
concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity.
Ralph Waldo Emerson (author)
-----------------------
#22 Where should one draw the line: animals, insects, bacteria?
-----------------------
AR philosophy asserts that rights are to be accorded to creatures that
have the capacity to experience pain, to suffer, and to be a "subject of
a life". Such a capacity is definitely not found in bacteria. It is
definitely found in mammals. There is debate about such animals as molluscs
and arthropods (including insects). One should decide, based upon available
evidence and one's own conscience, where the line should be drawn to adhere
to the principle of AR described in the first sentence.
Questions #39 and #43 discuss some of the evidence relevant to drawing
the line.
DG
SEE ALSO: #39, #43
-----------------------
#23 If the killing is wrong, shouldn't you stop predators from killing
other animals?
-----------------------
This is one of the more interesting arguments against animal rights. We
prevent human moral patients from harming others, e.g., we prevent children
from hitting each other, so why shouldn't we do the same for nonhuman moral
patients (refer to question #17 for a definition of moral patienthood)? If
anything, the duty to do so might be considered more serious because
predation results in a serious harm--death.
A first answer entails pointing out that predators must kill to survive;
to stop them from killing is, in effect, to kill them.
Of course, we could argue that intervening on a massive scale to prevent
predation is totally impractical or impossible, but that is not morally
persuasive.
Suppose we accept that we should stop a cat from killing a bird. Then we
realize that the bird is the killer of many snakes. Should we now reason
that, in fact, we shouldn't stop the cat? The point is that humans lack the
broad vision to make all these calculations and determinations.
The real answer is that intervening to stop predation would destroy the
ecosystems upon which the biosphere depends, harming all of life on earth.
Over millions of years, the biosphere has evolved complex ecosystems that
depend upon predation for their continued functioning and stability. Massive
intervention by humans to stop predation would inflict serious and
incalculable harm on these ecosystems, with devastating results for all life.
Even if we accept that we should prevent predation (and we don't accept
that), it does not follow that, because we do not, we are therefore justified
in exploiting moral patients ourselves. When we fail to stop widespread
slaughter of human beings in foreign countries, it does not follow that we,
ourselves, believe it appropriate to participate in such slaughter. Similarly,
our failure to prevent predation cannot be taken as justification of our
exploitation of animals.
DG
SEE ALSO: #17, #19, #36, #64
-----------------------
#24 Is the AR movement against abortion? If not, isn't that hypocritical?
-----------------------
Attempts are frequently made to tie Animal Rights exponents to one side
or the other of the abortion debate. Such attempts are misguided. Claims
that adherence to the ethics of AR determine one's position on embryo
rights are plainly counter-intuitive, unless one is also prepared to argue
that being a defender of human rights compels one to a particular position
on abortion. Is it the case that one cannot consistently despise torture,
serfdom, and other barbaric practices without coming to a particular
conclusion on abortion?
AR defenders demand that the rights currently held by humans be extended
to all creatures similar in morally relevant ways. For example, since
society does not accept that mature, sentient human moral patients (refer
to question #17 for a brief description of the distinction between patients
and agents) may be routinely annihilated in the name of science, it
logically follows that comparable nonhuman animals should be given the same
protection. On the other hand, abortion is still a moot point. It is
plainly illogical to expect the AR movement to reflect anything other than
the full spectrum of opinion found in society at large on the abortion issue.
Fundamentally, AR philosophers are content with submitting sufficient
conditions for the attribution of rights to individuals, conditions that
explain the noncontroversial protections afforded today to humans. They
neither encourage nor discourage attempts to widen the circle of protection
to fetuses.
AECW
There is a range of views among AR supporters on the issue of abortion
versus animal rights. Many people believe, as does AECW, that the issues
of abortion and AR are unrelated, and that the question is irrelevant to the
validity of AR. Others, such as myself, feel that abortion certainly is
relevant to AR. After all, the granting of rights to animals (and humans)
is based on their capacity to suffer and to be a subject-of-a-life. It
seems clear that late-term fetuses can suffer from the abortion procedure.
Certain physiological responses, such as elevated heart rates, and the
existence of a functioning nervous system support this view.
It also can be argued that the fetus is on a course to become a
subject-of-a-life, and that by aborting the fetus we therefore harm it.
Some counter this latter argument by claiming that the "potential" to
become subject-of-a-life is an invalid grounds for assigning rights, but
this is a fine philosophical point that is itself subject to attack. For
example, suppose a person is in a coma that, given enough time, will
dissipate--the person has the potential to be sentient again. Does the
person lose his rights while in the coma?
While the arguments adduced may show that abortion is not irrelevant
to AR, they do not show that abortion is necessarily wrong. The reason
is that it is possible to argue that the rights of the fetus are in
conflict with the rights of the woman, and that the rights of the woman
dominate. All may not agree with this trade-off, but it is a consistent,
non-hypocritical stance that is not in conflict with AR philosophy.
See question #4 for an analysis of hypocrisy arguments in general.
DG
SEE ALSO: #4
-----------------------
#25 Doesn't the ethical theory of contractarianism show that animals
have no rights?
-----------------------
Contractarianism is an ethical theory that attempts to account for our
morality by appealing to implicit mutually beneficial agreements, or
contracts. For example, it would explain our refusal to strike each other
by asserting that we have an implied contract: "You don't hit me and I
won't hit you." The relevance of contractarianism to AR stems from the
supposition that nonhuman animals are incapable of entering into such
contracts, coupled with the assertion that rights can be attributed only
to those individuals that can enter into such contracts. Roughly, animals
can't have rights because they lack the rational capacity to assent to a
contract requiring them to respect our rights.
Contractarianism is perhaps the most impressive attempt to refute the AR
position; therefore, it is important to consider it in some detail. It is
easily possible to write a large volume on the subject. We must limit
ourselves to considering the basic arguments and problems with them. Those
readers finding this incomplete or nonrigorous are advised to consult the
primary literature.
We begin by observing that contractarianism fails to offer a compelling
account of our moral behavior and motives. If the average person is asked why
they think it wrong to steal from their neighbor, they do not answer that by
refraining from it they ensure that their neighbor will not steal from them.
Nor do they answer that they have an implicit mutual contract with their
neighbor. Instead of invoking contracts, people typically assert some variant
of the harm principle; e.g., they don't steal because it would harm the
neighbor. Similarly, we do not teach children that the reason why they should
not steal is because then people will not steal from them.
Another way to point up the mismatch between the theory of contractarianism
and our actual moral behavior is to ask if, upon risking your own life to
save my child from drowning, you have done this as a result of a contractual
obligation. Certainly, one performs such acts as a response to the distress
of another being, not as a result of contractual obligations.
Contractarianism can thus be seen as a theory that fails to account for our
moral behavior. At best, it is a theory that its proponents would recommend
to us as preferable. (Is it seen as preferable because it denies rights to
animals, and because it seems to justify continued exploitation of animals?)
Arguably the most serious objection to contractarianism is that it can be
used to sanction arrangements that would be almost universally condemned.
Consider a group of very rich people that assemble and create a contract
among themselves the effect of which is to ensure that wealth remains in
their control. They agree by contract that even repressive tactics can be
used to ensure that the masses remain in poverty. They argue that, by virtue
of the existence of their contract, that they do no wrong. Similar contracts
could be drawn up to exclude other races, sexes, etc.
John Rawls attempts to overcome this problem by supposing that the
contractors must begin from an "initial position" in which they are not yet
incarnated as beings and must form the contract in ignorance of their final
incarnation. Thus, it is argued, since a given individual in the starting
position does not know whether, for example, she will be incarnated as a rich
woman or a poor woman, that individual will not form contracts that are based
on such criteria. In response, one can begin to wonder at the lengths to
which some will go in creating ad hoc adjustments to a deficient theory. But
more to the point, one can turn around this ad hoc defense to support the AR
position. For surely, if individuals in the initial position are to be truly
ignorant of their destiny, they must assume that they may be incarnated as
animals. Given that, the contract that is reached is likely to include strong
protections for animals!
Another problem with Rawls' device is that probabilities can be such that,
even given ignorance, contracts can result that most people would see as
unjust. If the chance of being incarnated as a slave holder is 90 percent, a
contract allowing slavery could well result because most individuals would
feel they had a better chance of being incarnated as a slave holder. Thus,
Rawls' device fails even to achieve its purpose.
It is hard to see how contractarianism can permit movement from the status
quo. How did alleged contracts that denied liberty to slaves and excluded
women from voting come to be renegotiated?
Contractarianism also is unable to adequately account for the rights we
give to those unable to form contracts, i.e., infants, children, senile
people, mental deficients, and even animals to some extent. Various means
have been advanced to try to account for the attribution of rights to such
individuals. We have no space to deal with all of them. Instead, we briefly
address a few.
One attempt involves appealing to the interests of true rights holders.
For example, I don't eat your baby because you have an interest in it and I
wouldn't want you violating such an interest of mine. But what if no-one
cared about a given infant? Would that make it fair game for any use or
abuse? Certainly not. Another problem here is that many people express an
interest in the protection of all animals. That would seem to require others
to refrain from using or abusing animals. While this result is attractive to
the AR community, it certainly weakens the argument that contractarianism
justifies our use of animals.
Others want to let individuals "ride" until they are capable of respecting
the contract. But what of those that will never be capable of doing so, e.g.,
senile people? And why can we not let animals ride?
Some argue a "reduced-rights" case. Children get a reduced rights set
designed to protect them from themselves, etc. The problem here is that with
animals the rights reduction is way out of proportion. We accept that we
cannot experiment on infants or kill and eat them due to their reduced rights
set. Why then are such extreme uses acceptable for nonhumans?
Some argue that it is irrelevant whether a given individual can enter into
a contract; what is important is their theoretical capacity to do so. But,
future generations have the capacity but clearly cannot interact reciprocally
with us, so the basis of contractarianism is gutted (unless we assert that we
have no moral obligations to leave a habitable world for future generations).
Peter Singer asks "Why limit morality to those who have the capacity to enter
into agreements, if in fact there is no possibility of their ever doing so?"
There are practical problems with contractarianism as well. For example,
what can be our response if an individual renounces participation in any
implied moral contracts, and states that he is therefore justified in
engaging in what others would call immoral acts? Is there any way for us to
reproach him? And what are we to do about violations of the contract? If an
individual steals from us, he has broken the contract and we should therefore
be released from it. Are we then morally justified in stealing from him? Or
worse?
In summary, contractarianism fails because a) it fails to accurately account
for our actual, real-world moral acts and motives, b) it sanctions contractual
arrangements that most people would see as unjust, c) it fails to account for
the considerations we accord to individuals unable to enter into contracts,
and d) it has some impractical consequences. Finally, there is a better
foundation for ethics--the harm principle. It is simple, universalizable,
devoid of ad hoc devices, and matches our real moral thinking.
TA/DG
SEE ALSO: #11, #17, #19, #96
----------------
PRACTICAL ISSUES
----------------
-----------------------
#26 Surely there are more pressing practical problems than AR, such
as homelessness; haven't you got better things to do?
-----------------------
Inherent in this question is an assumption that it is more important
to help humans than to help nonhumans. Some would dismiss this as a
speciesist position (see question #1). It is possible, however, to
invoke the scale-of-life notion and argue that there is greater suffering
and loss associated with cruelty and neglect of humans than with animals.
This might appear to constitute a prima-facie case for expending one's
energies for humans rather than nonhumans. However, even if we accept
the scale-of-life notion, there are sound reasons for expending time
and energy on the issue of rights for nonhuman animals.
Many of the consequences of carrying out the AR agenda are highly
beneficial to humans. For example, stopping the production and consumption
of animal products would result in a significant improvement of the
general health of the human population, and destruction of the environment
would be greatly reduced.
Fostering compassion for animals is likely to pay dividends in terms
of a general increase of compassion in human affairs. Tom Regan puts it
this way:
...the animal rights movement is a part of, not antagonistic to,
the human rights movement. The theory that rationally grounds the
rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. Thus those
involved in the animal rights movement are partners in the struggle
to secure respect for human rights--the rights of women, for
example, or minorities, or workers. The animal rights movement
is cut from the same moral cloth as these.
Finally, the behavior asked for by the AR agenda involves little
expenditure of energy. We are asking people to NOT do things: don't
eat meat, don't exploit animals for entertainment, don't wear furs.
These negative actions don't interfere with our ability to care for
humans. In some cases, they may actually make more time available for
doing so (e.g., time spent hunting or visiting zoos and circuses).
DG
Living cruelty-free is not a full-time job; rather, it's a way of life.
When I shop, I check ingredients and I consider if the product is tested
on animals. These things only consume a few minutes of the day. There is
ample time left for helping both humans and nonhumans.
JLS
I am in favor of animal rights as well as human rights. That is the
way of a whole human being.
Abraham Lincoln (16th U.S. President)
To my mind, the life of a lamb is no less precious than that of a
human being.
Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)
Our task must be to free ourselves...by widening our circle of compassion
to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature and its beauty.
Albert Einstein (physicist, Nobel 1921)
SEE ALSO: #1, #87, #95
-----------------------
#27 If everyone became vegetarian and gave up keeping pets,
what would happen to all the animals?
-----------------------
As vegetarianism grows, the number of animals bred for food gradually
will decline, since the market will no longer exist for them.
Similarly, a gradual decrease would accompany the lessening demand for
the breeding of companion animals. In both cases, those animals that
remain will be better cared for by a more compassionate society.
LK
SEE ALSO: #75
-----------------------
#28 Grazing animals on land not suited for agriculture increases the food
supply; how can that be considered wrong?
-----------------------
There are areas in the world where grazing of livestock is possible but
agriculture is not. If conditions are such that people living in these
areas cannot trade for crops and must raise livestock to survive, few
would question the practice. However, such areas are very small in
comparison to the fertile and semi-arid regions currently utilized for
intensive grazing, and they do not appreciably contribute to the world
food supply. (Some would argue that it is morally preferable not to live in
such areas.)
The real issue is the intensive grazing in the fertile and semi-arid
regions. The use of such areas for livestock raising reduces the world
food supply. Keith Acker writes as follows in his "A Vegetarian
Sourcebook":
Land, energy, and water resources for livestock agriculture range
anywhere from 10 to 1000 times greater than those necessary to
produce an equivalent amount of plant foods. And livestock
agriculture does not merely use these resources, it depletes them.
This is a matter of historical record. Most of the world's soil,
erosion, groundwater depletion, and deforestation--factors now
threatening the very basis of our food system--are the result of this
particularly destructive form of food production.
Livestock agriculture is also the single greatest cause of world-wide
deforestation both historically and currently (between 1967 and 1975,
two-thirds of 70 million acres of lost forest went to grazing). Between
1950 and 1975 the area of human-created pasture land in Central America
more than doubled, almost all of it at the expense of rain forests.
Although this trend has slowed down, it still continues at an alarming and
inexorable pace.
Grazing requires large tracts of land and the consequences of
overgrazing and soil erosion are very serious ecological problems. By
conservative estimates, 60 percent of all U.S. grasslands are overgrazed,
resulting in billions of tons of soil lost each year. The amount of U.S.
topsoil lost to date is about 75 percent, and 85 percent of that is
directly associated with livestock grazing. Overgrazing has been the
single largest cause of human-made deserts.
One could argue that grazing is being replaced by the "feedlot
paradigm". These systems graze the livestock prior to transport to a
feedlot for final "fattening" with grains grown on crop lands. Although
this does reduce grazing somewhat, it is not eliminated, and the feedlot
part of the paradigm still constitutes a highly inefficient use of crops
(to feed a human with livestock requires 16 times the grain that would be
necessary if the grain was consumed directly). It has been estimated that
in the U.S., 80 percent of the corn and 95 percent of the oats grown are
fed to livestock.
TA
I grew up in cattle country--that's why I became a vegetarian. Meat stinks,
for the animals, the environment, and your health.
k.d. lang (musician)
-----------------------
#29 If we try to eliminate all animals products, we'll be moving back to
the Stone Age; who wants that?
-----------------------
On the contrary! It is a dependency upon animal products that could be
seen as returning us to the technologies and mind set of the Stone Age.
For example, Stone Age people had to wear furs in Northern climates to
avoid freezing. That is no longer the case, thanks to central heating
and the ready availability of plenty of good plant and human-made fabrics.
If we are to characterize the modern age, it could be in terms of the
greater freedoms and options made possible by technological advance and
social progress. The Stone Age people had few options and so were forced
to rely upon animals for food, clothing, and materials for their implements.
Today, we have an abundance of choices for better foods, warmer clothing,
and more efficient materials, none of which need depend upon the killing
of animals.
TA
It seems to me that the only Stone Age we are in any danger of entering
is that constituted by the continuous destruction of animals' habitats
in favor of the Portland-cement concrete jungle!
DG
SEE ALSO: #60, #62, #95
-----------------------
#30 It's virtually impossible to eliminate all animal products from one's
consumption; what's the point if you still cause animal death without
knowing it?
-----------------------
Yes, it is very difficult to eliminate all animal products from one's
consumption, just as it is impossible to eliminate all accidental killing
and infliction of harm that results from our activities. But this cannot
justify making it "open season" for any kind of abuse of animals. The
reasonable goal, given the realities, is to minimize the harms one causes.
The point, then, is that a great deal of suffering is prevented.
DG
SEE ALSO: #57-#58
-----------------------
#31 Wouldn't many customs and traditions, as well as jobs, be lost if
we stopped using animals?
-----------------------
Consider first the issue of customs and traditions. The plain truth is
that some customs and traditions deserve to die out. Examples abound
throughout history: slavery, Roman gladiatorial contests, torture, public
executions, witch burning, racism. To these the AR supporter adds animal
exploitation and enslavement.
The human animal is an almost infinitely adaptable organism. The loss of
the customs listed above has not resulted in any lasting harm to
humankind. The same can be confidently predicted for the elimination of
animal exploitation. In fact, humankind would likely benefit from a
quantum leap of compassion in human affairs.
As far as jobs are concerned, the economic aspects are discussed in
question #32. It remains to point out that for a human, what is at stake is
a job, which can be replaced with one less morally dubious. What is at
stake for an animal is the elimination of torture and exploitation, and
the possibility for a life of happiness, free from human oppression and
brutality.
DG
People often say that humans have always eaten animals, as if this is a
justification for continuing the practice. According to this logic, we
should not try to prevent people from murdering other people, since this
has also been done since the earliest of times.
Isaac Bashevis Singer (author, Nobel 1978)
SEE ALSO: #32
-----------------------
#32 The animal product industries are big business; wouldn't the economy
be crippled if they all stopped?
-----------------------
One cannot justify an action based on its profitability. Many crimes and
practices that we view as repugnant have been or continue to be
profitable: the slave trade, sale of child brides, drug dealing, scams of
all sorts, prostitution, child pornography.
A good example of this, and one that points up another key
consideration, is the tobacco industry. It is a multibillion-dollar
industry, yet vigorous efforts are proceeding on many fronts to put it out
of business. The main problem with it lies in its side-effects, i.e., the
massive health consequences and deaths that it produces, which easily
outweigh the immediate profitability. There are side effects to animal
exploitation also. Among the most significant are the pollution and
deforestation associated with large-scale animal farming. As we see in
question #28, these current practices constitute a nonsustainable use of
the planet's resources. It is more likely true that the economy will be
crippled if the practices continue!
Finally, the profits associated with the animal industries stem from
market demand and affluence. There is no reason to suppose that this
demand cannot be gradually redirected into other industries. Instead of
prime beef, we can have prime artichokes, or prime pasta, etc. Humanity's
demand for gourmet food will not vanish with the meat. Similarly, the
jobs associated with the animal industries can be gradually redirected
into the industries that would spring up to replace the animal
industries. (Vice President Gore made a similar point in reference to
complaints concerning loss of jobs if logging was halted. He commented
that the environmental movement would open up a huge area for jobs that
had heretofore been unavailable.)
DG
It is my view that the vegetarian manner of living by its purely physical
effect on the human temperament would most beneficially influence the lot of
mankind.
Albert Einstein (physicist, Nobel 1921)
SEE ALSO: #28, #31
----------------------
ARGUMENTS FROM BIOLOGY
----------------------
-----------------------
#33 Humans are at the pinnacle of evolution; doesn't that give them
the right to use animals as they wish?
-----------------------
This is one of many arguments that attempt to draw ethical conclusions
from scientific observations. In this case, the science is shaky, and the
ethical conclusion is dubious. Let us first examine the science.
The questioner's view is that evolution has created a linear ranking of
general fitness, a ladder if you will, with insects and other "lower"
species at the bottom, and humans (of course!) at the top. This idea
originated as part of a wider, now discredited evolutionary system called
Lamarckism. Charles Darwin's discovery of natural selection overturned
this system. Darwin's picture, instead, is of a "radiating bush" of
species, with each evolving to adapt more closely to its environment,
along its own radius. Under this view, the idea of a pinnacle becomes
unclear: yes, humans have adapted well to their niche (though many would
dispute this, asserting the nonsustainable nature of our use of the
planet's resources), but so have bacteria adapted well to their niche. Can
we really say that humans are better adapted to their niche than bacteria,
and would it mean anything when the niches are so different?
Probably, what the questioner has in mind in using the word "pinnacle"
is that humans excel in some particular trait, and that a scale can be
created relative to this trait. For example, on a scale of mental
capability, humans stand well above bacteria. But a different choice of
traits can lead to very different results. Bacteria stand "at the
pinnacle" when one looks at reproductive fecundity. Birds stand "at
the pinnacle" when one looks at flight.
Now let us examine the ethics. Leaving aside the dubious idea of a
pinnacle of evolution, let us accept that humans are ranked at the top on
a scale of intelligence. Does this give us the right to do as we please
with animals, simply on account of their being less brainy? If we say yes,
we open a Pandora's box of problems for ourselves. Does this mean that
more intelligent humans can also exploit less intelligent humans as they
wish (shall we all be slaves to the Einsteins of the world)? Considering
a different trait, can the physically superior abuse the weak? Only a
morally callous person would agree with this general principle.
AECW
SEE ALSO: #34, #37
-----------------------
#34 Humans are at the top of the food chain; aren't they therefore
justified in killing and eating anything?
-----------------------
No; otherwise, potential cannibals in our society could claim the same
defense for their practice. That we can do something does not mean that it
is right to do so. We have a lot of power over other creatures, but with
great powers come even greater responsibilities, as any parent will
testify.
Humans are at the top of the food chain because they CHOOSE to eat
nonhuman animals. There is thus a suggestion of tautology in the
questioner's position. If we chose not to eat animals, we would not be
at the top of the food chain.
The idea that superiority in a trait confers rights over the inferior is
disposed of in question #33.
AECW
SEE ALSO: #33
-----------------------
#35 Animals are just machines; why worry about them?
-----------------------
Centuries ago, the philosopher Rene Descartes developed the idea that
all nonhuman animals are automatons that cannot feel pain. Followers of
Descartes believed that if an animal cried out this was just a reflex,
the sort of reaction one might get from a mechanical doll. Consequently,
they saw no reason not to experiment on animals without anesthetics.
Horrified observers were admonished to pay no attention to the screams
of the animal subjects.
This idea is now refuted by modern science. Animals are no more "mere
machines" than are human beings. Everything science has learned about
other species points out the biological similarities between humans and
nonhumans. As Charles Darwin wrote, the differences between humans and
other animals are differences of degree, not differences of kind. Since
both humans and nonhumans evolved over millions of years and share
similar nervous systems and other organs, there is no reason to think
we do not share a similar mental and emotional life with other animal
species (especially mammals).
LK
-----------------------
#36 In Nature, animals kill and eat each other; so why should it be wrong
for humans?
-----------------------
Predatory animals must kill to eat. Humans, in contrast, have a choice;
they need not eat meat to survive.
Humans differ from nonhuman animals in being capable of conceiving of, and
acting in accordance with, a system of morals; therefore, we cannot seek
moral guidance or precedent from nonhuman animals. The AR philosophy asserts
that it is just as wrong for a human to kill and eat a sentient nonhuman as
it is to kill and eat a sentient human.
To demonstrate the absurdity of seeking moral precedents from nonhuman
animals, consider the following variants of the question:
"In Nature, animals steal food from each other; so why should it be
wrong for humans [to steal]?"
"In Nature, animals kill and eat humans; so why should it be wrong for
humans [to kill and eat humans]?"
DG
SEE ALSO: #23, #34, #64
-----------------------
#37 Natural selection and Darwinism are at work in the world; doesn't
that mean it's unrealistic to try to overcome such forces?
-----------------------
Assuming that Animal Rights concepts somehow clash with Darwinian forces,
the questioner must stand accused of selective moral fatalism: our sense of
morality is clearly not modeled on the laws of natural selection. Why,
then, feel helpless before some of its effects and not before others?
Male-dominance, xenophobia, and war-mongering are present in many human
societies. Should we venture that some mysterious, universal forces must be
at work behind them, and that all attempts at quelling such tendencies should
be abandoned? Or, more directly, when people become sick, do we abandon them
because "survival of the fittest" demands it? We do not abandon them; and we
do not agonize about trying to overcome natural selection.
There is no reason to believe that the practical implications of the Animal
Rights philosophy are maladaptive for humans. On the contrary, and for
reasons explained elsewhere in this FAQ, respecting the rights of animals
would yield beneficial side-effects for humans, such as more-sustainable
agricultural practices, and better environmental and health-care policies.
AECW
The advent of Darwinism led to a substitution of the idea of individual
organisms for the old idea of immutable species. The moral individualism
implied by AR philosophy substitutes the idea that organisms should be
treated according to their individual capacities for the (old) idea that it
is the species of the animal that counts. Thus, moral individualism actually
fits well with evolutionary theory.
DG
SEE ALSO: #63-62
-----------------------
#38 Isn't AR opposed to environmental philosophy (as described, for
example, in "Deep Ecology")?
-----------------------
No. It should be clear from many of the answers included in this FAQ, and
from perusal of many of the books referenced in question #92, that the
philosophy and goals of AR are complementary to the goals of the mainstream
environmental movement. Michael W. Fox sees AR and environmentalism as
two aspects of a dialectic that reconciles concerns for the rights of
individuals (human and nonhuman) with concerns for the integrity of the
biosphere.
Some argue that a morality based on individual rights is necessarily
opposed to one based on holistic environmental views, e.g., the sanctity
of the biosphere. However, an environmental ethic that attributes some
form of rights to all individuals, including inanimate ones, can be
developed. Such an ethic, by showing respect for the individuals that make
up the biosphere, would also show respect for the biosphere as a whole, thus
achieving the aims of holistic environmentalism. It is clear that a rights
view is not necessarily in conflict with a holistic view.
In reference to the concept of deep ecology and the claim that it bears
negatively on AR, Fox believes such claims to be unfounded. The following
text is excerpted from "Inhumane Society", by Michael W. Fox.
DG
Deep ecologists support the philosophy of preserving the natural
abundance and diversity of plants and animals in natural ecosystems...
The deep ecologists should oppose the industrialized, nonsubsistence
exploitation of wildlife because...it is fundamentally unsound ecologically,
because by favoring some species over others, population imbalances and
extinctions of undesired species would be inevitable.
In their book "Deep Ecology", authors Bill Devall and George Sessions...
take to task animal rights philosopher Tom Regan, who with others of like
mind "expressed concern that a holistic ecological ethic...results in a
kind of totalitarianism or ecological fascism"...In an appendix, however,
George Sessions does suggest that philosophers need to work toward
nontotalitarian solutions...and that "in all likelihood, this will require
some kind of holistic ecological ethic in which the integrity of all
individuals (human and nonhuman) is respected".
Ironically, while the authors are so critical of the animal rights
movement, they quote Arne Naess (...arguably the founder of the deep
ecology movement)...For instance, Naess states: "The intuition of
biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal
right to live and blossom and to reach their own forms of unfolding and
self-realization..."
Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)
SEE ALSO: #28, #59
------------------
INSECTS AND PLANTS
------------------
-----------------------
#39 What about insects? Do they have rights too?
-----------------------
Before considering the issue of rights, let us first address the
question "What about insects?". Strictly speaking, insects are small
invertebrate animals of the class Insecta, having an adult stage
characterized by three pairs of legs, a segmented body with three major
divisions, and usually two pairs of wings. We'll adopt the looser
definition, which includes similar invertebrate animals such as spiders,
centipedes, and ticks.
Insects have a ganglionic nervous system, in contrast to the central
nervous system of vertebrates. Such a system is characterized by local
aggregates of neurons, called ganglia, that are associated with, and
specialized for, the body segment with which they are co-located. There
are interconnections between ganglia but these connections function not so
much as a global integrating pathway, but rather for local segmental
coordination. For example, the waves of leg motion that propagate along
the body of a centipede are mediated by the intersegmental connections.
In some species the cephalic ganglia are large and complex enough to
support very complex behavior (e.g., the lobster and octopus). The
cuttlefish (not an insect but another invertebrate with a ganglionic
nervous system) is claimed by some to be about as intelligent as a dog.
Insects are capable of primitive learning and do exhibit what many would
characterize as intelligence. Spiders are known for their skills and
craftiness; whether this can all be dismissed as instinct is arguable.
Certainly, bees can learn in a limited way. When offered a reward from a
perch of a certain color, they return first to perches of that color. They
also learn the location of food and transmit that information to their
colleagues. The learning, however, tends to be highly specialized and
applicable to only limited domains.
In addition to a primitive mental life as described above, there is some
evidence that insects can experience pain and suffering. The earthworm
nervous system, for example, secretes an opiate substance when the
earthworm is injured. Similar responses are seen in vertebrates and are
generally accepted to be a mechanism for the attenuation of pain. On the
other hand, the opiates are also implicated in functions not associated
with analgesia, such as thermoregulation and appetite control. Nevertheless,
the association of secretion with tissue injury is highly suggestive.
Earthworms also wriggle quite vigorously when impaled on a hook. In
possible opposition to this are other observations. For example, the
abdomen of a feeding wasp can be clipped off and the head may go on
sucking (presumably in no distress?).
Singer quotes three criteria for deciding if an organism has the
capacity to suffer from pain: 1) there are behavioral indications, 2)
there is an appropriate nervous system, and 3) there is an evolutionary
usefulness for the experience of pain. These criteria seem to satisfied
for insects, if only in a primitive way.
Now we are equipped to tackle the issue of insect rights. First, one
might argue that the issue is not so compelling as for other animals
because industries are not built around the exploitation of insects. But
this is untrue; large industries are built around honey production, silk
production, and cochineal/carmine production, and, of course, mass insect
death results from our use of insecticides. Even if the argument were
true, it should not prevent us from attempting to be consistent in the
application of our principles to all animals. Insects are a part of the
Animal Kingdom and some special arguments would be required to exclude
them from the general AR argument.
Some would draw a line at some level of complexity of the nervous
system, e.g., only animals capable of operant conditioning need be
enfranchised. Others may quarrel with this line and place it elsewhere.
Some may postulate a scale of life with an ascending capacity to feel pain
and suffer. They might also mark a cut-off on the scale, below which
rights are not actively asserted. Is the cut-off above insects and the
lower invertebrates? Or should there be no cut-off? This is one of the
issues still being actively debated in the AR community.
People who strive to live without cruelty will attempt to push the line
back as far as possible, giving the benefit of the doubt where there is
doubt. Certainly, one can avoid unnecessary cruelty to insects.
The practical issues involved in enfranchising insects are dealt with in
the following two questions.
DG
I want to realize brotherhood or identity not merely with the beings
called human, but I want to realize identity with all life, even with
such things as crawl upon earth.
Mahatma Gandhi (statesman and philosopher)
What is it that should trace the insuperable line? ...The question
is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
Jeremy Bentham (philosopher)
SEE ALSO: #22, #40-#41, #47
-----------------------
#40 Do I have to be careful not to walk on ants?
-----------------------
The Jains of India would say yes! Some of their more devout members
wear gauze masks to avoid inhaling and killing small insects and
microbes.
Regardless of how careful we are, we will cause some suffering as a
side-effect of living. The goal is to avoid unnecessary suffering and
to minimize the suffering we cause. This is a far cry from wanton,
intentional infliction of cruelty. I refer here to the habit of some of
pulling off insects' wings for fun, or of torching a congregation of
ants for pleasure.
This question is an issue for the individual conscience to decide. Perhaps
one need not walk around looking out for ants on the ground, but should one
be seen and it is easy to alter one's stride to avoid it, where is the harm
in doing so?
DG
SEE ALSO: #39, #41
-----------------------
#41 There is some evidence of consciousness in insects; aren't you
descending to absurdity to tell people not to kill insects?
-----------------------
Enfranchising insects does not mean it is never justifiable to kill
them. As with all threats to a being, the rule of self-defense applies.
If insects are threatening one's well-being in a nontrivial way, AR
philosophy would not assert that it is wrong to eliminate them.
Pesticides and herbicides are often used for mass destruction of insect
populations. While this might be defended on the self-defense principle,
one should be aware of the significant adverse impact on the environment,
on other non-threatening animals, and indeed on our own health. (Refer to
question #59 for more on the use of insecticides.)
It is not absurd to attempt to minimize the amount of suffering
that we inflict or cause.
DG
We should begin to feel for the flies and other insects struggling to
be free from sticky fly paper. There are humane alternatives.
Michael W. Fox (Vice President of HSUS)
SEE ALSO: #39-#40, #59
-----------------------
#42 Isn't it hypocritical to kill and eat plants?
-----------------------
It would be hypocritical IF the same criteria or morally relevant
attributes that are used to justify animal rights also applied to
plants. The criteria cited by the AR movement are "pain and suffering"
and being "subjects-of-a-life". An assessment of how plants measure up
to these criteria leads to the following conclusions.
First, our best science to date shows that plants lack any semblance
of a central nervous system or any other system design for such complex
capacities as that of conscious suffering from felt pain.
Second, plants simply have no evolutionary need to feel pain. Animals
being mobile would benefit from the ability to sense pain; plants would
not. Nature does not gratuitously create such complex capacities as that
of feeling pain unless there is some benefit for the organism's
survival.
The first point is dealt with in more detail in questions #43 and #44.
The general hypocrisy argument is discussed in question #4.
TA
SEE ALSO: #4, #39-#44
-----------------------
#43 But how can you prove that plants don't feel pain?
-----------------------
Lest we forget the ultimate point of what follows, let us not forget the
central thesis of AR. Simply stated: to the extent other animals share
with us certain morally relevant attributes, then to that extent we confer
upon them due regard and concern. The two attributes that are arguably
relevant are: a) our capacity for pain and suffering, and b) the capacity
for being the "subject-of-a-life", i.e., being such that it matters to one
whether one's life fares well or ill.
Both of these qualities require the existence of mental states. Also
note that in order to speak of "mental states" proper, we would denote, as
common usage would dictate, that such states are marked by consciousness.
It is insufficient to mark off mental states by only the apparent presence
of purposefulness or intentionality since, as we shall see below, many
material objects possess purposeful-looking behaviors.
So then, how do we properly attribute the existence of mental states to
other animals, or even to ourselves for that matter? We cannot infer the
presence of felt pain simply by the presence of a class of behaviors that
are functional for an organism's amelioration or avoidance of noxious
stimuli. Thermostats obviously react to thermal changes in the environment
and respond in a functionally appropriate manner to restore an initial
"preferred" state. We would be foolish, however, to attribute to
thermostats a capability to "sense" or "feel" some kind of thermal "pain".
Even placing quotes around our terms doesn't protect us from absurdity.
Clearly, the behavioral criterion of even functional avoidance/defense
reactions is simply not sufficient nor even necessary for the proper
attribution of pain as a felt mental state.
Science, including the biological sciences, are committed to the working
assumption of scientific materialism or physicalism (see "The Metaphysical
Foundations of Modern Science", E. A. Burtt, 1924). We must then start
with the generally accepted scientific assumption that matter is the only
existent or real primordial constituent of the universe.
Let it be said at the outset that scientific materialism as such does
not preclude the existence of emergent or functional qualities like that
of mind, consciousness, and feeling (or even, dare I say it, free will),
but all such qualities are dependent upon the existence of organized
matter. If there is no hardware, there is nothing for the software to run
on. If there is no intact, living brain, there is no mind. It should also
be said that even contemporary versions of dualism or mind-stuff theories
will also make embodiment of mental states dependent on the presence of
sufficiently organized matter.
To briefly state the case, cognitive functions like consciousness and
mind are seen as emergent properties of sufficiently organized matter.
Just as breathing is a function of a complex system of organs referred to
as the respiratory system, so too is consciousness a function of the
immensely complex information-processing capabilities of a central nervous
system. It is possible, in theory, that future computers, given a
sufficiently complex and orderly organization of hardware and clever
software, could exhibit the requisite emergent qualities. While such
computers do not exist, we DO know that certain living organisms on this
planet possess the requisite complexity of specialized and highly
organized structure for the emergence of mental states.
In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain, but if, and
only if, there were a requisite complexity of organized plant tissue that
could serve to instantiate the higher order mental states of consciousness
and felt pain.
There is no morphological evidence that such a complexity of tissue
exists in plants. Plants lack the specialized structures required for
emergence of mental states. This is not to say that they cannot exhibit
complex reactions, but we are simply over-interpreting such reactions if
we designate them as "felt pain".
With respect to all mammals, birds, and reptiles, we know that they
possess a sufficiently complex neural structure to enable felt pain plus
an evolutionary need for such consciously felt states. They possess
complex and specialized sense organs, they possess complex and specialized
structures for processing information and for centrally orchestrating
appropriate behaviors in accordance with mental representations,
integrations, and reorganizations of that information. The proper
attribution of felt pain in these animals is well justified. It is not for
plants, by any stretch of the imagination.
TA
The absurdity (and often disingenuity) of the plant-pain promoters can be
easily exposed by asking them the following two questions:
1) Do you agree that animals like dogs and cats should receive
pain-killing drugs prior to surgery?
2) Do you believe that plants should receive pain-killing drugs
prior to pruning?
DG
SEE ALSO: #42, #44
-----------------------
#44 Aren't there studies that show that plants can scream, etc.?
-----------------------
How can something without vocal apparatus scream? Perhaps the questioner
intends to suggest that plants somehow express feelings or emotions. This
notion is popularized in the book "The Secret Life of Plants", by Tompkins
and Bird, 1972. The book describes "experiments" in which plants are
claimed to respond to injury and even to the thoughts and emotions of
nearby humans. The responses consist of changes in the electrical
conductivity of their leaves. The truth is, however, that nothing but a
dismal failure has resulted from attempts to replicate these experiments.
For some definitive reviews, see Science, 1975, 189:478 and The Skeptical
Inquirer, 1978, 2(2):57.
But what about plant responses to insect invasion? Does this suggest
that plants "feel" pain? No published book or paper in a scientific
journal has been cited as indeed making this claim that "plants feel
pain". There is interesting data suggesting that plants react to local
tissue damage and even emit signaling molecules serving to stimulate
chemical defenses of nearby plants. But how is this relevant to the claim
that plants feel and suffer from pain? Where are the replicated
experiments and peer-reviewed citations for this putative fact? There are
none.
Let us, for the sake of argument, consider the form of logic employed by
the plant-pain promoters:
premise 1: Plants are responsive to "sense" impressions.
premise 2: As defined in the dictionary, anything
responsive to sense impressions is sentient.
conclusion 1: Plants are sentient.
premise 3: Sentient beings are conscious of sense impressions.
conclusion 2: Plants are conscious of sense impressions.
premise 4: To be conscious of a noxious stimuli is unpleasant.
conclusion 3: Noxious stimuli to plants are unpleasant, i.e., painful.
There is a major logical sleight-of-hand here. The meaning of the term
"sentient" changes between premise 2 ("responsive to sense impressions")
and premise 3 ("conscious of sense impressions"). Thus, equivocation on
the usage of "sentient" is used to bootleg the false conclusion 3. There
is also an equivocation on the meaning of "painful" ("unpleasant" versus
the commonly understood meaning).
TA
If we can bring ourselves to momentarily assume (falsely) that plants
feel pain, then we can easily argue that by eliminating animal farming,
we reduce the total pain inflicted on plants, leading to the ironic
conclusion that plant pain supports the AR position. This is discussed
in more detail in question #46.
DG
SEE ALSO: #42-#43, #46
-----------------------
#45 But even if plants don't feel pain, aren't you depriving them of
their life? Why isn't that enough to accord moral status to plants?
-----------------------
The philosophy of Animal Rights is generally regarded as encompassing
only sentient creatures. Plants are just one of many non-sentient, living
creatures. To remain consistent, granting moral status to plants would
lead one to grant it to all life. It may be thought that a philosophy
encompassing all life would be best, but granting moral status to all
living creatures leads to rather implausible views.
For example, concern for life would lead one to oppose the distribution
of spermicides, even to overpopulated Third world countries. The morality
of any sexual intercourse could be questioned as well, since thousands of
sperm cells die in each act. Also, the sheer variety of life forms creates
difficulties; for example, arguments have been made to show that some
computer programs--such as computer viruses--may well be called alive.
Should one grant them moral status?
There are questions even in the case of plants. The use of weed-killers
in a garden would need defending. And if killing plants is wrong, why
isn't merely damaging them in some other way also wrong? Is trimming
hedgerows wrong?
The problems raised above are not attempts to discourage efforts to
develop an ethics of the environment. They simply point out that according
moral status to all living creatures is fraught with difficulties.
Nevertheless, some people do, indeed, argue that the taking of life
should be minimized where possible; this constitutes a kind of moral
status for life. Interestingly, such a view, far from undermining the AR
view, actually supports it. To see why, refer to question #46.
AECW
SEE ALSO: #46, #59
-----------------------
#46 Isn't it better to eat animals, because that way you kill the least
number of living beings.
-----------------------
There are at least two problems with this question. First, there is the
assumption that killing is the factor sought to be minimized, but as
explained in question #18, killing is not the central concern of AR; rather,
it is pain and suffering, neither of which can be attributed to plants.
Second, the questioner overlooks that livestock must be raised on a diet
of plant foods, so consumption of animals is actually a once-removed
consumption of plants. The twist, of course, is that passing plants through
animals is a very inefficient process; losses of up to 80-90 percent are
typical. Thus, it could be argued that, if one's concern is for killing,
per se, then the vegetarian diet is preferable (at least for today's
predominant feedlot paradigm).
DG
SEE ALSO: #18, #28, #45
-----------------------
#47 Nature is a continuum; doesn't that mean you cannot draw a line, and
where you draw yours is no better than where I draw mine?
-----------------------
Most people will accept that the diversity of Nature is such that one is
effectively faced with a continuum. Charles Darwin was right to state that
differences are of degree, not of kind.
One should take issue, however, with the belief that this means that a
line cannot be drawn for the purpose of granting rights. For example,
while there is a continuum in the use of force, from the gentle nudge of
the adoring mother to the hellish treatment visited upon concentration
camp prisoners, clearly, human rights are violated in one case and not the
other. People accept that the ethical buck stops somewhere between the two
extremes.
Similarly, while it is true that the qualities relevant to the
attribution of rights are found to varying extents in members of the
animal kingdom, one is entitled to draw the line somewhere. After all,
society does it as well; today, it draws the line just below humans.
Now, such a line (below humans) cannot be logically defensible, since
some creatures are excluded that possess the relevant qualities to a
greater degree than current rights-holders (for example, a normal adult
chimpanzee has a "higher" mental life than a human in a coma, yet we still
protect only the human from medical experimentation). Therefore, any line
that is drawn must allow some nonhuman animals to qualify as
rights-holders.
Moreover, the difficulty of drawing a line does not by itself justify
drawing one at the wrong place. On the contrary, this difficulty means
that from an ethical point of view, the line should be drawn a) carefully,
and b) conservatively. Because the speciesist line held by AR opponents
violates moral precepts held as critical for the viability of any ethical
system, and because some mature nonhumans possess morally relevant
characteristics comparable to some human rights-bearers, one must come to
the conclusion that the status quo fails on both counts, and that the
arrow of progress points toward a moral outlook that encompasses nonhuman
as well as human creatures.
In addition, it should be noted that when a new line is drawn that is
more in step with ethical truth (something quite easy to do), in no way
should one feel that the wanton destruction of non rights-holders is
thereby encouraged. It is desirable that a moral climate be created that
gives due consideration to the interests and welfare of all creatures,
whether they are rights-holders or not.
AECW
The idea that a continuum makes drawing a line impossible or that one
line is therefore no better than another is easily refuted. For example,
the alcohol concentration in the blood is a continuum, but society draws
a line at 0.10 percent for drunk driving, and clearly that is a better
line than one drawn at, say, 0.00000001 percent.
DG
SEE ALSO: #22, #39-#41
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FARMING
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-----------------------
#48 The animals are killed so fast that they don't feel any pain or
even know they're being killed; what's wrong with that?
-----------------------
This view can only be maintained by those unfamiliar with modern meat
production methods. Great stress occurs during transport in which
millions die miserably each year. And the conveyor-belt approach to the
slaughtering process causes the animals to struggle for their lives as
they experience the agony of the fear of death. Only people who have never
watched the process can believe that they don't feel any pain or aren't
aware that they're being killed.
One point that many people are unaware of is that poultry is exempted from
the requirements of the Humane Slaughter Act. Egg-laying hens are typically
not stunned before slaughter. Also exempt from the act are animals killed
under Kosher conditions (see question #49).
But even if no suffering were involved, the killing of sensitive,
intelligent animals on a vast scale (over six billion each year in the
U.S. alone) cannot be regarded as morally correct, especially since today
it is demonstrably clear that eating animal flesh is not only unnecessary
but even harmful for people. Fellow-mammals are not like corn or carrots.
To treat them as if they were is to perpetuate an impoverished morality
which is based not on rationality but merely tradition.
DVH
Even the climactic killing process itself is not so clean as one is led
to believe. Every method carries strong doubts about its "humaneness".
For example, consider electrocution. We routinely give anesthetics to
people receiving electro-shock therapy due to its painful effects.
Consider the pole-axe. It requires great skill to deliver a perfect,
instantly fatal blow. Few possess the skill, and many animals suffer from
the ineptness with which the process is administered. Consider Kosher
slaughter, where an animal is hoisted and bled to death without prior
stunning. Often joints are ruptured during the hoisting, and the death is
a slow, conscious one. The idea of a clean, painless kill is a fantasy
promulgated by those with a vested interest in the continuance of the
practices.
DG
-----------------------
#49 What is factory farming, and what is wrong with it?
-----------------------
Factory farming is an industrial process that applies the philosophy and
practices of mass production to animal farming. Animals are considered not as
individual sentient beings, but rather as a means to an end--eggs, meat,
leather, etc. The objective is to maximize output and profit. The animals
are manipulated through breeding, feeding, confinement, and chemicals to
lay eggs faster, fatten more quickly, or make leaner meat. Costs are
minimized by recycling carcasses through feed, minimizing unit space, not
providing bedding (which gets soiled and needs cleaning), and other
practices.
Battery-hen egg production is perhaps the most publicized form. Hens are
"maintained" in cages of minimal size, allowing for little or no movement
and no expression of natural behavior patterns. Hens are painfully debeaked
and sometimes declawed to protect others in the cramped cage. There are no
floors to the cages, so that excrement can fall through onto a tray--the hens
therefore are standing on wire. Cages are stacked on top of each other in
long rows, and are kept inside a climate-controlled barn. The hens are then
used as a mechanism for turning feed into eggs. After a short, miserable life
they are processed as boiler chickens or recycled.
Other typical factory farming techniques are used in pig production, where
animals are kept in concrete pens with no straw or earth, unable to move more
than a few inches, to ensure the "best" pork. When sows litter, piglets are
kept so the only contact between the sow and piglets is access to the teats.
The production of veal calves is a similar restraining process. The calves are
kept in narrow crates which prevent them from turning; they can only stand or
lie down. They are kept in the dark with no contact with other animals.
Factory farming distresses people because of the treatment of the animals;
they are kept in unnatural conditions in terms of space, possible behaviors,
and interactions with other animals. Keeping animals in these circumstances
is not only cruel to the animals, but diminishes the humanity of those
involved, from production to consumption.
In addition, the use of chemicals and hormones to maximize yields, reduce
health problems in the animals, and speed production may also be harmful to
human consumers.
JK
SEE ALSO: #12, #14, #32, #48, #50
-----------------------
#50 But cattle can't be factory-farmed, so I can eat them, right?
-----------------------
At this time, cattle farming has not progressed to the extremes inflicted
on some other animals--cows still have to graze. However, the proponents of
factory farming are always considering the possibilities of extending their
techniques, as the old-style small farm becomes a faded memory and farming
becomes a larger and more complex industry, competing for finance from
consumers and lenders. Cattle farming practices such as increasing cattle
densities on feedlots, diet supplementation, and controlled breeding are
already being implemented. Other developments will be introduced.
However, as discussed in question #49, it is not only the method of
farming that is of concern. Transport to the slaughterhouse, often a long
journey in crowded conditions without access to food and water, and the wait
at the slaughterhouse followed by the slaughtering process are themselves
brutal and harmful. And the actual killing process is itself not necessarily
clean or painless (see question #48).
JK
We can challenge the claim that cattle cannot be factory-farmed; it just
isn't true. We can also challenge the claim that if it were true, it would
justify killing and eating cattle.
A broad view of factory farming includes practices that force adaptations
(often through breeding) that increase the "productivity" of animal farming.
Such increases in productivity are invariably achieved at the expense of
increased suffering of the animals concerned. This broader view definitely
includes cattle, both that raised for meat and for dairy production.
Veal production is paradigmatic factory farming. David Cowles-Hamar
describes it as follows: "Veal calves are kept in isolation in 5'x2' crates
in which they are unable even to turn around. They are kept in darkness much
of the time. They are given no bedding (in case they try to eat it) and are
fed only a liquid diet devoid of iron and fiber to keep their flesh anemic
and pale. After 3-5 months they are slaughtered."
Dairy farming also qualifies as factory-farming. Here are some salient
facts:
* Calves are taken away at 1-3 days causing terrible distress to both
the cows and the calves; many calves go for veal production.
* Over 170,000 calves die each year due to poor husbandry and appalling
treatment at markets.
* Cows are milked for 10 months and produce 10 times the milk a calf
would take naturally. Mastitis (udder inflammation) frequently results.
* Cows are fed a high-protein diet to increase yield; often even this is
not enough and the cow is forced to break down body tissues, leading
to acidosis and consequent lameness. About 25 percent of cows are
afflicted.
* At about 5 years of age, the cow is spent and exhausted and is
slaughtered. The normal life span is about 20 years.
Finally, we cannot accept that even if it were not possible to factory-farm
cattle, that therefore it is morally acceptable to kill and eat them. David
Cowles-Hamar puts it this way: "The suggestion that animals should pay for
their freedom with their lives is moral nonsense."
DG
SEE ALSO: #14, #48-#49
-----------------------
#51 But isn't it true that cows won't produce milk (or chickens lay
eggs) if they are not content?
-----------------------
This is simply untrue. Lactation is a physiological response that
follows giving birth. The cow cannot avoid giving milk any more than
she can avoid producing urine. The same is true of chickens and egg-laying;
the egg output is manipulated to a high level by selective breeding,
carefully regulated conditions that simulate a continuous summer season,
and a carefully controlled diet.
To drive this point home further, consider that over the last five
decades, the conditions for egg-laying chickens have become increasingly
unnatural and confining (see question #49), yet the egg output has increased
many times over. Chickens will even continue to lay when severely injured;
they simply cannot help it.
DG
SEE ALSO: #49, #52, #55
-----------------------
#52 Don't hens lay unfertilized eggs that would otherwise be wasted?
-----------------------
Yes, but that is no justification for imposing barbaric and cruel regimes
on them designed to artificially boost their egg production. If the
questioner is wondering if it is OK to use eggs left by free-range chickens
"to go cold", then the answer from the AR side is that free-range egg
production is not so idyllic as one might like to think (see question #55).
Also, such a source of eggs can satisfy only a tiny fraction of the demand.
DG
SEE ALSO: #49, #51, #55
-----------------------
#53 But isn't it true that the animals have never known anything better?
-----------------------
If someone bred a race of humans for slavery, would you accept their
excuse that the slaves have never known anything better? The point is that
there IS something better, and they are being deprived of it.
DG
Not having known anything better does not alleviate the suffering of the
animal. Its fundamental desires remain and it is the frustration of those
desires that is a great part of its suffering. There are so many examples:
the dairy cow who is never allowed to raise her young, the battery hen who
can never walk or stretch her wings, the sow who can never build a nest or
root for food in the forest litter, etc. Eventually we frustrate the animal's
most fundamental desire of all--to live.
David Cowles-Hamar
-----------------------
#54 Don't farmers know better than city-dwelling people about how
to treat animals?
-----------------------
This view is often put forward by farmers (and their family members).
Typically they claim that, by virtue of proximity to their farmed animals,
they possess some special knowledge. When pressed to present this
knowledge, and to show how it can justify their exploitation of animals
or discount the animals' pain and suffering, only the tired arguments
addressed in this FAQ come forth. In short, there is no "special knowledge".
One should also remember that those farmers who exploit animals have a
strong vested interest in the continuance of their practices. Would one
assert that a logger knows best about how the forests should be treated?
Technically, this argument is an instance of the "genetic fallacy". Ideas
should be evaluated on their own terms, not by reference to the originators.
DG
-----------------------
#55 Can't we just eat free-range products?
-----------------------
The term "free-range" is used to indicate a production method in which the
animals are (allegedly) not factory-farmed but, instead, are provided with
conditions that allow them to fully express their natural behavior. Some
people feel that free-range products are thus ethically acceptable. There
are two cases to be considered: first, the case where the free-range animal
itself is slaughtered for use, and second, the case where the free-range
animal provides a product (typically, hens providing eggs, or cows providing
milk).
Common to both cases is a problem with misrepresentation of conditions as
"free-range". Much of what passes for free-range is hardly any better than
standard factory-farming; a visit to a large "free-range egg farm" makes
that obvious (and see MT's comments below).
Nutritionally, free-range products are no better than their factory-farmed
equivalents, which are wholly or partly responsible for a list of diseases as
long as your arm.
For the case of free-range animals slaughtered for use, we must ask why
should a free-range animal be any more deserving of an unnecessary death than
any other animal? Throughout this FAQ, we have argued that animals have a
right to live free from human brutality. Our brutality cannot be excused by
our provision of a short happy life. David Cowles-Hamar puts it this way:
"The suggestion that animals should pay for their freedom with their lives
is moral nonsense." Another thing to think about is the couple described
at the end of question #13. Their babies are free-range, so it's OK to
eat them, right?
For the case of products from free-range animals, we can identify at least
four problems: 1) it remains an inefficient use of food resources, 2) it is
still environmentally damaging, 3) animals are killed off as soon as they
become "unproductive", and 4) the animals must be replaced; the nonproductive
males are killed or go to factory farms (the worst instance of this is the
fate of male calves born to dairy cows; many go for veal production).
BRO
What's wrong with free-range eggs? To get laying hens you must have
fertile eggs and half of the eggs will hatch into male chicks. These are
killed at once (by gassing, crushing, suffocation, decompression, or
drowning), or raised as "table birds" (usually in broiler houses) and
slaughtered as soon as they reach an economic weight. So, for every
free-range hen scratching around the garden or farm (who, if she were able to
bargain, might pay rent with her daily infertile egg), a corresponding male
from her batch is enduring life in a broiler house or has already been
subjected to slaughter or thrown away to die. Every year in Britain alone,
more than 35 million day-old male chicks are killed. They are mainly used for
fertilizer or dumped in landfill sites.
The hens are slaughtered as soon as their production drops (usually after
two years; their natural life span is 5-7 years). Also, be aware that many
sites classified as free-range aren't really free-range; they are just
massive barns with access to the outside. Since the food and light are
inside, the hens rarely venture outside.
MT
SEE ALSO: #13, #49-#50, #52
-----------------------
#56 Anything wrong with honey?
-----------------------
Bees are often killed in the production of honey, in the worst case the
whole hive may be destroyed if the keeper doesn't wish to protect them over
the winter. Not all beekeepers do this, but the general practice is one that
embodies the attitude that living things are mere material and have no
intrinsic value of their own other than what commercial value we can wrench
from them. Artificial insemination involving death of the male is now also
the norm for generation of new queen bees. The favored method of obtaining
bee sperm is by pulling off the insect's head (decapitation sends an
electrical impulse to the nervous system which causes sexual arousal). The
lower half of the headless bee is then squeezed to make it ejaculate. The
resulting liquid is collected in a hypodermic syringe.
MT
SEE ALSO: #22, #39-#41
-----------------------
#57 Don't crop harvest techniques and transportation, etc., lead to the
death of animals?
-----------------------
The questioner's probable follow-up is to assert that since we perform
actions that result in the death of animals for producing crops, a form of
food, we should therefore not condemn actions (i.e., raising and slaughter)
that result in the death of animals for producing meat, another form of
food. How do we confront this argument?
It is clear that incidental (or accidental, unintended) deaths of animals
result from crop agriculture. It is equally clear that intentional deaths of
animals result from animal agriculture. Our acceptance of acts that lead to
incidental deaths does not require the acceptance of acts that lead to
intentional deaths. (A possible measure of intentionality is to ask if the
success of the enterprise is measured by the extent of the result. In our
case, the success of crop agriculture is not measured by the number of
accidental deaths; in animal agriculture, conversely, the success of the
enterprise is directly measured by the number of animals produced for
slaughter and consumption.)
Having shown that the movement from incidental to intentional is not
justified, we can still ask what justifies even incidental deaths. We must
realize that the question does not bear on Animal Rights specifically, but
applies to morality generally. The answer, stripped to its essentials, is
that the rights of innocents can be overridden in certain circumstances.
If rights are genuinely in conflict, a reasonable principle is to violate
the rights of the fewest.
Nevertheless, when such an overriding of the rights of innocents is
done, there is a responsibility to ensure that the harm is minimized.
Certainly, crop agriculture is preferable to animal agriculture in this
regard. In the latter case, we have the added incidental harm due to
the much greater amount of crops needed to produce animals (versus feeding
the crops directly to people), AND the intentional deaths of the produced
animals themselves.
Finally, many argue for organic and more labor-intensive methods of crop
agriculture that reduce incidental deaths. As one wag puts it, we have a
responsibility to survive, but we can also survive responsibly!
DG
SEE ALSO: #58-#59
-----------------------
#58 Modern agriculture requires us to push animals off land to convert
it to crops; isn't this a violation of the animals' rights?
-----------------------
Pushing animals off their habitats to pursue agriculture is a less
serious instance of the actions discussed in question #57, which deals with
animal death as a result of agriculture. Refer to that question for
relevant discussion.
An abiding theme is that vegetarianism versus meat eating, and crop
agriculture versus animal agriculture, tend to minimize the amount of
suffering. For example, more acreage is required to support animal
production than to support crop production (for the same nutritional
capability). Thus, animal production encroaches more on wildlife than does
crop agriculture. We cannot eliminate our adverse effects, but we can
try to minimize them.
DG
SEE ALSO: #57, #59
-----------------------
#59 Don't farmers have to kill pests?
-----------------------
We could simply say that less pests are killed on a vegetarian diet and
that killing is not even necessary for pest management, but because the
issue is interesting, we answer more fully!
This question is similar to question #57 in that the questioner's likely
follow-up is to ask why it is acceptable to kill pests for food but not to
kill animals for food. It differs from question #57 in that the defense
that the killing is incidental is not available because pests are killed
intentionally. We can respond to this argument in two ways. First, we can
argue that the killing is justifiable, and second, we can argue that it
is not necessary and should be avoided. Let's look at these in turn.
Our moral systems typically allow for exceptions to the requirement that
we not harm others. One major exception is for self-defense. If we are
threatened, we have the right to use force to resist the threat. To the
extent that pests are a threat to our food supplies, our habitats, or
our health, we are justified in defending ourselves. We have the
responsibility to use appropriate force, but sometimes this requires
action fatal to the threatening creatures.
Even if the killing of pests is seen as wrong despite the self-defense
argument, we can argue that crop agriculture should be preferred over
animal agriculture because it involves the minimization of the required
killing of pests (for reasons described in question #57).
Possibly overshadowing these moral arguments, however, is the argument that
the use of pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, and herbicides is not only
not necessary but extremely damaging to the planet, and should therefore
be avoided. Let us first look at the issue of necessity, followed by the
issue of environmental damage.
David Cowles-Hamar writes: "For thousands of years, peoples all over the
world have used farming methods based on natural ecosystems where potential
pest populations are self-regulating. These ideas are now being explored
in organic farming and permaculture." Michael W. Fox writes: "Integrated
pest management and better conservation of wilderness areas around crop lands
in order to provide natural predators for crop pests are more ecologically
sensible alternatives to the continuous use of pesticides." The point is
that there are effective alternatives to the agrichemical treadmill.
In addition to the agricultural methods described above, many pest
problems can be prevented, certainly the most effective approach. For
example, some major pest threats are the result of accidental or intentional
human introduction of animals into a habitat. We need to be more careful
in this regard. Another example is the use of rodenticides. More effective
and less harmful to the environment would be an approach that relies on
maintenance of clean conditions, plugging of entry holes, and nonlethal
trapping followed by release into the wild.
The effects of the intensive use of agrichemicals on the environment are
very serious. It results in nation-wide ground water pollution. It results
in the deaths of beneficial non-target species. The development of
resistant strains requires the use of stronger chemicals with resulting
more serious effects on the environment. Agrichemicals are generally more
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